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ABSTRACT 
I examine the primary market for syndicated private credit agreements to U.S. firms within the 
context of contract theory with information asymmetries between contracting parties in a 
repeated game. Specific governance mechanisms determine a firm’s cost of borrowing in 
syndicated credit agreements. Firms with governance mitigating agency risk between 
stakeholders, i.e. independent boards, strong shareholder monitoring, and greater CEO pay-
performance sensitivity, enjoy lower borrowing costs. The interests of creditors and shareholders 
diverge with regard to external governance. Lenders charge higher spreads to firms at greater 
risk of acquisition and reward stronger firms with price concessions when they possess staunch 
anti-takeover provisions. With regard to the networks I find that CFO centrality, the size and 
influence of network connections, affects the structure and cost of firm private debt. Specifically, 
powerfully networked CFOs negotiate more flexible contracts and lower loan spreads. More 
favorable loan terms do not appear to be inappropriate as these borrowers do not subsequently 
underperform relative to their peers. I conclude that CFO centrality decreases information 
asymmetries and agency problems through increased information flows and reputational effects. 
The syndication process itself is a two stage process. The first stage is the underwriting process 
wherein lead arrangers perform due diligence on the borrower and the parties agree to loan 
terms. The second stage is the syndication process wherein lead arrangers invite non-arrangers to 
participate in the primary offering. I find that asymmetric information and agency concerns 
affect not only the terms of the loan but also the structure of the syndicate. Greater information 
asymmetry increases loan spreads and the concentration of the syndicate; non-lead arrangers are 
less willing to participate in the offering when information asymmetries are more severe between 
borrowers and non-lead arrangers and between underwriters and participant lenders. I find that 
when the proposed spread differs from that of a typical offering potential creditors are less 
willing to participate, that is, an atypical spread is itself an indicator of asymmetric information 
between originators and potential participants. These effects are mitigated, but not eliminated, by 
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A syndicated loan is a large loan funded by more than one lender and issued by a corporate 
borrower under the terms of a private credit agreement. While much has been studied and written 
about public capital markets, i.e. stocks and bonds, studies of syndicated loans are only recently 
coming to the fore. While syndicated loans are not securities per se the syndication process 
approaches that of initial public offerings of public securities. A borrower (issuer) contracts with 
an underwriter to raise capital under the terms of an agreement. The underwriter performs due 
diligence and agrees with the borrower on the amount to be raised, the pricing, and the terms of 
the issue. A memorandum is prepared, a prospectus is circulated to accredited investors, 
meetings are held, investors participate in the offering, and a syndicated loan is originated.  
Syndicated loans, or private credit agreements, are the largest source of external firm capital 
and yet the literature on syndicated loans is relatively young and sparse in comparison to the 
literature on public capital markets. Data on loans is only recently available; prior to 1995 
syndications were rare, expensive, and opaque. The past two decades has seen dramatic increase 
in syndications with the advent of standardized documentation, the rise of the “originate to 
distribute” model of financial intermediation, and increased demand for loans from institutional 
investors including collateralized loan obligations, pension funds, primary funds, hedge funds, 
insurance companies, and other non-bank financial companies.    
The studies herein concern the primary market for syndicated loans, that is, loans at 
origination.
1
 Essay one examines whether sophisticated lenders – underwriters and institutional 
participants in loan originations – take borrower governance into consideration when setting loan 
                                                     
1
 The primary market is that of loan origination while the secondary market is the trading of loan 
shares after origination. There is an increasingly liquid secondary market for loan shares.  
2 
 
terms. I find that lenders do consider governance, but not always in ways that one would expect 
given extant literature on corporate governance. Essay two explores the ability of networks to 
facilitate information flows amongst contracting parties even in the absence of direct connections 
between borrower and lender management. Networks studies are new to the finance literature 
and this essay documents that network position facilitates implicit contracting when contracts are 
necessarily incomplete. Finally I describe the syndication process in detail in essay three by 




II: Governance, Takeover Probability, and the Cost of Private Debt 
Abstract:  Using a sample of bank loans issued to U.S. firms from 2000-2009 I find that internal 
and external governance affects the cost of private debt, and that lenders price both agency-
related costs and takeover risks when determining loan spreads. Firms with stronger internal 
governance – e.g., board independence, absence of limits on shareholders, greater CEO pay-
performance sensitivity – enjoy lower debt costs, consistent with the mitigation of agency costs 
for shareholders and debt holders. However, lenders consider acquisitions (a form of external 
governance beneficial for shareholders) of borrowing firms value-reducing, and they charge 
higher debt costs to firms more likely to be taken over. In addition, lenders reward borrowers that 
possess provisions to fight takeovers. I document that lower debt costs due to stronger internal 
governance are primarily attributable to firms that are financially weaker and/or less likely to be 
acquired, while debt cost savings due to anti-takeover provisions are associated with firms that 
are financially stronger and/or expected to be taken over. Our study contributes to the literature 
on the relationship between shareholder and creditor rights, the dynamics of corporate control, 





There is a vast literature documenting that internal firm governance, such as firm ownership 
structure, board size and composition, shareholder rights, compensation practices, and external 
firm governance exemplified by the market for corporate control, mitigate agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders and improves firm performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Denis and McConnell, 2003). There is a growing literature documenting that firm governance is 
also relevant to creditors (Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam, 2009; Chava, Kumar, and Warga, 
2010; Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2011). Depending upon the impact of governance, creditors may 
charge higher spreads and/or demand covenant protection to mitigate losses due to the agency 
conflicts of shareholder-creditor risk shifting, manager-creditor incomplete contracting, or the 
risk of asset substitution in the case of firm acquisition. 
Since efficient internal and external governance has been associated with higher firm market 
value inclusive of equity and debt (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1997), creditors and shareholders 
should benefit when borrower governance mitigates agency conflicts between managers and 
stakeholders. Debt holders may also profit from external governance due to coinsurance effects 
when a poorly performing borrower is acquired by more profitable bidder (Shastri 1990). In 
addition, efficient shareholder monitoring of management leads to lower cost of debt (Billett and 
Liu, 2008). 
However, shareholder and creditor interests can diverge. Chava et al. (2009) and Klock, 
Mansi, and Maxwell (2005) document that firms that employ weaker takeover defenses – and 
thus allow external monitoring by the market for corporate control, generally considered 
valuable for shareholders – face higher borrowing costs. These higher costs can be attributed to 
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debt holders’ concerns about post-takeover asset substitution and financing risks.
2
 Similarly, 
Billet, Mauer, and Jiang (2010) suggest that increases in the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO 
contracts cause shifts in risk from shareholders to bondholders. Consequently, higher CEO pay-
performance sensitivity leads to decreases in bond prices, even though previous finance research 




Ultimately, extant literature suggests that governance matters to bondholders. Like 
shareholders, they must price the benefits as well as the risks posed by different governance 
structures. Pricing of the risks posed by different governance regimes may go in opposite 
directions when creditor and shareholder interests diverge. When in alignment, governance that 
mitigates agency risk between managers and stakeholders is valuable to creditors, lowering the 
cost of borrowing. When shareholder and creditor interests diverge, however, creditors may 
reward firms with governance that mitigates risk to creditors regardless of the impact on 
shareholders.  
The majority of recent studies on the relation between governance and loan characteristics 
has dealt with public bonds, where the endogeneity of the link between governance and loan 
prices is likely a concern (Klock et al., 2005; Cremers et al., 2007; Chava et al., 2010, Billett et 
al., 2010).
4
 In contrast, my study examines the role of governance on the initial pricing of private 
                                                     
2
 Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) further show that event risk covenants reduce bond yields for 
companies at greater risk of being acquired. 
3
 On the other hand, Carlson and Lazrak (2010) show that lower CEO pay performance 
sensitivity is associated with higher credit spreads, arguing that CEOs whose compensation is 
more cash than stock are more likely to engage in risky behavior that increases the likelihood of 
bankruptcy. 
4
 One notable exception is Chava et al. (2009) who study the spreads of private loans as a 
function of takeover defenses utilized by the borrowers.  
6 
 
loans. The study of private credit agreements is an ideal setting in which to empirically examine 
governance and contract theory for several reasons. Private debt is the largest source of external 
finance for firms, larger than public debt and equity issuance combined (Gorton and Winton, 
2003, Gomes and Phillips, 2007). Even more importantly, governance variables studied in my 
paper are persistent and are less likely to change immediately prior to or following the 
negotiation of a private credit agreement. Consequently, governance characteristics are expected 
to be the exogenous determinants of initial loan spreads. Finally, private agreements governing 
syndicate and single-lender loans are concentrated securities for lenders, and thus well represent 
the environments of theoretical contract theory and security design literature. 
Since recent financial literature suggests a strong link between loan characteristics and the 
borrowers’ propensity to be acquired (e.g. Chava et al., 2009; Cremers et al., 2007), I study the 
impact of governance on credit agreements for the full sample of available private loans, as well 
as for subsamples of borrowers with different takeover likelihood. However, in contrast to 
previous studies that measured generalized acquisition propensity by the number of anti-takeover 
provisions employed by the firm, I utilize a different approach. My study calculates the 
likelihood that a particular firm is acquired based on a Probit model developed by Billett and Liu 
(2007). Consequently, I analyze the differential impact of governance mechanisms on the cost of 
borrowing based on an empirical probability the borrower is acquired, a direct measurement, 
rather than the vulnerability to takeover, a generalized assessment.  
To my knowledge, my paper is the first to investigate the relationship between specific, as 
opposed to aggregated, measures of governance, e.g. board characteristics, restrictions of 
shareholder power, antitakeover provisions, ownership, and executive compensation and the cost 
of private debt capital. I investigate the following four issues: First, do banks differentially price 
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the benefits and risks of specific means of governance, especially the internal mechanisms, 
generally understood to mitigate the agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and 
control? Second, do banks seek compensation for the potential costs – such as asset substitution 
risk, renegotiation, due diligence, and liquidity costs – resulting from a higher likelihood that the 
borrower is acquired?
5,6
 Third, do lenders price governance differently for borrowers at higher or 
lower takeover risk? Last, do lenders distinguish between the potentially different impact of 
governance in financially healthy (stronger) vs. distressed (weaker) borrowers? 
Based on a sample of 2,683 aggregated loans (9,671 tranches) to 947 unique borrowers 
between 2000 and 2009, I find the following main results: 
 Lenders assess and price risks in line with agency and contract theory. Firms more 
                                                     
5
 There are at least four reasons why lenders may incur costs when borrowers get acquired. 
Chava et al. (2009) attribute lower costs of debt charged to borrowers with stronger anti-takeover 
covenants to asset substitution risk, resulting in losses to lenders whenever strong borrower is 
acquired by a relatively riskier bidder. Regardless of whether an acquisition weakens the loan, 
lenders are likely to incur renegotiation and/or due diligence costs, especially in the case that the 
acquiring firm does not have a current or recent relationship with the lender(s). Last, lenders may 
face liquidity and/or reputational costs in the event of a borrower acquisition. If a borrower 
whose loan has been sold to primary or secondary market participants is acquired by a bidder not 
to an investor’s liking, it is possible that although there is no explicit recourse the investor may 
request that the bank buy back the investor’s share in the loan. Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) 
provide some evidence that implicit guarantees are present in loan sales. Reputational costs may 
be relevant to lead arrangers if borrower acquisitions decrease the likelihood that syndicate 
members or secondary investors participate in future deals. 
6
 The due diligence costs may be particularly severe when the loan is already sold in the 
secondary market, as suggested by the following press release (Source: US Loan Market Pulse: 
A weekly wrap-up of news. February 2, 2004. Copyright, Loan Pricing Corporation): 
Reliant's $3 billion term loan was trading in the 98.875-99.125 range last Tuesday, up from 
where it was trading in the 98.75 context the day before as rumors of a possible transaction for 
the company swept through the market. The thinking went something like this: Reliant has 
announced it is putting some of its Orion plants up for sale. If the sale goes through, Reliant will 
want to refinance its Orion debt, which matures in October 2005, at the holdco level so as to 
avoid the cash traps. This likely would lead to a total refinancing in the second half of 2004 
because the company would not want the opco debt listed as short-term at year-end 2004. Also, 
sources added, with the senior secured bonds trading around the 107-108 range, a bond issue 
for Reliant seemed a distinct possibility. 
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accountable to stakeholder monitoring and those whose executives have greater pay 
performance sensitivity pay lower borrowing costs. Specifically, I find that borrowing 
costs are increasing in shareholder restrictions and decreasing in board independence and 
equity compensation.   
 Firms at greater risk of takeover pay higher borrowing costs. Additionally, lenders price 
(adjust spreads given) governance that affects the likelihood of borrower acquisition. 
Specifically, spreads are decreasing in insider ownership, CEO-Chairman duality, and 
poison pills and increasing in institutional ownership.  
 Controlling for the higher cost of debt due specifically to takeover probability, lenders 
require higher loan spreads of firms with higher aggregate numbers of antitakeover 
defenses, especially change in control provisions. 
 Borrowers enjoying lower borrowing costs due to governance mitigating agency risk, i.e. 
independent boards, are borrowers not likely to be acquired as measured by takeover 
probability. Firms at greater risk of acquisition are not rewarded for internal governance 
mitigating agency risk between managers and stakeholders.  
 Takeover probability is a significantly positive determinant of borrowing costs regardless 
of the financial health of the firm. However, the pricing of internal and external 
governance does depend upon the financial health of the borrower. Agency pricing 
dominates for weaker borrowers while takeover pricing dominates for stronger 
borrowers. For example, board independence is rewarded in weaker but not stronger 
borrowers in low states of takeover probability. In higher states of takeover probability 
duality and insider ownership is rewarded with lower spreads in stronger borrowers but 
not in weaker borrowers. Similarly, again in states of higher takeover probability, 
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institutional ownership is punished in stronger borrowers but not in weaker borrowers, 
while weaker borrowers with classified boards are punished but stronger borrowers with 
classified boards are rewarded.  
Overall, my results suggest that governance affects loan contracts. Stronger internal 
governance is associated with lower loan spreads charged to borrowers, especially to those at 
less risk of acquisition. However, my finding that greater takeover probability increases the cost 
of debt, regardless of borrower’s financial health, implies that the interests of shareholders and 
creditors diverge with regard to the market for corporate control. Shareholders derive value from 
takeover vulnerability, but lenders consider borrower acquisitions to be value reducing. 
Consequently, private creditors reward borrowers that possess provisions to fight takeovers with 
lower costs of debt. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I formulate hypotheses 
regarding the impact of governance on the cost of debt charged to borrowers. In Section 3, I 
describe my data. The methodology and results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Hypotheses 
Previous research has established that stronger internal governance is linked to higher market 
and equity values due to its mitigating effect on agency costs. Stronger internal governance is 
typically associated with the following characteristics: 
 independent boards, boards without CEO-Chairman duality, and smaller boards 
 absence of limits to the ability of shareholders to monitor (e.g., act by written consent, 
call special meetings, or amend corporate charters) 
 more concentrated equity positions and higher institutional ownership 
10 
 
 greater pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, i.e., greater equity 
compensation relative to cash salaries and bonuses 
If stronger internal governance mitigates agency risk for all stakeholders then lenders should 
prefer to contract with these firms, granting firms with strong internal governance lower spreads. 
Conversely, if stronger governance benefits shareholders more than creditors, i.e. risk shifting 
per Billet et.al. (2010), then firms with strong internal governance should pay higher borrowing 
costs. Therefore, the impact of internal governance on the cost of private debt is an empirical 
matter: 
H1 [H1a]: Stronger internal corporate governance employed by borrowers is associated with a 
lower [higher] cost of debt. 
 
External governance exemplified by the functioning of the market for corporate control may 
also exhibit bidirectional pricing in credit agreements.  Chava et al. (2009) and Klock et al. 
(2005) show that borrowers with weaker anti-takeover defenses are charged higher spreads. The 
authors interpret such findings as evidence that lenders tend to suffer losses, primarily linked to 
asset substitution, when borrowers are acquired. Conversely, creditors to a relatively weaker firm 
may benefit if the firm is acquired by a stronger borrower through a coinsurance effect; their 
claims are now backed by stronger combined entity (Shastri, 1990). Consequently I again have a 
dual hypothesis: 
H2 [H2a]: Borrowers at greater risk of acquisition are associated with higher [lower] 
borrowing costs. The presence of strong anti-takeover defenses results in lowering [increasing] 




Cremers et al. (2007) show that stronger shareholder control, proxied by the presence of large 
institutional block holders, lowers the credit risk and therefore the yield spreads of public bonds 
only when borrowers have strong anti-takeover defenses in place. It may be that bondholders 
fear asset substitution risk in vulnerable borrowers regardless of internal governance effects. 
These findings suggest that firms who benefit from internal governance by way of lower 
borrowing costs should be firms at low risk of acquisition. Thus: 
H3: If stronger internal corporate governance employed by borrowers is associated with lower 
cost of debt, then such benefits should be primarily associated with firms that are less likely to be 
acquired. 
 
If stronger internal governance benefits debt holders then borrowers who are financially 
weaker ex ante should reap the majority of price concessions. Financially stronger borrowers 
should be able to negotiate lower borrowing costs regardless of governance. However, if lenders 
face asset substitution and liquidity risk and renegotiation and due diligence costs when 
borrowers are acquired, then financially healthier firms at greater risk of acquisition should be 
charged the bulk of increased spreads. Weaker borrowers can actually benefit from acquisitions 
due to coinsurance gains, as such targets are likely to be acquired by better-performing bidders. 
Therefore: 
H4: If stronger internal corporate governance employed by borrowers is associated with lower 
borrowing costs then such benefits should be primarily associated with firms that are financially 
weaker ex ante (and at greater risk of distress). 
 
H5: If borrowers at greater risk of acquisition bear higher borrowing costs then these should be 
primarily borne by firms that are financially stronger (at less risk of distress). Further, if 
takeover defenses lower borrowing costs then benefits should proportionally accrue to 
financially stronger borrowers.  
12 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
3.1 Loan information 
I collected information on all bank loans with covenant information from 2000 to 2009, 
excluding financials and utilities, wherein both banks and firms are U.S. incorporated and 
domiciled firms, from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database resulting in a sample of  
2,683 aggregated loans (9,761 tranches) and 947 unique borrowers. I exclude all loans of less 
than 13 months tenor. Shorter loans mean more frequent and thorough due diligence processes 
by banks of borrowers, potentially substituting for higher spreads and protective covenants.  
Loan data are comprehensive, including information on loan size and stated purpose, the cost 
of the loan, the circumstances under which material provisions of the deal change, whether or not 
the loan had been amended, loan ratings, and detailed covenant information. The mean (median) 
spread of all tranches of all loans, including any annual fees paid by the borrower to the 
lender(s), is 157 (125) basis points above LIBOR on an aggregated basis. The mean (median) 
size of sample loans is $656 ($350) million, which represents the mean (median) proportion of 
assets equal to 38 (18) percent. The median loan term is 60 months and the mean syndicate size 
is nine lenders.  
3.2 Structural intensity 
Each of the 9,761 tranches in the sample has covenant information. The median number of 
covenants, both financial and general, in the sample is 2. I follow Bradley and Roberts (2004) to 
create an index of structural intensity that assigns one point for the presence of each of the 
following in the loan agreement for a maximum value of six: dividend restrictions, more than 
two financial ratio covenants, asset, debt, and equity sweeps, and collateral requirements. Mean 
13 
 
(median) structural intensity is two (one), though there is significant dispersion in intensity; 
13.67% of loans have no covenant restrictions and 14.19% have five or more. 
3.3 Governance data 
Governance data is collected primarily from RiskMetrics and the Corporate Library, and 
compensation data is from CompuStat’s Execucomp database. Table II lists summary statistics 
on firm governance, financials, and information asymmetry measures. Besides reporting the 
comprehensive summary governance indices, in tests to follow I group governance into three 
areas: monitoring, takeover defenses, and compensation. As RiskMetrics and some Corporate 
Library data is only reported every other year, and because governance data is typically 
persistent, I assume that governance data is the same in year t as in t-1 (that is, until reported 
otherwise) to fill in missing observations; results are robust to alternative methods of 
interpolation.  
3.3.1 Governance indices 
The Governance Index (GIM Index) is an index giving equal weight to 24 governance 
provisions that the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) monitors.  The index is 
maintained by the developers of the index, Gomers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Similarly, 
Bebchuck and Cohen’s (2009) Entrenchment Index is a empirically concentrated governance 
index such that it includes only those six provisions found by the authors to be most significantly 
related to firm valuation: staggered (classified) boards, poison pills, shareholder restrictions to 
amendments to bylaws, charters, and merger agreements, and golden parachute provisions. In 
both cases, the index gets one point for each restriction; ‘good’ – more democratic and 
shareholder friendly - governance therefore has lower index scores. Higher index scores are more 
despotic in terms of corporate governance and are reflective of more entrenched management. 
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Both studies, and numerous extensions of the GIM study, show a negative relationship between 
firm valuation and performance and the GIM/Entrenchment indices. 
3.3.2 Monitoring characteristics 
I group variables that affect stakeholders’ ability to monitor executives together as 
monitoring governance variables. Duality is an indicator variable with a value of one if the CEO 
is also chairman of the board of directors. 88% of the CEOs in the sample also chair the board. % 
Board, Independent is the percentage of the board not identified as insiders or “linked” to 
management, i.e. wherein an “independent” board member has a significant relationship with the 
CEO. Mean board independence in my sample is 83%. Ownership data are collected from 
Execucomp. Insiders Percentage is the percentage of outstanding firm shares owned by insiders. 
From an entrenchment perspective, a higher percentage of shares owned by insiders is indicative 
of more entrenched management, lowering the power of other stakeholders to monitor 
effectively; the mean (median) percentage of shares held by insiders is 15.8% (6.8%). The 
percentage of outstanding firm shares owned by institutions, Institutional Percentage, is meant to 
capture the monitoring effect of sophisticated shareholders. Higher institutional ownership has 
been shown to decrease debt yields, purportedly due to the monitoring power and effectiveness 
of institutional owners (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003).  Institutional ownership for borrower 
shares is 62% at the mean and 71% at the median. Board size has also been shown to impact 
monitoring effectiveness, with smaller boards argued to be more effective (Yermack, 1996). 
Mean and median board size of sample firms is nine members; board size is Directors 
henceforth. Finally, to control for the possibility that more complex firms require larger boards 
(Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008) I calculate Tobin’s Q, a proxy for firm complexity, and 
multiply it by the size of the board. The Complex variable is therefore an interaction term meant 
15 
 
to control for non-linearity in the relationship between firm complexity and board size. 
3.3.3 Takeover defenses 
I group variables that make firm acquisition more difficult for prospective bidders into 
takeover defenses. The first, Classified Board, is an indicator variable equal to one if the board 
has staggered elections. 59% of sample borrowers have classified (staggered) boards. I 
investigate three common restrictions to the shareholders’ ability to act, namely limits on 
shareholders’ ability to call special meetings, act by written consent, and amend the firm’s 
charter and/or bylaws. 47% of sample firms restrict shareholders’ ability to call special meetings 
and 39% do not allow shareholders to act by written consent. 43% and 30% of firms limit 
shareholders’ ability to amend the firm bylaws and charter, respectively. I find that shareholder 
restrictions are highly collinear, and therefore only include limits to shareholders’ ability to 
amend the corporate bylaws or charter, Amend Charter, in subsequent analysis. Inclusion of 
other shareholder limits in regressions does not alter other results, though charter restrictions 
appear to be more significant to lenders. A formidable takeover defense is Change in Control 
Provisions, wherein CEO pension payouts are accelerated and/or important firm assets are 
shifted to a new entity in the case of a hostile takeover attempt. 75% of sample firms have 
change-in-control provisions in place. Similarly, Golden Parachutes are provisions accelerating 
the vesting of CEO compensation or pension payouts; 47% of sample firms have golden 
parachute provisions. Poison Pill is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm vastly dilutes 
shares around a hostile bidder in a takeover attempt, making the acquisition of target shares 
prohibitively expensive for a would-be acquirer. 51% of sample firms have poison pills in place.  
3.3.4 CEO compensation attributes 
Agency and contract theory postulate that CEOs with different compensation and wealth 
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profiles may have very different incentives, which may be taken into consideration by creditors 
when designing their own contracts with borrowers. I thus calculate and group compensation 
metrics into a third group of variables of interest. Compensation variables capture current and 
cumulative cash and equity compensation. All compensation variables are scaled by total current 
compensation to arrive at a percentage representation of compensation variables. Salary is the 
percentage of executive total compensation comprised of cash salary, which is 29% at the mean. 
Likewise, Bonus is the percentage of compensation that is paid in cash for meeting or exceeding 
accounting or sales based firm goals in the current year. Bonus compensation is 13% at the 
mean. The cumulative value of the CEO’s restricted stock and in-the-money options portfolios 
are as reported by Execucomp; restricted stock usually vests over a five year period while 
options vest over a 10 year period. I find a large dispersion of equity compensation among 
sample CEOs. At the mean, the cumulative value of in-the-money options is 5.5 times current 
annual compensation, and the value of restricted stock is almost 15 times total annual 
compensation. The large standard deviations of these variables indicate that some CEOs do not 
earn equity awards and/or are new to their posts, and that some CEOs have very large, 
undiversified positions in their firms compared to their annual compensation. Thus, I take the 
natural log of cumulative compensation (wealth) variables to create ln Restricted Stock and ln 
ITM Options to measure the effects of restricted stock and in the money options portfolios, 
respectively, on borrowing costs.  
3.4 Control variables 
I control for variables shown in the literature to be significant determinants of debt structure 
and cost. These include the natural log of firm assets, cash and equivalents to assets ratio, firm 
leverage as the total debt to assets ratio, and firm profitability as the return on assets. I control for 
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industry effects using 2-digit SIC codes. And because the time period encompasses both a 
recession at the beginning and a financial crisis at the end of the decade I control for lending 
conditions with the percentage of banks reporting tightening commercial lending standards, as 
reported by the St. Louis Federal Reserve.  
I control for loan characteristics that also impact borrowing costs. I control for information 
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders with Previous Loan,  a dummy variable equal to one 
if the firm borrowed previously from any current syndicate participant. Most loans are syndicate 
loans wherein the loan deal is shared among several lenders who jointly bear the risk of default. I 
assumed the firm had a significant previous relationship with a bank if at any time during the 
sample period, and in the ten years prior to my sample time period, a bank was a leading or a co-
leading lender to the firm. The average number of loans per firm in the sample is three, and most 
loans are comprised of several tranches. Tranches may have different leading banks, different 
stated uses of the capital, different tenors, etc. I assume that any remaining tranche or loan, after 
having dropped all loans less than 13 months in tenor, would provide ample motivation for a 
rigorous due-diligence process by the lender(s).
7
 When a firm borrows from a bank that was 
listed as a lead or co-lead in the syndicate in a previous loan, I Previous Loan equal to one. If a 
loan is deemed a revolving loan I assign Revolver equal to one presuming that revolving loans, 
even those of several years in maturity, have greater monitoring than non-revolving loans. 86% 
of sample loans are deemed revolving. Loans that have a Pricing Grid allow for lenders to adjust 
the terms of loan, usually increasing spreads charged, if lender financials deteriorate over the 
term of the loan. 86% of loan arrangements include a pricing grid. Tenor is the stated maturity of 
                                                     
7
 One should note, however, that even loans with a tenor greater than 13 months are often 
considered ‘revolving’ by lenders. Revolving loans may have different due diligence processes 
than non-revolving loans and as such may have different costs and covenant structures, hence the 
need for an additional control variable, Revolver.  
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the loan at origination, in months. Number of Lenders is the syndicate size, inclusive of primary 
investors who are not lead arrangers, and Deal Size is the ratio of loan proceeds to borrower total 
assets. At the median, loans are five year loans with nine lenders representing 18% of borrower 
assets. I also control for the stated purpose of loan proceeds. The majority of loans are for 
amorphous corporate purposes, and thus it is my base case. I control for other common stated 
purposes of loan proceeds with Acquisition, Debt Repayment, and Working Capital purpose 
dummies. 
Finally, in order to equally weight the study, I aggregate all tranches of a deal on a specific 
date with a firm as one ‘deal’ so as to not have several observations of firm/governance and loan 
data bias findings against a single firm/governance loan observation. The final sample includes 
2,863 aggregated deals initiated by 947 unique borrowers, for which there is governance data, 
from 2000-2009. 
4 Methodology and Results 
 
Cost of capital regressions are multivariate generalized least squares panel regressions with 
errors clustered by firm. The dependent variable is the all-in spread in basis points over LIBOR. 
The first series of tests considers whether monitoring, takeover defenses, and compensation 
mechanisms are significant determinants of the cost of private debt. My basic model 
specification is: 
                
       
       
      
      
                (1)
 
where SPREAD is the all-in spread in basis points over LIBOR for a loan package between firm i 
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and bank j, G is a vector of firm governance
8
 variables, L is a vector of loan control variables, F 
is a vector of firm control variables, C is a vector of variables capturing the covenant structure of 
the deal between firm i and bank j, and O is a vector of other control variables including 
macroeconomic , industry, and time controls. 
Subsequently I attempt to disentangle bidirectional pricing of governance in the 
presence/absence of a relatively higher likelihood of being acquired. I calculate the ex-ante 
probability that a borrower becomes a takeover target. I then compare the pricing of governance 
in and out of states of high takeover probability to identify any differences in the way lenders 
welcome or punish governance mitigating these risks. If creditor and shareholder interests are in 
alignment I expect pricing in line with agency theory. On the other hand, if creditor and 
shareholder interests diverge with regard to the market for corporate control I expect the same 
governance mechanism to be priced differently dependent upon takeover probability. My model 
specification is therefore  
( 1)[ ] [ ]ijt it i t it it it it ijt it iSPREAD TOprob G T L F C O                                (2)
 
where TOprob is the quarterly rolling annual probability, in percent, that firm i is a takeover 
target, T is a vector of governance variables interacted with an indicator variable equal to one if 
the firm is a high risk of takeover (see discussion below), and the rest of the variables are 
identical to those in equation (1).  
4.1 Comprehensive governance indices and the cost of debt 
Before I analyze the relation between loan spreads and individual characteristics of 
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governance, I examine the power of aggregated governance metrics (GIM and Entrenchment) to 
explain loan spreads. This analysis will allow us to compare and contrast my results with the 
findings of previous studies that found a negative link between governance index values and loan 
spreads for the samples of public bonds (e.g. Klock et al., 2005; Cremers et al., 2007). Since 
higher governance index values are associated with firms with greater managerial entrenchment, 
insulating them from external governance discipline, the studies above suggest that public bond 
lenders value takeover defenses in borrowers.  
Table III reports results of the analysis of the impact of governance indices. Model (1) 
only considers variables shown in previous studies to be determinants of spreads. Models (2) and 
(3) include the Entrenchment and GIM Index values, respectively.  
I find that loans with longer maturities and more syndicate participants have statistically 
lower spreads, though the economic significance is slight. This may simply be a reflection that 
primary participants in lending syndicates prefer longer, less risky, loans in their portfolios. 
Revolving loans, even those longer than 13 months in duration, charge statistically and 
economically significant lower spreads, possibly due to the increased frequency of thorough due-
diligence processes by banks when choosing whether to renew revolving loans. Similarly, loans 
with a performance grid, such that the spread charged varies with the performance of the firm 
over the duration of the loan, are priced lower than fixed loans at the outset of the loan. This is 
consistent with adjustable pricing lowering the likelihood that the bank will not be compensated 
for future increases in risk (Asquith et al., 2005). Firms facing higher spreads are more likely to 
face more restrictions as measured by structural intensity, as spreads and deal structure are 
jointly determined (Strahan 1999). Interestingly, firms with previous loans with their lenders do 
not enjoy a price break due to decreased information asymmetry, though the effect is only 
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marginally significant. In subsequent regressions there is a negative but insignificant relationship 
between repeat borrowers and lenders, which is more intuitive. In terms of firm characteristics, I 
find that larger firms and more profitable firms pay lower spreads. Unsurprisingly, firms with 
greater leverage pay higher spreads, as do firms with greater cash reserves, the latter finding 
consistent with theories of the agency cost of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). The mean spread for 
the sample, as measured by the intercept, is approximately 260 basis points over LIBOR. The 
base spread (intercept) is stable as the model expands to include governance variables.  
Most importantly, I find that neither the Entrenchment Index nor the GIM Index are 
statistically significant determinants of loan spreads. In addition, entrenched management, as 
measured by the Entrenchment Index, show a positive relationship between entrenchment and 
spreads. This suggests that lenders may in fact reward borrowers willing to be disciplined by the 
market for corporate control, consistent with the agency theory. The insignificance of the link 
between governance indices and loan spreads is inconsistent with findings of Klock et al. (2005) 
and Cremers et al. (2007). It should be noted that while the previous studies dealt primarily with 
public bonds, my sample contains exclusively private debt contracts. It is therefore possible that 
firms in my sample are less able to issue public debt, increasing the likelihood that creditors 
benefit from coinsurance in the event of borrower acquisition. If so, the negative consequences 
of acquisitions for target debtholders (asset substitution risk, renegotiation, due diligence, and 
liquidity/reputation costs) may play a smaller role in my sample of private loans. As importantly, 
the absence of a significant relation between governance indices and the cost of debt still leaves 
the possibility that there are specific governance characteristics – especially those unrelated to 




4.2 Internal governance characteristics and the cost of debt 
Although aggregate measures of governance and entrenchment are not significant 
determinants of the cost of private debt, I next investigate whether and to what extent specific 
measures of internal governance contribute to the cost of private debt capital. I run two 
regressions, exclusive and inclusive of executive compensation as the inclusion of these 
variables results in fewer observations due to data availability. 
Table IV reports results of the regression analysis of the expanded cost of private debt 
model to include monitoring, takeover defenses, and executive compensation. Model (1) 
excludes and model (2) includes compensation data. Most loan and firm control variables have 
similar coefficient signs, size, and significance as those in Table III, though I note that the 
inclusion of more precise monitoring variables lessens the importance of Revolving and Cash to 
assets variables; these are now insignificant.  
Interestingly, I find that monitoring variables illustrate support for both H1, that 
improved monitoring lowers spreads, and H1a, that improved monitoring raises spreads. 
Specifically, firms whose boards are comprised of a greater percentage of independent directors 
enjoy lower spreads, a finding that is both statistically and economically significant. At the 
means, a board that is 71% comprised of independent members (a one standard deviation 
decrease in independence) faces increased borrowing costs of 52 basis points. Independent 
members are those not identified as insiders or ‘significantly’ (e.g., firm’s attorney) tied to 
management. This finding is in agreement with agency theory in that independent boards are 
thought to be more objective or better monitors of firm management than insiders (Bhojraj and 
Sengupta 2003), decreasing agency risk and the monitoring costs of other stakeholders. Board 
independence reduces the monitoring costs of private lenders and decreases the risk of manager-
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creditor agency costs. However, firms wherein insiders own a larger percentage of outstanding 
firm shares are also rewarded with lower spreads, a finding contrary to that implied by agency 
theory but supportive of H1a. It may be that the interests of concentrated position holders, 
whether insiders (firm equity) or lenders (syndicate participations) are well aligned.  
The final set of internal governance variables investigates the effects of CEO 
compensation and wealth on borrowing costs. Past cumulative awards in the form of in the 
money options is significantly negative. Options wealth increases pay-performance sensitivity, 
which in turn can lower agency costs (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Thus, the negative link again 
supports Hypothesis H1. 
I do not have specific expectations for the impact of defensive tactics on cost of debt 
(outside of the environment characterized by the threat of takeover, which is covered by 
Hypothesis 2), since those provisions can be considered barriers to external governance, rather 
than direct internal or external governance mechanisms. The results in Table III, in fact, show 
that the aggregate numbers of anti-takeover provisions (proxied by the GIM and Entrenchment 
indices) are unrelated to the cost of debt. Table IV, however, documents that the presence of 
specific defensive tactics affects private loan spreads. Mostly, my results support Klock et al. 
(2005) and Cremers et al. (2007), as the existence of a classified board structure is negative and 
significant in Model (1) and negative, but insignificant, in Model (2).
9
 On the other hand, firms 
whose managers are insulated from the market for corporate control by change in control 
provisions face higher spreads, consistent more with agency theory. 
                                                     
9
 Since staggered boards can also be considered a form of an anti-takeover provision, the 
negative link between the presence of staggered boards and cost of debt can also be considered 
supportive of Klock et al. (2005) and Cremers et al. (2007).  
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The above findings support arguments that lenders price both agency and takeover risk. I 
now turn to tests that include the probability that the firm will be acquired over the term of the 
loan in order to determine (a) whether lenders price takeover risks more for the firms actually 
threatened by acquisitions and (b) whether lenders price governance differently for borrowers 
with high vs. low likelihood of being acquired.  
4.3 Predicting ex-ante takeover probability 
In order to disentangle the pricing effects of agency versus takeover risk I need to 
estimate takeover probability. I follow Billett and Xue (2007) in modeling latent takeover 
probability (Takeover
*
) as a linear relation: 
1 1* it iTOprob z u   , 
2
1~ (0, ),iu N                (3) 
where z are quarterly rolling annual firm characteristics and a constant term. Of course, 
Takeover
*
 is unobservable in practice. I collect all takeovers from 1999-2009 from the SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions database of all non-financial public firms to create an indicator 
variable Acquired equal to one if a firm announces an acquisition, such that 
                                         








                                          
(4) I model the latent probability that a firm becomes an acquisition target using a probit model:  
                               ( 1)
( 1) ( )it it i t iTOprob prob Acquired z                                   (5)
 
where Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution and zit-1 is a 





 TOprob is the resulting predicted values from the model and is therefore a 
quarterly rolling annual probability that a firm becomes a takeover target. Thus, a lender 
negotiating terms of a loan this quarter would, in theory, assess the probability of borrower 
acquisition based on information from the previous four quarters. TOprob is used in regressions 
in Equation (2) to identify the pricing of agency and takeover risks, if any. During my sample 
period, 12.24% of borrower firms are takeover targets. Firms are acquired after the loan is 
issued, as acquired firms disappear from the database ex-post. Not surprisingly, a significant 
determinant of takeover probability is concurrent industry acquisition activity. Simply counting 
the number of quarterly acquisitions in each 4-digit SIC code I construct industry takeovers, an 
independent variable capturing concurrent industry activity. Other independent variables include 
firm sales growth, the market to book ratio, the natural log of market capitalization, net property 
plant and equipment, and non-operating income. Return on assets and total debt to assets ratios 
are computed, then adjusted by the industry median in the same 2-digit SIC code, resulting in the 
iROA and iLeverage ratios, respectively. I winsorize all variables at the 1% level, setting 
variables outside of this range to the 1% (99%) levels so as to retain the observations without 
allowing outliers to skew estimates. Further, I calculate Huber-White quasi-maximum likelihood 
standard errors robust to firm heterogeneity.  
Table V reports results of my estimation. Industry takeover activity is the greatest predictor 
that a firm will become a target, while firms with larger market capitalizations are significantly 
less likely to become targets, in agreement with previous research. The mean takeover 
probability for all firms in all quarters is 0.41%, while the range of probability is 0.00% to a high 
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of 2.57% that a firm will become a target in that quarter. Rolling annual takeover probability 
ranges from 0.31% to 7.72% during this time period. I conduct a link test for single equation 
models to determine if the model is well-specified. If so, the square of the predicted takeover 
probability should not be a significant determinant of takeovers. As Toprob(hat)^2 is not 
significant, I conclude that the model is well-specified. Finally, though I took care to construct 
variables for the probit estimation that are different from those in subsequent regressions, a 
common concern is that firm variables that have some power to predict takeover activity may 
also be variables that are determinants of loan spreads. I calculate Pearson pairwise correlations 
of ex-ante takeover probability as predicted by the probit model with firm controls used in the 
second stage regressions, concluding that the correlations are not high enough to significantly 
bias results. 
4.4 Takeover probability, governance, and the cost of debt 
In order to isolate the effect that ex-ante takeover probability has on the cost of private debt I 
first rerun model (1) of Table IV to establish a “base case” scenario inclusive of takeover 
probability; the only addition is my calculation of predicted takeover likelihood. The base 
scenario is presented as Model (1) in Table VI. In models (2) and (3) I attempt to disentangle 
potential bidirectional pricing of internal and external governance in states of higher or lower 
takeover probability. I interact each governance variable with an indicator variable hiTOP which 
is equal to one if the firm is at greater than median risk of becoming a takeover target. Thus, 
controlling for takeover probability itself, each governance variable becomes two: the original 
variable, which is meant to capture the pricing of agency risk, and the interaction variable, meant 




The results are presented in Table VI. In all three model specifications takeover probability is 
a positive and economically meaningful determinant of the cost of private debt, significant at 
better than the 1% level. At the means, a one standard deviation increase in takeover probability 
increases loan spreads by 77-84 basis points. This result strongly supports Hypothesis H2. 
Interestingly, the addition of takeover probability as a regressor decreases the size of the 
intercept term going forward, suggesting that a portion of the base spread is in fact lender 
compensation for the potential of borrower acquisitions and the costs therein, namely asset 
substitution, renegotiation, due diligence and liquidity costs. 
     Models (2) and (3) are exclusive and inclusive of compensation variables, respectively. 
The coefficients on governance variables measure the effect of said mechanisms on firm 
borrowing costs for firms at lower risk of becoming a takeover target. The interaction variable 
(*hiTOP variables) measure the additive effect of governance when a firm is at greater than 
median risk of acquisition. Overall, my results strongly support Hypothesis H3. Lenders assess 
firm governance differently depending upon takeover probability. For example, board 
independence is highly valued by creditors when firms are at low risk of acquisition. A one 
standard deviation increase in board independence lowers borrowing costs by 67 basis points at 
the mean. As before, however, change in control provisions are punished, even in states of low 
takeover probability; lenders charge higher spreads to firms with change in control provisions in 
place. Both results are supportive of agency theory. In states of higher takeover probability, 
however, I find bidirectional pricing of both board independence and change in control 
provisions; the sign of the coefficient changes from negative to positive for the former and 
positive to negative for the latter. Given the significance of board independence coefficients in 
differential states of takeover probability it appears that lenders view board independence as 
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additive in value.  
In states of higher takeover probability I find that lenders price governance that affects the 
likelihood of borrower acquisition. Firms with greater institutional ownership are more likely to 
become targets (Smith, 1996) as are firms with larger boards (Yermack 1996). At the means, a 
one standard deviation increase in institutional ownership and board size face higher borrowing 
costs of 25 and 10 basis points, respectively, though firm complexity mitigates the latter finding 
somewhat (4 basis points). The presence of poison pills is significantly welcomed by lenders in 
higher states of takeover probability, a finding that is highly negatively significant and 
economically meaningful, reducing borrowing costs by 47 to 64 basis points at the mean. It is 
interesting to note the difference in pricing of two staunch takeover defenses, poison pills and 
change in control provisions. Lenders charge higher spreads to firms with either in states of low 
takeover likelihood, in line with agency theory, and lower spreads to firms with either 
mechanism in states of higher likelihood of acquisition. However, lenders price change in control 
provisions as value destroying (positive and significant in low takeover states) while poison pills, 
on balance, appear to be value enhancing (negative and significant in high takeover states). I do 
not find compensation to be a significant determinant of the cost of debt in these specifications.  
4.5 Risk of financial distress, internal governance characteristics, and the cost of 
debt 
If firms more likely to be acquired are associated with higher private loan spreads then these 
extra costs should be borne primarily by financially stronger borrowers, especially if increased 
costs are due to increased risk of asset substitution. Creditors face a greater probability of losses 
when strong borrowers are acquired as there is a lower probability that strong borrowers are 
acquired by even stronger bidders. Consequently, takeover defenses should be valued in strong 
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borrowers but not rewarded in weak borrowers; in the latter case target debt holders can actually 
benefit from acquisitions due to coinsurance gains. Therefore, lenders should be more interested 
in, and reward with lower spreads, internal governance mitigating agency risk in relatively 
weaker firms and external governance lowering takeover vulnerability in financially healthier 
firms. Financially stronger firms should be able more likely to borrow at lower loan spreads 
regardless of their governance attributes. 
To investigate whether banks price risks differently based upon the financial health of the 
borrower in and out of states of heighted acquisition probability, I first calculate a common 
measure of risk of financial distress, Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 2000).
11
 Higher “Z” firms are 
financially stronger and are at lower risk of default. I calculate Altman’s Z within four digit SIC 
codes for all firms in the S&P 1500 and divide firms into less or greater than the industry 
median. Thus, I have 202 borrowers at greater than median industry-adjusted Z at loan 
origination and 156 at less than median industry-adjusted Z.  I then rerun the regressions of the 
governance-related determinants of the cost of debt for the two subsamples. I thus have four 
models, (1) and (2) are for financially stronger firms exclusive (1) and inclusive (2) of 
compensation variables, while models (3) and (4) are of low Z firms.
12
 
Table VII reports results. Importantly, I find that lenders charge significantly larger spreads 
to firms at greater risk of takeover, regardless of borrower financial strength, as Takeover 
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 Altman’s Z is calculated according to the following formula, wherein component variables are 
found to be significant determinants of default at the following levels: Z = 0.012X1 + 0.014X2 + 
0.033X3 + 0.006X4 + 0.999X5. X1 is the ratio of working capital to total assets, X2 is the ratio of 
retained earnings to total assets, X3 is the ratio of EBIT to total assets, X4 is the ratio of market 
value of equity to the book value of total liabilities, and X5 is sales (turnover, net) to total assets. 
All data is from Compustat.  
12
 It should be noted that the statistical significance of coefficients in Table VII is expected to be 
lower due to diminished number of observations after splitting the borrowers into subsamples. 
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Probability in itself is significantly positive in three out of four models. This finding suggests 
that asset substitution risk is likely not the only cost leading to loan spread increase for potential 
takeover targets. After all, lenders must undergo another due diligence process if a borrower is 
acquired, regardless of whether the loan portfolio is theoretically strengthened or weakened by 
the new borrower and these costs may be non-trivial. Poison pills are rewarded in three out of 
four model specifications, suggesting that pills mitigate the risk of takeover costs and supporting 
the notion that costs are non-trivial regardless of borrower financial strength.  
For low Z firms I find evidence to support H4; governance mitigating agency risk is 
rewarded in weaker borrowers but not in stronger borrowers. Independent boards significantly 
lower spreads for weaker borrowers but not for stronger borrowers. In states of higher takeover 
probability, weaker firms are punished with higher spreads if the firm has a classified board 
structure, suggesting lenders welcome the disciplining effects of the market for corporate control 
in weaker borrowers but not in stronger borrowers.  
I find strong support for H5 that lenders reward governance mitigating takeover risk in 
financially stronger borrowers. Specifically, in states of high takeover probability CEO chairman 
duality and increased insider ownership significantly reduce the cost of borrowing; effects are 
economically meaningful. As before, institutional ownership and large boards are punished with 
higher spreads as these increase the likelihood that a borrower is acquired. These four effects are 
not present in weaker borrowers.  
4.6 Robustness tests 
In an unreported analysis, I also run regressions using different model specifications with 
regard to control variables. Other firm control variables used in robustness tests include a 12-
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quarter rolling cash flow volatility measure, Tobin’s Q, and other sales, cash flow, and 
expenditures variables. I also rerun the regressions clustering errors by both firm and quarter 
(Petersen, 2009), and results are unaffected. With regard to compensation metrics I further 
control for both the level and the natural log of the executive’s age. There is a negative and 
marginally statistically significant relationship between age and loan spreads, though the 
economic significance is slight. More importantly, the results reported above are unchanged. 
Finally, I run regressions using different proxies for information asymmetry and covenant 




Lenders assess the benefits and risks posed by borrower firm governance when determining 
loan spreads, and they price internal and external governance mitigating both agency conflicts 
and the risk of borrower acquisition. Firms more accountable to monitoring by stakeholders and 
the market for corporate control, and those whose executives’ compensation incentivize building 
shareholder wealth, have a lower cost of private debt.  
With regard to borrower acquisitions, I find that lenders charge a premium to firms at greater 
risk of takeover. Firms appear to pay lower spreads if they can utilize poison pills, have 
classified boards, higher insider ownership, and CEO chairman duality discouraging or defeating 
takeover attempts, especially if the firm is at greater risk of becoming a target. On the other hand, 
borrowers with lower acquisition likelihood are more likely to benefit from lower borrowing 
costs due to governance provisions reducing agency costs. 
Finally, I find that high takeover likelihood increases private loan spreads regardless of 
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the financial health of the borrower, suggesting that factors other than asset substitution risk – 
e.g., due diligence costs – affect loan pricing of likely takeover targets. I also show that the 
benefits from strong internal governance accrue primarily associated to financially weaker 
borrowers, while lenders reward takeover defenses primarily for stronger borrowers.  
Overall, my finding suggest that governance – both internal and external – matters for 
debtholders. Lenders benefit from strong governance mitigating agency costs, especially in 
financially weaker borrowers at lower risk of becoming targets. I also find, however, that the 
interests of shareholders and creditors diverge with regard to the market for corporate control. 
Lenders appear to view acquisitions of their borrowers as mostly value reducing – especially if 
the borrowers are financially strong. Consequently, lenders reward antitakeover provisions, 
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Table I: Loan summary statistics 
Summary statistics of loans issued to U.S. non-financial firms 2000-2009. Spread is in basis 




N Mean 10th Median 90th St. Dev.
Borrowers 947
Aggregated Facilities 2,683
Spread, bps over LIBOR 2,683 156.93 40.00 125.00 300.00 119.47
Structural Intensity 2,683 2.00 0.00 1.00 5.00 1.63
Previous Loan 2,683 0.51 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50
Tenor (months) 2,683 51.37 36.00 60.00 62.00 14.68
Number of Lenders 2,683 11.26 3.00 9.00 22.00 8.82
Deal Size to Assets 2,683 0.38 0.06 0.18 0.43 8.65
Pricing Grid 2,683 0.86 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.35
Revolving Loan (> 13 months) 2,683 0.86 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.35
Amended 2,683 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.39
Stated Purpose of Loan:
Corporate Purposes 2,683 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48
Debt Repayment 2,683 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.30
Acquisition Line 2,683 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.31
Working Capital 2,683 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48
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Table II: Firm summary statistics 
Firm governance, CEO compensation, ownership, and financial data on 2,973 borrowers, 2000-
2009. The Government (GIM) Index is per Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). The 
Entrenchment Index is as per Bebchuck, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). Other than indices and board 
size, governance data are indicator variables, i.e. at the mean, 39% of borrower firms restricted 
shareholder rights to act by written consent. Compensation data, including cumulative awards, 
are scaled by total current compensation. Total CEO compensation, firm assets, and firm market 





Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev
Governance  Financials
Governance Index 9.23 9.00 2.53 Assets 6.34 6.33 1.93
Entrenchment Index 4.06 4.00 1.19 Market Capitalization 6.22 6.31 2.01
Duality, dummy 0.88 1.00 0.32 EBITDA to Sales -0.12 0.12 8.77
Institutional Majority, dummy 0.65 1.00 0.48 Total Debt to Sales 0.29 0.24 4.37
Board Size 9.09 9.00 2.44 Total Debt to Assets 0.29 0.24 4.39
% of Board, Employees 0.11 0.09 0.08 Current Ratio 2.26 1.76 2.92
% of Board, Linked 0.07 0.04 0.09 Cash to Assets 0.12 0.06 0.16
% of Board, Independents 0.83 0.84 0.12 CapEx to Assets 0.06 0.04 0.08
% of Board, Insiders 0.18 0.16 0.12 Net Worth to Assets 0.42 0.46 2.71
Golden Parachutes 0.47 0.00 0.50 Market to Book Ratio 2.27 0.88 281.47
Limits: Act by Written Consent 0.39 0.00 0.49 Information Asymmetery
Limits: Call Special Meeting 0.47 0.00 0.50 Company Age 43.33 30.00 37.72
Limits: Amend Charter 0.30 0.00 0.46 Distance from IPO, in quarters 7.90 7.50 6.18
Limits: Amend Bylaws 0.43 0.00 0.50 Rated 0.65 1.00 0.48
Supermajority to Approve Merger 0.16 0.00 0.37 Investment Grade 0.63 1.00 0.48
Severance Agreement 0.05 0.00 0.21 Previous Loan with Lender 0.51 1.00 0.50
Change in Control 0.75 1.00 0.43
Classified Board 0.59 1.00 0.49
Poison Pill 0.51 1.00 0.50
Ownership
Insiders, Percentage 15.80 6.80 19.60
Institutional Blockholder 0.99 1.00 0.10
Institutional, Percentage 62.10 71.20 45.70
Institutional Majority 0.65 1.00 0.48
Compensation
Total Current Compensation 0.42 0.37 0.27
Salary 0.29 0.23 0.21
Bonus 0.13 0.07 0.17
ITM Options 5.50 0.77 191.92
Restricted Stock 1,498 0 150,000
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Table III: Cost of capital – Government Index (GIM) and Entrenchment Index 
Multivarite panel regressions of the spread of bank loans over LIBOR (in bps), 2000 – 2009. 
Governance and structural intensity variables are as previously defined. Leverage (cash) is total 
debt (cash and eqivalents) to firm assets. Profitability is the return on assets. Firm controls are 
annual, rolling quarterly. Errors robust to firm heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. Statistical 








Previous Loan 6.194* 6.236* 6.160*
(3.691) (3.674) (3.689)
Revolver -32.305*** -32.324*** -32.265***
(7.898) (7.900) (7.905)
Pricing Grid -50.052*** -50.094*** -49.865***
(8.469) (8.474) (8.508)
Tenor -1.251*** -1.251*** -1.252***
(0.273) (0.273) (0.272)
Number of Lenders -1.073*** -1.072*** -1.077***
(0.270) (0.270) (0.270)
Deal Size 6.220 6.278 6.005
(7.099) (7.113) (7.175)
Loan Purpose
Acquisition 7.186 7.139 7.285
(6.446) (6.436) (6.432)
Debt Repayment -3.627 -3.609 -3.747
(7.312) (7.322) (7.315)
Working Capital 0.760 0.749 0.780
(4.056) (4.041) (4.052)
Covenants
Structural Intensity 25.669*** 25.683*** 25.622***
(1.755) (1.760) (1.749)
Firm Characteristics
ln Assets -4.280* -4.260* -4.149
(2.534) (2.545) (2.540)
Cash and Equivalents 48.804** 49.175** 47.774**
(20.948) (21.001) (20.874)
Leverage 84.089*** 84.087*** 83.646***
(20.617) (20.605) (20.671)
Profitability -646.178*** -646.243*** -646.204***
(204.298) (204.225) (204.561)
Other
Constant 261.357*** 259.475*** 265.513***
(26.992) (28.576) (26.711)
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time/Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes
Aggregated Facilities 2,683 2,683 2,683







Table IV: Cost of capital vs. monitoring, takeover defenses, and compensation 
Multivariate panel regression analysis of the spread of bank loans over LIBOR (in bps), 2000 – 
2009. Duality, large board complex firm and takeover defenses are indicator variables. 
Compensation data is scaled by current year compensation. Firm variables are as previously 
defined. Errors robust to firm heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. Statistical significance is 




Duality -10.590 -0.929 Previous Loan -4.658 -1.895
(16.611) (14.641) (4.595) (4.988)
% Board, Independent -52.234* -74.661** Revolver -16.880 -19.391
(28.724) (34.161) (13.449) (16.179)
Insiders Percentage -34.877* -45.776* Pricing Grid -42.590*** -40.014***
(19.692) (25.368) (13.625) (14.831)
Institutional Percentage -2.581 -4.180 Tenor -0.633** -0.906***
(4.714) (4.547) (0.246) (0.303)
Directors 3.578** 2.751 Number of Lenders -0.338 -0.229
(1.818) (1.925) (0.246) (0.231)
Large Board, Complex Firm -1.576*** -1.083*** Deal Size -17.093 -23.639
(0.334) (0.355) (21.136) (22.372)
Takeover Defenses Loan Purpose
Classified Board -11.072* -8.246 Acquisition 20.354* 17.505*
(5.980) (7.348) (10.901) (10.552)
Amend Charter -1.469 18.281 Debt Repayment 30.610** 37.038**
(20.111) (16.739) (11.957) (14.787)
Change in Control Provisions 11.935 16.056* Working Capital 16.498*** 13.807**
(7.403) (9.110) (6.020) (6.527)
Golden Parachute 3.407 2.669 Covenants
(5.178) (6.427) Structural Intensity 18.065*** 15.634***
Poison Pill -7.796 -10.804 (2.447) (2.731)
(6.678) (7.667) Firm Characteristics
Compensation ln Assets -15.128*** -18.363***
Salary 12.411 (4.349) (4.231)
(23.789) Cash and Equivalents 32.131 21.940
Bonus -18.367 (26.365) (28.534)
(18.822) Leverage 93.134*** 101.956***
ln Restricted Stock -1.250 (22.349) (27.141)
(3.382) Profitability -687.050*** -833.673***




Industry Controls Yes Yes
Time/Macro Controls Yes Yes





(1) (2) (1) (2)
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Table V: Predicting ex-ante takeover probability 
Ex-ante takeover probability is calculated by fitting a probit model wherein the dependent 
variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the firm is a takeover target in that quarter. Takeover 
targets are firms that announced a complete acquisition by another firm, an acquisition of 
majority interest, or a merger. Independent variables are lagged by one quarter. Industry 
Takeovers are the number of firms in the same 4-digit SIC code that are takeover targets. iROA 
is the firm return on assets ratio minus the industry median ROA. iLeverage is the firm’s total 
debt to firm assets ratio minus the industry median ratio. Both iROA and iLeverage compute 
median industry ratios using a 2-digit SIC code. Sales Growth is the natural log of the ratio of 
sales this quarter to sales last quarter. Size is the natural log of firm market capitalization. Net 
PPE is net property, plant, and equipment. Pairwise correlations are computed for ex-ante 
takeover probability and firm control variables used in subsequent regressions. Standard errors 





Probit model specification Coefficient z-score
Industry Takeovers 0.0273 2.48**
iROA -0.1153 -1.1
Sales Growth -0.0814 -1.59 Size
Market to Book -0.0112 -0.67 Leverage
Size -0.0195 -1.99** Cash and Equivalents
iLeverage 0.0430 0.8 Profitability
Net PPE -0.0597 -0.75 Market to Book




model specification test Standard Deviation















Yes Ex-ante takeover probability descriptive statistics






Table VI: Spreads vs. monitoring, takeover defenses, compensation and takeover 
probability 
Multivariate panel regression analysis of the spread of bank loans over LIBOR (in bps), 2000 – 
2009. All variables are as previously defined. Variable*hiTOP are interaction terms between 
variable and a binary indicator equaling one if the firm has a takeover probability greater than 
the median. Errors robust to firm heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. Statistical significance is 





Takeover Probability 82.194*** 83.930*** 76.890***
(14.606) (25.232) (27.877)
Monitoring Compensation
Duality -1.829 -2.540 Salary -6.991
(17.029) (17.777) (16.950)
Duality*hiTOP -39.387 -10.589 Salary*hiTOP 51.563
(28.712) (29.418) (50.345)
% Board, Independent -67.076** -65.404* Bonus 1.971
(33.121) (34.825) (14.195)
%BI*hiTOP 61.926 7.065 Bonus*hiTOP -65.493
(64.521) (73.503) (52.084)
Insiders Percentage -16.912 -3.904 ln Restricted Stock -3.146
(21.389) (25.712) (4.718)
InP*hiTOP -25.550 -81.804 RS*hiTOP 4.234
(43.373) (54.966) (7.060)
Institutional Percentage -5.010 -3.970 ln ITM Options -3.424
(5.772) (5.805) (2.195)
IP*hiTOP 27.332** 23.620* ITM*hiTOP -2.138
(13.841) (13.481) (4.152)
Directors 1.802 1.188 Covenants
(1.902) (2.245) Structural Intensity 24.172*** 16.711*** 15.077***
D*hiTOP 9.808** 11.568** (1.663) (2.537) (2.797)
(4.414) (5.338) Other
Large Board, Complex Firm -0.614* -0.266 Constant 101.355** 121.482** 157.801**
(0.357) (0.432) (40.374) (60.035) (70.309)
LBCF*hiTOP -4.139** -4.016 All Previous Controls Yes Yes Yes
(1.682) (2.482) Aggregated Facilities 2,459 614 461
Takeover Defenses Borrowers 903 346 275






















(3)(1) (2) (3) (1) (2)
43 
 
Table VII: Spreads, takeover probability and financial strength 
Multivariate panel regression analysis of the spread of bank loans over LIBOR (in bps), 2000 – 
2009. Hi/Low Alt-Z represent groups of firms of  higher/lower Altman’s Z Score, a proxy for 
financial strength. High Z firms are stronger, financially. Takeover probability, governance and 
compensation variables are as previously defined. Variable*hiTOP are interaction terms between 
variable and a binary indicator equaling one if the firm has a takeover probability greater than 
the median. Errors robust to firm heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. Statistical significance is 






Takeover Probability 81.014* 113.254** 83.800*** 52.441
(43.348) (44.151) (31.237) (35.540)
Monitoring
Duality -0.064 0.046 8.011 -4.388
(17.871) (20.466) (27.559) (21.117)
Duality*hiTOP -89.436*** -45.261 -8.395 49.680
(34.009) (35.199) (36.018) (48.999)
% Board, Independent -43.145 -52.819 -87.377* -59.403
(42.416) (38.499) (52.577) (61.195)
%BI*hiTOP 24.455 -86.178 77.104 89.727
(77.226) (108.578) (87.216) (90.254)
Insiders Percentage 12.088 0.878 -24.031 -39.032
(24.230) (26.432) (39.725) (48.278)
InP*hiTOP -87.673 -191.806* 6.832 -35.418
(93.932) (103.794) (60.350) (75.868)
Institutional Percentage 0.897 0.340 -6.269 -17.563
(5.516) (6.040) (13.855) (11.576)
IP*hiTOP 80.596* 9.097 19.629 20.824
(47.216) (63.526) (18.370) (22.364)
Directors 3.619* 1.917 0.624 0.797
(2.044) (2.836) (3.143) (3.484)
D*hiTOP 20.875*** 22.417** 3.680 5.553
(7.728) (8.754) (5.904) (6.547)
Large Board, Complex Firm -0.614 -0.256 -1.358 -0.524
(0.403) (0.537) (0.890) (0.930)
LBCF*hiTOP -7.620*** -6.696** -3.070 -5.673*











Classified Board -8.608 -3.860 -13.560 -12.318
(7.827) (8.981) (10.027) (12.733)
CB*hiTOP -14.750 -12.565 36.525* 42.731*
(17.326) (23.230) (21.269) (24.927)
Amend Charter 5.869 -22.946 13.848 79.827***
(19.753) (24.128) (27.077) (20.003)
AC*hiTOP 0.000 0.000 8.097 -99.226**
(0.000) (0.000) (45.644) (45.101)
Change in Control Provisions 13.685 15.856* 11.356 19.361
(9.621) (9.306) (12.018) (12.943)
CIC*hiTOP 6.265 13.773 -19.414 -37.889
(20.501) (27.435) (23.748) (25.951)
Golden Parachute 0.588 -4.723 8.066 7.043
(7.247) (9.083) (9.102) (10.313)
GP*hiTOP -17.912 -15.504 10.140 18.918
(12.434) (12.608) (13.057) (15.316)
Poison Pill 0.123 4.838 8.527 6.861
(7.165) (7.981) (11.311) (12.196)
PP*hiTOP -46.359 -66.978** -48.752** -54.159**
(31.331) (33.337) (22.529) (26.784)
D*hiTOP 20.875*** 22.417** 3.680 5.553
(7.728) (8.754) (5.904) (6.547)
Large Board, Complex Firm -0.614 -0.256 -1.358 -0.524
(0.403) (0.537) (0.890) (0.930)
LBCF*hiTOP -7.620*** -6.696** -3.070 -5.673*



















Structural Intensity 16.927*** 18.972*** 16.631*** 14.441***
(3.285) (3.494) (3.055) (3.227)
Other
Constant 125.113* 61.801 101.061 209.960*
(65.097) (84.363) (105.160) (118.325)
All Previous Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Aggregated Facilities 320 236 294 225
Borrowers 202 156 173 141
Adjusted R
2





III. CFO Network Centrality and Private Debt 
Abstract : Using an extensive database of initial bank loans issued to U.S. firms from 1998-
2010 I find that CFO centrality,  the size and influence of network connections, affects the 
structure and cost of firm private debt. Specifically, I find that powerfully networked CFOs 
retain greater flexibility over financial covenant restrictions in loan contracts. In addition, I find 
that powerful CFOs negotiate lower spreads. With regard to syndicate size, lead arrangers are 
able to sell participations to a greater number of syndicate members when a borrower CFO is 
highly central. More favorable loan terms do not appear to be inappropriate as there is no 
evidence that firms underperform ex post. These effects are decreasing in firm size, CEO 
centrality and board centrality, thus CFO power is more important in debt contracting for smaller 
firms with less influential CEOs and boards. I conclude that CFO centrality decreases 






An emerging line of research examines the importance of social connections between 
corporate stakeholders, bankers, directors and executives. This research is closely related to 
issues in corporate governance in that both social networks and governance mechanisms can 
mitigate or exacerbate agency problems. The study of social networks in economics and finance 
is relatively new, though network theory has been explored at length in related management, 
sociology, and game theory literature. The study of social networks is not limited to the influence 
of “friends” per se, as one might imagine in the age of Facebook, but is relevant to inter and intra 
corporate networks, firm performance, capital structure, financial system stability, capital flows, 
crime networks, systemic fragility in the face of network shocks, contract theory, and more.  
This paper investigates the impact of social network dynamics in the context of contract 
theory, specifically, that of initial private debt contracts between borrowing firms and lending 
syndicates. Initial loan origination is an ideal setting in which to empirically investigate the 
network effects in contracting for several reasons. Private debt is the largest source of external 
financing for firms, larger than public debt and equity market issuance combined (Gorton and 
Winton, 2003, Gomes and Phillips, 2007). Private agreements governing loans are concentrated 
securities for lenders, even for syndicate members, and thus well represent the environments of 
theoretical contact theory and security design. I focus on initial loans between firms and 
syndicates in order to isolate the effects of network dynamics on the initial contracting 
environment without the contaminating effects of previous loans between firms and lenders; 
once a loan has been issued, the network dynamics are necessarily altered, as there exists a 
relationship where one may not have been present ex-ante. Thus, recurring loans obscure the 
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network effects I wish to capture.
13
 Finally, by focusing on initial private credit agreements I 
largely avoid the problem of endogeneity between dynamic networks and subsequent loans and 
the feedback loop between changing network metrics and public debt yields.  
I focus on four measures of broad network power and thus our investigation is different 
than those of the effects of past personal ties between firm stakeholders, i.e. past work 
experience or shared school experience. Our measures of network influence utilize several 
measures of network power borrowed from the mathematics, physics, neural networks, and 
recently, economic literatures. I calculate measures of network centrality for CEOs, CFOs, and 
board members of borrower firms to investigate whether network power impacts contracting. 
Specifically, I focus on the network centrality of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) to investigate 
whether CFO influence is relevant in loan negotiations.  
CFOs are directly responsible for and are most able to influence the levels and reporting 
of financial covenants. Greater network influence implies that CFOs have greater access to 
information and have greater ability to communicate or withhold material information. Thus, 
greater network influence may improve information flows and decrease information 
asymmetries. Further, the loss of network status and future opportunities should CFOs perform 
poorly, shirk from contractual obligations, or withhold material information should restrain 
executive opportunism, and mitigate agency costs between borrowers and lenders. These effects 
are very similar to reputational effects documented in related literature.  
                                                     
13
 Engleberg, Gao, and Parsons (2012) find that although lending terms can change when firms 
borrow from lenders from whom they have previously borrowed the effects of past banking 
relationships are weakened when personal relationships are added to their regressions. I ask 
different questions. I ask whether CFO network influence (irrespective of personal relationships) 
impact loan agreements and whether any effects differ in firm size and CEO and board centrality. 




I find that lenders use of financial covenants is decreasing in CFO network centrality, that 
is, powerful CFOs negotiate greater loan flexibility. Further, CFOs with greater network 
influence also negotiate lower spreads while retaining covenant flexibility. I also find that 
powerful CFOs negotiate covenant levels that are further from a violation state than less 
powerful CFOs, thus assigning fewer control rights to lenders ex ante. I find that borrower CFO 
centrality is a positive determinant of syndicate size; lead arrangers are able to sell participations 
in the loan to a greater number of syndicate members suggesting that CFO centrality mitigates 
information asymmetries and discourages executive opportunism. Loans to firms with more 
central CFOs are not “sweetheart” deals. I no evidence of subsequent firm underperformance  as 
measured by profitability and financial strength. The effects of CFO centrality are decreasing, 
but still economically and statistically significant, in firm size, CEO and board centrality. Thus, I 
find that CEO and board centrality have similar effects on loan contracting as these are partial 
substitutes for CFO centrality.  
This paper contributes to the growing literatures of CFOs and network effects in finance. 
To our knowledge this is the first investigation to focus on the power of the CFO in debt 
contracting. It is also the first to measure the interplay of network centrality effects of the CFO, 
CEO, and board with regard to private debt issuance. This is among the first studies linking 
network centrality directly to information asymmetry and reputation effects in contracting. 
Finally, as I have data to calculate the centralities of all network participants, it is also the first to 
investigate the effects of CFO network influence relative to the entire network as opposed to that 
of a much smaller sample.  
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops network concepts and 
discusses related literature, section 3 discusses our measures of centrality and other relevant data, 
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section 4 describes our research methodology, section 5 reports empirical results, and section 6 
concludes.  
2. Concept Development and Related Literature 
2.1 Governance and Private Debt 
A growing line of research makes it clear that firm governance matters to private 
creditors as well as to shareholders and bondholders. Private creditors have access to material 
non-public information during the loan screening and negotiation processes as well as ex post in 
monitoring borrowers.
14
 As monitoring is an ongoing process creditors demand and have greater 
access to borrower management than other stakeholders. Creditors not only set loan terms based 
in part on governance mechanisms ex ante but also play a governance role themselves ex post.  
Consider that for bankers to grant concessions to firms with higher network centrality 
bankers must derive some direct benefit from firm centrality, namely, better access to sensitive 
and timely information and/or ease of information flows between creditors and borrower 
management. Creditors grant ex-ante greater flexibility and lower cost to firms with highly 
central CFOs if bankers benefit from decreased information asymmetry not only ex ante but ex 
post. Creditors may also derive indirect benefits from network centrality. If highly central CFOs 
are insulated from discipline provided by the market for corporate control, i.e. are more 
entrenched, or if reputation effects restrain managerial misbehavior, i.e. fear of losing network 
                                                     
14
 Theoretical banking literature stresses the role of commercial bankers as underwriters who 
decrease information asymmetries between borrowers and creditors ex ante and  in monitoring 
ex post. See Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Fama (1985), and Diamond (1991) for thorough 
discussions of the role of bankers in decreasing information asymmetries not only between 
creditors and borrowers but between firms and other market participants.  
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Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009) find that creditors take firm governance into 
account when pricing setting loan spreads. Though managerial entrenchment is often shown to 
be detrimental to firm value and performance (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003, Bebchuck and 
Cohen 2009) Chava et. al. find that creditors charge higher spreads to less entrenched 
management citing increased borrower risk if a borrower is acquired by a weaker firm. Jandik 
and McCumber (2012) find that creditors price specific governance mechanisms in accordance 
with agency theory but as per Chava et. al. in states of greater takeover probability. Creditors 
reward governance that mitigates agency conflicts between stakeholders and management when 
creditor and shareholder interests are aligned. However, as creditors face increased due diligence 
and renegotiation costs, and possibly liquidity risk and asset substitution risk in the event of 
borrower acquisition, creditors reward firms with staunch anti-takeover provisions in place. Both 
studies focus on ex ante pricing and do not address governance with regard to ongoing 
monitoring of borrowers by creditors.  
Chava and Roberts (2008) find that debt covenants assign control rights to creditors ex 
ante which allow creditors to accelerate payments and intervene in firm financial policies in the 
                                                     
15
 Though focusing on the consequences of restatements for board members, Srinivasan (2005) 
finds that director turnover is 48% for firms that restate earnings downward, which is much 
greater than turnover rates at firms that do not restate or restate upwards. Further, directors also 
lose positions on other boards, suggesting that reputation and career concerns incentivize proper 
behavior and better monitoring. Yermack (2004) calculates that outside director wealth increases 
$285,000 for a one standard deviation improvement in firm performance, thus, poor firm 
performance and  the loss of concurrent and future opportunities from said performance 
significantly impacts director wealth. Relatedly, Mian (2001) finds that CFO turnover is 
preceded by poor firm performance and negative excess returns, thus CFO turnover is 
disciplinary in nature. I assume that the same reputation and career concerns motivate CFOs. 
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event of a violation of a covenant threshold. The authors find that the severity of creditor 
intervention is increasing in agency and information problems, specifically for firms with no 
previous relationship with the lenders and thus, little reputational capital (Diamond, 1989).
16
 
Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009) create a theoretical framework in which firms grant greater rights 
to creditors when information asymmetries are greater; borrower reputation decreases 
information asymmetries over time resulting in looser covenant thresholds and waived rights 
when contracts are renegotiated. 
The studies of creditor intervention in states of covenant violation impute that covenants 
grant creditors powerful control rights over the firm even outside of violation states, though the 
direct effects of creditor intervention are only visible after a covenant violation. Further, these 
studies find that covenants are a contractual mechanism meant to decrease informational 
inefficiencies and when firms are more opaque or there are greater information asymmetries, 
creditor charge higher spreads, demand more covenant protection, and more severely punish 
violations. When the quality and flow of information is higher, firms are rewarded with lower 
spreads, weaker covenant restrictions, and lenient treatment in violation states. If CFO network 
centrality decreases information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers I should expect 
fewer covenant restrictions and thresholds that are further from violation states at the initiation of 
the loan.  
It is more difficult to meaningfully identify and measure informal monitoring of 
borrowers. Daniels and Triantis (1995) develop a theory of interactive governance largely upon 
anecdotal evidence wherein lenders take an active, if indirect, role in firm governance outside of 
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 Roberts and Sufi (2009), Sufi (2009), and Nini, Smith and Sufi (2009) also find that covenant 
violations lead creditors to restrict firm investments, acquisitions, and credit availability while 
increasing spreads, financial covenants, and collateral requirements. 
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violation states. In a violation state creditor control rights are triggered, with results documented 
in the literature discussed above. Outside of a violation, however, lenders may give voice to 
concerns about managerial decisions or firm performance. However, due to the bankruptcy 
doctrine of equitable subordination (Daniels and Triantis, 1995) lenders must be careful not to 
use their informational advantages over other stakeholders inappropriately, as evidence of direct 
creditor intervention in firm management or decisions allows a lender’s claim to be subordinated 
to other stakeholders. Thus, lenders must employ indirect methods to attain their goals. Lenders 
may therefore give signals that may be interpreted by other stakeholders or management as to 
what lenders expect. These signals could be behind the scenes advice, rumors of lender 
displeasure, or the (again, behind the scenes) suggestion that management be replaced. Baird and 
Rasmussen (2006) claim that the powers creditors wield rivals that of a hostile takeover in 
disciplining underperforming managers. Calling this a “missing lever” of corporate governance, 
Baird and Rasmussen argue that lenders are able to replace offending managers even outside 
violation states. Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012) provide empirical evidence to this effect, finding 
that covenant violations allow creditors to amend credit agreements with greater restrictiveness 
and point to an increase in CEO turnover following violations to illustrate lenders’ informal 
influence on corporate governance. However, what is missing in both the theoretical frameworks 
and the empirical evidence is the mechanism by which the “missing lever” of creditor influence 
is wielded. Influence, especially indirect or behind the scenes influence, must hinge on the 
quality of signals sent and received, the speed with which information flows between parties, and 
the ease with which signals are properly interpreted. Network centrality captures elements of this 
hidden mechanism. As CFOs have the greatest direct control over firm financial reporting and 
53 
 
actions CFO centrality – the power of the CFO to send, receive, and interpret information – is of 
great import.  
2.2 The Role and Influence of the Chief Financial Officer 
The attention paid to the role of the CFO in firm policies and financial reporting 
dramatically increased in the late 1990s and early 2000s as several large public companies were 
charged with fraudulent reporting and declared bankruptcy. Public outcry led the U.S. Congress 
to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 placing CFOs on equal footing with CEOs in terms of 
reporting accountability. Surprisingly, only recently has the academic literature focused more 
closely on the role and influence of the CFO in setting, shaping, and reporting firm financial 
policies. Graham and Harvey (2001) and Graham, Harvey, and Rajopal (2005) are among the 
first to address CFOs in the literature. Surveying CFOs about capital structure decisions Graham 
and Harvey (2001) find that with regard to debt issuance CFOs are most concerned with 
retaining flexibility, with the costs of distress a distant 10
th
 on the list of concerns. If CFOs are 
concerned with flexibility with regard to the level of firm debt it is a reasonable conjecture that 
they also value flexibility with regard to the terms of debt. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) 
survey CFOs about financial reporting and find that CFOs willingly and publicly volunteer 
information to decrease information asymmetries between the firm and its investors. They argue 
that executives are concerned about building a reputation for precise and meaningful 
information. Doing so decreases “informational risk”, though CFOs are equally concerned about 
revealing too much information to competitors and creating disclosure precedents that are 
difficult to maintain. Reputational effects of voluntary disclosure would also decrease 
information asymmetries between firms and lenders presumably without the same concern of 
simultaneous disclosure to competitors as the borrower-lender relationship allows for greater 
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confidentiality. The authors also find that CFOs are more concerned about managing and 
reporting accounting earnings than cash flows, and that the primary incentive for doing so is to 
manage stock prices and improve their own career opportunities and reputations. Interestingly, 
CFOs’ career and reputational concerns trump those of managing earnings for debt covenant 
restrictions, a finding that implies that the carrot of career advancement is more effective than the 
stick of lender discipline in the event of a covenant violation. Tadelis (2002) develops a theory of 
reputation as an incentive mechanism in a model with moral hazard and adverse selection that is 
relevant for private debt contracting, noting that while incentives for individuals wane as 
retirement approaches it is “ageless” with regard to the firm. Interestingly, in an investigation of 
disciplinary CFO turnover Mian (2001) finds that CFOs reputational horizon is longer than that 
of CEOs. Both the model and the empirical evidence support the survey findings of Graham, 
Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) that CFOs are concerned with reputation and career opportunities 
when shaping and reporting firm financials. Regardless of the primary incentive to disclose 
material information and carefully manage accounting earnings lenders benefit from decreased 
information asymmetry and incentive alignment.   
CFOs may have incentives, but only recently has evidence been presented that CFOs also 
have the real ability to impact firm financials. Gieger and North (2006) study the effects of a 
newly appointed CFO on the firm’s use of discretionary accruals and find that new CFOs 
significantly decrease the use of discretionary accruals. Further, these changes were found not to 
be driven by the concurrent appointment of new CEOs. Jiang, Petroni and Wang (2010) find that 
CFO equity incentives significantly impact firm the use of accruals and earnings management 
and that CFO incentives impact firm policies more than CEO incentives. Similarly, Chava and 
Purnanandam (2010) find that CFOs’ risk decreasing incentives are associated with safer debt 
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maturity choices and greater earnings smoothing through accruals. Kim, Li and Zhang (2011) 
document that CFO option portfolio sensitivity to firm stock price incentivizes short term 
opportunistic behavior such as manipulating financial information, withholding bad news, or 
investing in sub-optimal projects. This in turn increases the risk of significant future deterioration 
in firm stock prices. Futher, though careful to note caveats, the authors provide evidence 
suggesting that CFO option incentives dominate CEO incentives in determining the risk of future 
stock price crashes. Finally, Mobbs (2011) studies the impact of CFO appointments to the board 
of directors, finding that board appointed CFOs decrease firm leverage and financial constraints, 
increase financial flexibility, and improve firm operating performance. In sum, the above studies 
document that CFOs have both the incentive and ability to directly and significantly impact firm 
policies and reporting.    
2.3 Social Networks in Finance 
The study of networks in finance is still in its infancy, and yet there is evidence that 
network effects are of great importance. There are two emerging lines of research that reach very 
different, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, conclusions.  
The first is that social ties and high network centrality lead to lesser accountability, poor 
decision making, less effective firm governance, and lower firm value, conclusions that highlight 
networks’ negative agency and entrenchment effects. Kirchmaier and Stathopoulos (2008) find a 
negative relationship between CEO degree centrality (the size of the executive’s network) and 
firm performance, specifically that sales growth, return on assets, and return on equity is 
decreasing in the size of the CEO network. Hwang and Kim (2009) and Nguyen (2011) find that 
when CEOs and directors have social connections the monitoring mechanism weakens. CEO-
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board connections compromise otherwise independent directors, resulting in higher CEO 
compensation and reduced pay-performance and turnover-performance sensitivity in firms with 
compromised boards compared to firms with truly independent boards. Barnea and Guedj (2009) 
report supporting evidence focusing instead on the centrality of board members. Highly central 
boards grant CEOs greater compensation and are less likely to discipline managers. Further, the 
authors argue that less central boards have reputational incentives to monitor properly, but as 
director centrality increases monitoring decreases. Ishii and Xuan (2011) find that when 
acquirers and targets share social ties both the acquirer and the combined entity suffer 
significantly negative abnormal returns upon merger announcement. Further, the authors find 
that both the target CEO and a larger proportion of the target’s board remain active in the 
combined entity. El-Khatib, Fogel and Jandik (2012) find that more central CEOs pursue more 
acquisitions and that these are more value-destroying than for less central CEOs. The authors 
also lend support to the findings of Hwang and Kim (2009) and Nguyen (2011) in that central 
CEOs are less sensitive to disciplinary turnover after value-destroying mergers. Finally, Fracassi 
and Tate (2012) find that social ties between executives and directors reduce firm value, proxied 
by Tobin’s Q, and that this effect is increasing in the absence of other strong governance 
mechanisms. In sum, these findings provide evidence that direct social connections between 
CEOs and directors impair firm performance and weaken governance mechanisms, while greater 
CEO and board centrality allow executives to avoid discipline even after poor performance or 
value-destroying mergers.  
A second line of research highlights the benefits that connections bring, largely those of 
improved information flows between connected parties, decreasing information asymmetries, 
and the ability of networks to enforce otherwise non-contractual agreements, complementing 
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more formal contracts and governance mechanisms.
17
 Lippert and Spagnolo (2011) develop a 
model in a setting of complex and necessarily incomplete contracting wherein network dynamics 
create multilateral enforcement mechanisms and informal communications channels. Our 
measures of network centrality capture elements of these dynamics. Lippert and Spagnolo argue 
that network influence may be detrimental to welfare maximization, for example, enabling 
corruption, cartels, or of interest in our investigation, withholding negative material information 
or hiding fraud. However, network dynamics also allow for decreased information asymmetry 
and governance improvement. Their model well explains why cooperative relationships improve 
monitoring. Importantly, it is not necessarily the direct connections that matter most, as private 
information may successfully and truthfully flow through a relational network to enforce agents’ 
good behavior and punish deviance.
18
 Larcker, So and Wang (2012) find that firm performance 
is increasing in board centrality, specifically growth in return on assets, and that analysts do not 
fully reflect this superior performance in earnings forecasts.  
Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor (1993) develop a model to explain the use of legally 
unenforceable and discretionary financial contracts in circumstances where legally enforceable 
contracting is possible. In the context of our study, for example, why would a lender choose to 
write a loan with fewer covenants – allowing for greater borrower discretion and flexibility – 
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 Burt (1997) argues that networks allow someone to collect information on someone else 
indirectly. This allows for more efficient screening and filtering of relevant information, giving 
more weight to more trusted or influential sources of information. Further, networks enable 
“trust” transactions where it is unclear what the other party will do; the more incomplete the 
contract and the higher the information asymmetry between parties the greater the importance of 
networks, centrality, trust, and reputation (Tullock (1985); Nahapiet and Choshal (1998); Uzzi 
(1999); Burt, (2005)). 
18
 See also Burt (2005) and Brass and Labianca (2006) for discussions of network closure, echo, 
and rigidity amplifying the effects of negative information; tarnished reputations, character 
assassination, and social liabilities are as relevant (or more relevant) to agents as the benefits 
enabled by network position.  
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when covenants are frequently used and legally enforceable? The authors’ explanation rests on 
considerations of trust and reputational capital. The greater the reputation of a contractual party 
the more flexibility in contracting, granting more degrees of freedom to parties with greater 
reputation. Conversely, the less a party is trusted the greater the use of legally binding and 
enforceable contracting. Their model further shows that discretionary contracting allows for the 
development of reputation, as when unenforceable expectations are met, and the “liquidation” of 
reputational capital in the event that unenforceable terms are broken. If a trusted party upholds 
his (legally unenforceable) promises his reputation grows; if he breaks his word his reputation is 
damaged, possibly beyond repair (Tullock, 1985). Our investigation empirically tests the Boot, 
Greenbaum and Thakor model. Centrality proxies for reputation, and if more trusted parties are 
granted greater discretion and flexibility in contracting then greater centrality should decrease the 
use of legally enforceable financial covenants.  
With regard to debt and capital structure, Amaro de Matos, Ferreira, Matos and 
Mergulhao (2010) find that when influential bankers sit on firm boards the firms have greater 
leverage. That is, firms with banker-directors with greater network centrality issue more debt. 
Further, the authors find that the effects are increasing in firm opacity, thus supporting the theory 
that centrality decreases information asymmetries. Chuluun, Prevost and Puthenpurackal (2010) 
hypothesize and empirically support that centrality decreases information asymmetries. The 
authors find that greater board centrality is associated with lower bond yield spreads and that this 
effect is increasing in firm opacity. Overall, they conclude that centrality is associated with lower 
borrowing costs. Finally, Engelberg, Gao and Parsons (2012) document that past social 
connections between borrowers and lenders decrease the cost of loans and, in support of network 
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effects increasing information flows, that these loans are not value-destroying for banks. In fact, 
the authors find that firms making connected deals improve firm performance subsequently.  
In sum, there is increasing evidence that social connections and more broadly, centrality 
regardless of social connections, facilitate information flows and serve as a “missing lever” of 
monitoring and governance in incomplete contracting. Our paper contributes to these findings.  
3. Data and Centrality Descriptions 
3.1 Firm Characteristics 
Firm data on borrowers is collected from Compustat, Execucomp, the Corporate Library, 
and Risk Metrics as I require financials as well as CEO, CFO, and board identities and 
characteristics. Firm control variables are ubiquitous in the literature and I preclude discussion 
here. Appendix A gives detailed variable descriptions, and panel A of table I reports summary 
statistics. From Corporate Library and Risk Metrics data I construct a measure to control for firm 
governance as per Bebchuck and Cohen (2009), the Entrenchment Index. The index ranges from 
zero to six, giving one point for each of the following measures of managerial entrenchment: 
poison pills, classified boards, golden parachute provisions, and shareholder restrictions on 
charter and bylaw amendments, and requirements of a supermajority to approve mergers. The 
index for borrower firms in our sample is zero to four.  
3.2 Loan Characteristics 
I collect all loans issued to non-financial U.S. public firms from 1988-2010 from the 
Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database. Loan information is comprehensive, including 
spread, detailed covenant information, deal size, and the identities of all lead arrangers. The 
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majority of loans are syndicate deals in which more than one lender acts as the “lead” arranger; 
lenders other than lead arrangers are purchasers of loans from the borrower in the primary 
market as arranged by the lead arrangers. Lenders who purchase portions of the loan are also 
syndicate members. I assume that all lead arrangers are privy to all contact negotiations and are 
active in the due diligence process, while purchasing lenders are less likely to be intimately 
involved in the due diligence process. Panel B of table I gives summary statistics of loan data. 
Appendix A gives detailed variable descriptions. The median loan is a five year agreement, with 
a 125 basis point spread over LIBOR, two financial covenants, and no general covenant 




BoardEx collects professional and personal affiliations of executives and board members. 
BoardEx has over 12 million links between network participants from 1938 to 2010 for U.S. 
companies. Executives and board members are nodes in network terminology, with links 
representative of direct relationships with other nodes. I utilize this vast database to construct 
four measurements of network centrality for borrower executives and board members. These 
measurements are meant to capture different aspects of network influence and power which may 
facilitate information flows, reduce information asymmetry, insulate the powerful from 
discipline, or provide other benefits to executives and board members. Conversely, it is possible 
that the loss of network status or the threat of waning influence keeps network participants from 
behaving badly, such that the loss of influence, reputation , and future opportunities improve 
monitoring in the case of boards or restrain executives from accruing personal benefits at the 
expense of stakeholders.  
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 See Appendix B for a detailed discussion of the calculation of centrality variables.  
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The simplest measure of network power is degree centrality, which the number of direct 
links a node has to other nodes. Degree is the size of an individual’s network; an executive with 
many connections is said to be more central in the network than someone with fewer 
connections. That said, network size alone fails to capture several interesting characteristics of 
networks. For example, it may be that an individual has many connections that are acquaintances 
but few that are confidants. In a similar vein, one may argue that it is unnecessary to have many 
“friends” if the few you have are powerful people. I therefore compute measures of centrality 
meant to capture other, more nuanced, sources of network influence. The resulting measures 
proxy for the ease with which information or reputation flows through an executive’s network.  
Betweenness centrality captures the extent to which a node lies between other nodes. For 
information to flow to disconnected nodes it must travel along paths or along links between 
nodes that are directly connected. For example, consider a three node network, with nodes A and 
C that are not directly connected but share a link with node B. B lies between A and C, and thus 
for information to flow from A to C it must past through B. Betweenness is the number of 
informational paths that flow through B to other nodes. Betweenness encompasses the notion of 
brokerage, as an executive with high betweenness centrality can choose to pass information 
along or to not reveal information to other nodes. Nodes with high betweenness potentially have 
power to control information flows amongst network participants.  
Closeness centrality is measure of the average distance between the node and all other 
nodes. For ease of interpretation I calculate the inverse of closeness such that higher centrality 
corresponds with shorter distance between nodes. Closeness measures the density of a node’s 
network. Information flows unevenly within a network, and dense, or close, networks may have 
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informational advantages over distant networks in that information may flow more quickly from 
nodes with high closeness centrality (inverse) to other nodes.
20
  
Finally, I calculate eigenvector centrality. As discussed above, degree centrality is the 
number of direct connections between a node and other nodes. Eigenvector centrality extends 
this simple measure of network influence by weighing degree centrality by the importance a 
node’s direct connections. In other words, eigenvector centrality measures not only the size of an 
executive’s rolodex but the importance, in terms of network influence, of the people in his 
network.  
For ease of interpretation I utilize the distribution of the raw centrality scores to express 
centralities as percentages. Thus, degree centrality of 84 means that the executive in question has 
a network size that falls within the 84
th
 percentile of all network sizes. Table II reports summary 
statistics of centrality measures for CFOs, CEOs, and boards, wherein the latter are computed as 
mean centralities of all sitting board members.  
Unsurprisingly, executives and board members of large public U.S. firms are central in 
the networks of executives and board members. The median CEO has a network larger than 81% 
of all network participants. Mean board centrality lags just behind CEO centrality in all metrics. 
CFOs have greater dispersion in network metrics, though they are still influential executives, 
they may be younger with less experience than the CEOs and boards of the firms they serve. The 
median CFO has a network size greater than 71% of all network participants.  
Our resulting database has all required data on 852 initial loans and 588 unique borrower 
firms. I have fewer observations of board centrality, and thus when taking CFO and board 
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 For a thorough discussion of the network concepts of brokerage and closure in relation to 
economics see Burt (2005). 
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centrality into contemporaneous consideration our observations drop to 774 loans and 567 
borrowers. 
4. Research Methodology 
 4.1 Baseline model 
Our baseline model is a panel regression of the dependent variable on centrality, firm 
controls, loan controls, and industry, time, and macro controls such that 
it cit lit fit oitDepVar CFOcentrality Loan Firm Other            (2) 
where DepVar is the dependent variable of firm i at time t and represents either financial 
covenants, the natural log of loan spread, covenant tightness, or syndicate size. To investigate 
financial covenants I create a dummy variable equal to one if the loan in question has greater 
than the median (two) number of financial covenant restrictions. To examine the effect of 
centrality on covenant tightness I create a dummy variable equal to one if the level at which the 
debt to EBITDA covenant is set is close to a violation state at the initiation of the loan.
21
 The 
dependent variable in investigations of loan spreads is the natural log of all-in-spread drawn in 
basis points over LIBOR.  
 CFOcentrality is the primary variable of interest in each model specification. The first 
four measures of centrality represent the percentage centrality of the CFO in degree, 
betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality. I also create four indicator variables equal to 
one if CFO centrality is greater than or equal to the median percent of degree, betweenness, 
closeness, and eigenvector centrality compared only to other CFOs in our sample. Thus, I have 
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 A detailed discussion of the construction of Tight follows in section 5.2. 
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eight measures of centrality for each investigation. Models two through five investigate 
percentage centrality compared to the entire network while models six through nine compare 
higher or lower centrality (0/1) of in sample CFOs. 
 Firm and Loan are vectors of independent variables of firm (loan) i at time t. Other is a 
vector of industry, time, and macro control variables. I closely follow Chava, Livdan, and 
Purnanandam (2009) and Chava and Roberts (2008) with regard to models investigating spreads 
and financial covenants and Demiroglu and James (2010) with regard to covenant tightness. 
Financial covenant and tightness regressions use a logit specification whereas spread 
investigations are linear regressions.  
 4.2 Margins analysis 
 In order to interpret statistically significant regression coefficients in an economically 
meaningful way I employ margins analysis to compare levels of the dependent variable for 
relatively unconnected CFOs and highly central CFOs. I compare levels of the dependent 




 percentile in the entire network in centrality and CFOs that 
are below and above median centrality in sample.  
I calculate margins in two ways. I first calculate average marginal effects in that I 
multiply coefficients by independent variable levels to obtain the level of the dependent variable 
at varying levels of centrality. The average effect is the average, given all firm varying 
observations of the independent variables, of the level of the dependent variable at CFO at, for 
example, less or greater than median centrality in sample. Thus, 
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                       (3) 
where X  in equation (2) is CFO centrality less or more than median centrality in sample. Level is 
therefore the average predicted level of the dependent variable for CFOs with less or more than 
median centrality allowing for different firm and time independent variable observations. I also 
compute levels of dependent variables holding all other independent variables at the sample 
mean, thus calculating levels of the variable of interest for the “average” firm. Marginal effects 
at the mean is therefore 
                      Pr( 1| ), 0,1DepVarLevel DepVar X i i                          (4) 
where equation (3) represents the probability that the loan has greater than median covenant 
restrictions given that the CFO in question is less or more central than the median CFO in 
sample, holding all other covariates at their means. Finally, I compute Chi-squared metrics of 
differences in dependent variable levels when a CFO is less or more central in sample.  
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 CFO Centrality and Loan Structure 
5.1.1 Financial covenants 
I first run our baseline logit regression (1) where the dependent variable is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the loan has greater than median financial covenant restrictions. Model 1 
of Table III reports results of the regression without centrality variables, whereas models 2 
through 9 include centrality. Loans with higher spreads are also associated with higher than 
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median financial covenant restrictions, indicating that riskier firms not only have greater 
restrictions placed upon them but also pay a higher cost of debt. I also find that lenders require 
more financial covenant restrictions of more entrenched managers, as proxied by the 
Entrenchment Index, to mitigate agency costs. 
Models 2 through 5 include CFO centrality measured as a percentage of all network 
participants whereas models 6 through 9 include centrality indicators equal to one if the CFO has 
greater than median percentage centrality compared to in sample CFOs. In all but one (in 
sample) model specifications higher CFO centrality is associated with fewer restrictive 
covenants; the coefficients are all highly statistically significant. Thus, controlling for firm, loan, 
industry, time, and macro differences more powerful CFOs are awarded fewer loan restrictions, 
allowing the firm greater flexibility to operate without lender intervention. 
To examine the economic impact of CFO centrality on loan restrictions I turn to margins 
analysis, calculating the likelihood that a loan has greater restrictions given a level of CFO 
network influence. Table IV reports results. In panel A I compare relatively unconnected CFOs, 
at the 10
th
 percentile of all network participants, to those who are highly central, at the 90
th
 
percentile. Allowing all other independent variables to vary by observation, the probability that a 
loan has greater covenant restrictions given an unconnected CFO in degree centrality is 40.59% 
while the probability of greater restrictiveness for a powerful CFO in degree is 13.72%. Thus, a 
CFO who has a network size that is in the 10
th
 percentile of degree of all network participants is 
almost three times as likely to face additional covenant restrictions as a CFO whose network size 
falls in the 90
th
 percentile. Similarly, a CFO whose closeness centrality falls within the 10
th
 
percentile of network participants is more than 4.2 times more likely to face greater covenant 
restrictions than a CFO at the 90
th
 percentile. Panel B of Table IV compares CFOs at centralities 
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at less and greater than median within the sample. The results are quantitatively similar to those 
comparing CFO centrality amongst all network participants. Within sample, CFOs with less than 
median network size are twice as likely to face additional financial covenant restrictions than 
CFOs at greater than median network size (degree centrality). CFOs who are more distant from 
other network participants (closeness centrality) are 2.1 times as likely to negotiate loans with 
greater than median financial covenants than CFOs whose closeness centrality is greater than the 
sample mean. These results hold across all measures of centrality. Finally, panel C reports Chi-
square metrics of differences in probabilities of greater than median covenant restrictions for in 
sample CFOs at less and greater than median centrality. Betweenness centrality approaches 
statistical significance while all other differences are statistically significant at better than the 1% 
level. Thus, highly central CFOs negotiate statistically significant and economically meaningful 
decreases in loan restrictiveness.  
5.1.2 CEO and board centrality 
As higher CFO centrality results in fewer loan restrictions it is probable that CEO and 
board centrality is also relevant to loan structure. More central CEOs and CFOs are able to 
negotiate fewer restrictions if network influence allows them to gain more and broker better 
information between borrowers and lenders, mitigating information asymmetries. Boards with 
greater network influence may also decrease loan restrictions on behalf of the firms they 
monitor, mitigating agency costs between lenders and borrowers. Similarly, loss of network 
influence or future opportunities should mitigate some risk that executives consume private 
benefits at the expense of their firms or shirk from contractual obligations, while the same threat 
should incentivize boards to monitor properly.  
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I test whether CEO and board centrality is relevant to loan structure while also measuring 
CFO centrality effects given powerful CEOs and boards. I create an indicator variable Powerful 
CEO equal to one if the CEO has a greater than median centrality in three out of four centrality 
measures,  thus aggregating CEO power into a single variable. Similarly, I create Powerful 
Board equal to one if the mean centralities of all sitting board members are greater than the 
median board centrality in three or more centrality measures. I rerun our base logit regression (1) 
twice more, once with Powerful CEO and again with Powerful Board to investigate the relative 
influence of CEOs, boards, and CFOs in negotiating financial covenant restrictions.
22
 As before 
the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the loan has greater than the 
median number of financial covenants.  
Table V reports results of margins analysis of the effect of CFO centrality on financial 
covenant restrictions in firms with less and more central CEOs. Panel A reports the probabilities 





of the entire network and for firms with less and more powerful chief executives. For example, 
the first column reports that firms with relatively unconnected CFOs, those in the 10
th
 percentile 
of centrality, face a 36.5% probability that a loan will require greater than median covenant 
restrictions when the CEO is also relatively unconnected. However, if the firm has a more central 
CEO the probability that the loan will require greater restrictions falls to 15.9%. When the firm 
has a CFO whose degree centrality is within the 90
th
 percentile, however, these likelihoods fall to 
30% and 12%, respectively.  I therefore have two conclusions, namely that CEOs with high 
network centrality face fewer financial covenant restrictions and, regardless of CEO power, CFO 
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 For parsimony I do not report logit regression results in tables, instead focusing on 
economically meaningful results reported by margins analysis. Regression results are available 
upon request.  
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centrality is still meaningfully associated with fewer covenant restrictions. These effects are 
persistent across all measures of CFO centrality whether measuring average marginal effects or 
marginal effects at the means of all other covariates. Panel B reports similar findings limiting the 
investigation to the CFO centralities in sample. A borrower whose CFO is less central than the 
median CFO in closeness centrality in sample has a 25% probability of facing increasing 
covenant restrictions if the CEO is also relatively unconnected and 19.5% probability if the CEO 
is more powerful than the median. For firms whose CFOs are more central, however, these 
probabilities drop to 16% and 12%, respectively. Again these effects remain robust across three 
of four centrality metrics and methods of margin calculation. Panel C confirms that regardless of 
CEO power higher CFO centrality results in statistically significant differences in the probability 
that a loan has greater than median financial covenant restrictions. Thus, CEO and CFO 
centrality are substitutes in contract effects while CFO centrality remains significant independent 
of CEO network influence. 
Table VI repeats the above analysis substituting board centrality for CEO centrality. The 
results are similar to those reported above, with the most significant effects borne by degree and 
closeness centralities. Highly central boards are associated with fewer financial covenant 
restrictions. CFO centrality effects are mitigated by higher board centrality but remain 
economically and statistically significant. Board and CFO centrality are substitutes, but CFO 
centrality effects on covenant restrictions are meaningful largely independent of board centrality. 
5.1.3 Firm size  
It has been documented that larger firms have a lower cost of private debt (Chava, Livdan 
and Purnanandum, 2009) and thus it is reasonable to hypothesize that firm size also plays a role 
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in covenant structure. I divide our sample firms into four quartiles by assets and rerun our logit 
regression to compare the effects of CFO centrality amongst quartiles from 1 (smallest) to 4 
(largest). Table VII reports margins analysis of changes in covenant restrictiveness given low 
and high CFO centrality and firm size. Panel A reports probabilities that the loan requires greater 




 percentile of the entire 
network while panel B reports probabilities given low and high CFO centrality in sample for 
each firm size quartile. One quickly finds that larger firms have fewer financial covenants as the 
probability that a loan has greater than median financial covenants declines linearly in size 
quartiles. The probability of greater covenant restrictions for less central CFOs in degree is 48% 
in the smallest firms and 16% in the largest firms in network and 38% and 20%, respectively, in 
sample. For powerful CFOs, the probabilities are 29% and 7% in network and 16% and 7% in 
sample for the smallest and largest firms, respectively. Importantly, CFO centrality still matters; 
in sample, more central CFOs are 2.3 times less likely than their less connected counterparts to 
have greater than median loan restrictions in smaller firms. The Chi-squared metrics for 
differences in probabilities for degree, closeness, and eigenvector centrality are all significant at 
better than the 10% level. CFOs with greater centrality enjoy less restrictive loan terms 
regardless of firm size.  
5.1.4 Combined centrality and size effects 
I find that larger firms and firms with CEOs and boards with greater network centrality 
are less likely to initiate loans with greater than median covenant restrictions. In an effort to 
identify which effects are most important I combine these studies in order to compare the effects 
of CFO centrality juxtaposed on the smallest and largest firms with less and more central CEOs 
and boards. Tables VIII and IX report results of comparative probabilities among cross sections.  
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Both tables report, as expected, that the influence of the CFO is decreasing in firm size and CEO 
and board centrality, but that more central CFOs retain their ability to negotiate fewer financial 
covenant restrictions. Panels C of tables VIII and IX report that degree, closeness, and 
eigenvector centralities are highly statistically different for differences in the probability of 
greater covenant restrictions. I conclude that central CFOs negotiate and/or are awarded fewer 
financial covenant restrictions than less central CFOs and that the influence of the CFO remains 
significant, but is decreasing, in firm size and the centrality of the firm’s CEO and board.  
5.2 Covenant tightness 
Loan restrictiveness is not only measured in the number of financial covenants but also 
the level at which covenants are set at loan origination. A violation of a covenant threshold is a 
technical default of the loan contract allowing creditors to significantly intervene in firm 
investment and financial policies.
23
  Demiroglu and James (2010) find that the level at which 
covenant thresholds are set conveys information to lenders about firm riskiness, that is, covenant 
thresholds that are closer to the violation state at loan origination signals to lenders that managers 
believe the firm will not violate, and may improve upon, covenant variables in question. 
Managers choosing to set covenant thresholds closer to a violation state signal to lenders that the 
firm is less risky than firms that choose looser thresholds, thus decreasing information 
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. All else equal, it is reasonable to assume that 
managers would prefer to set covenant thresholds further away from a technical violation, thus 
retaining greater contractual flexibility. I test whether more central CFOs negotiate tighter or 
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 Technical violations of covenant thresholds are found to result in higher interest rates and 
decreased credit availability (Beneish and Press, 1993, Dichev and Skinner, 2002), declines in 
investment spending (Chava and Roberts, 2008, Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2009),  reduction s in debt 
issuance and leverage (Roberts and Sufi, 2009) and a decline in acquisitions, capital 
expenditures, dividend payouts, and increased CEO turnover (Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2012).  
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looser covenant thresholds. If the former, then central CFOs signal to lenders their willingness 
and ability to meet or exceed contractual expectations; if the latter, then as with the number of 
financial covenant restrictions, more central CFOs are able to negotiate more flexible loan terms 
for their firms.   
I concentrate on the debt to EBITDA covenant as it is the most common in our sample as 
well as the covenant most often explicitly described in the notes to financial covenants in the 
DealScan database. Of our 852 initial loans, 580 require a maximum debt to EBITDA ratio 
covenant. As firms would not initiate a loan already in technical default, I discard loans if the 
firm has negative cash flow or has a debt to cash flow greater than that allowed by the covenant. 
In both cases, regardless of any notes concerning covenants in the database, it is clear that the 
lender has altered the definition of the covenant at origination. Often lenders allow firms to 
become compliant after a certain date or will make other adjustments as to what is meant by a 
debt to cash flow ratio. As I cannot accurately measure the covenant threshold in these cases I 
must discard these observations. In order to most accurately measure covenant thresholds I 
concentrate only on those loans without significant non-GAAP adjustments. Carefully reading 
through the notes to loan covenants in the DealScan database and discarding all non-compliant 
covenants results in a sample of 257 loans with vanilla debt to EBITDA covenants.
24
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 I define a “vanilla” covenant to be one without serious adjustments, i.e. the firm has positive 
cash flows, is under the maximum debt to EBITDA ratio stipulated in the contract, and the 
language of the notes to the covenant make clear that the ratio is defined as “debt to EBITDA = 
total consolidated debt to EBITDA” or similar. Conversely, discarded or non-vanilla covenants 
are those with serious violations or adjustments at origination; the firm has negative cash flow, 
has a debt to EBITDA ratio that is already beyond that stipulated in the contract, and/or contains 
non-measurable language in the notes to the covenant. An example of the latter is “debt to 
EBITDA = consolidated adjusted total net debt to annualized consolidated adjusted EBIDAX 
with compliance required after FQE 3/2006”. 
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I closely follow Demiroglu and James (2010) in grouping covenants by thresholds under 
the assumption that firms with similar debt to cash flow levels have similar choices of which 
threshold to choose given a “menu” of possible choices. As threshold levels are usually at 
discrete intervals I am able to form groupings of thresholds from which similar borrowers (in 
terms of debt to cash flow ratios) are able to choose. Within each group of thresholds I calculate 
the median borrower debt to EBITDA ratio, labeling the firm’s choice of threshold as “tight” if it 
is firm’s ratio is closer to the chosen threshold than the median firm within the group. I create 
five groups of debt to EBITDA thresholds: below 2.5, 2.5 to less than 3, 3 to less than 3.25, 3.25 
to less than 4, and greater than or equal to 4. Of these, 116 firms chose thresholds that were 
closer to the firm’s debt to EBITDA ratio at loan origination and therefore chose tighter 
thresholds. 141 firms chose looser thresholds.  
Again borrowing from Demiroglu and James (2010) I investigate whether more central 
CFOs negotiate looser or tighter covenant thresholds utilizing a probit model with a dependent 
variable Tight equal to one if the firm’s debt to EBITDA ratio at loan origination is closer to the 
chosen covenant threshold and therefore closer to a violation state. As I have significantly fewer 
observations than in earlier regressions I also create an aggregated CFO centrality indicator 
variable Power, Sample equal to one if the CFO has greater than median centrality in at least 
three of four centrality measures. I also limit our investigation of single centrality variables to in 
sample CFO centrality measures. Control variables are similar to Demiroglu and James (2010) 
and are defined in Appendix A.  
Table X reports results of covenant tightness and CFO centrality. I largely confirm the 
findings of Demiroglu and James (2010) that larger firms choose tighter covenants, perhaps due 
to greater predictability of debt and cash flow at large firms. I also find in agreement that growth 
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firms, proxied by higher market to book ratios, choose looser covenants as it is likely they 
require greater flexibility. However I do not find a significant relationship between threshold 
selection and cash flow volatility, syndicate size, or profitability. This may simply be a reflection 
of sample size (271 observations to their 480 observations), though Demiroglu and James also 
investigate all loans, not initial loans, with lenders thus making direct comparisons difficult. 
Loans that are not initial loans have fewer information asymmetries between borrowers and 
lenders.  
As to the effects of centrality on covenant thresholds I have some evidence to suggest 
that more central CFOs negotiate greater flexibility, choosing looser covenant thresholds. CFOs 
with greater than median eigenvector centrality choose looser covenant thresholds, significant at 
the 5% level. Not surprisingly, the coefficient for CFOs with very high centralities as measured 
by the Power indicator is negative and significant at the 5 % level.  
I again turn to margins analysis to make coefficient estimates economically meaningful. 
Table XI reports probabilities that the firm chooses tight covenant thresholds when the CFO has 
less than or greater than median centrality in sample and when a CFO is highly central in three or 
more centrality measures. Allowing all covariates to vary by observation, the average probability 
that a CFO with greater than median eigenvector centrality chooses a tight covenant threshold is 
30% less than that of a CFO with less than median centrality. A highly central Power CFO is 
37% less likely than a less powerful counterpart to choose a tight covenant threshold. The pattern 
persists across all centrality metrics, though differences in probabilities are significant 
eigenvector and Power centrality and approaches significance for closeness centrality.  
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I conclude in our investigations of CFO centrality and financial covenant restrictions that 
more powerful CFOs in terms of network centrality are able to negotiate fewer restrictive 
covenants and that the covenants chosen are set at levels granting powerful CFOs more 
flexibility. Thus, firms with more powerful CFOs are less likely to be in technical violation of 
loan agreements; greater flexibility in contracting means fewer control rights are assigned to 
creditors ex ante.  
5.3 CFO centrality and the cost of debt 
In theory, spreads and covenants are partial substitutes in contracting. Higher spreads 
compensate lenders for taking on firm default and other general risks while covenants mitigate 
specific firm risks for lenders. For example, higher spreads are charged to riskier borrowers in 
general while a maximum allowable debt to cash flow covenant bars the firm from issuing more 
debt than creditors believe is serviceable. To the extent that spreads and covenant restrictions are 
substitutes it may be that highly central CFOs are simply negotiating greater flexibility with 
regard to specific risks but accepting higher spreads to compensate the lender for greater overall 
firm risk. If I find that covenant restrictions are fewer but spreads are higher I may conclude that 
central CFOs are exchanging flexibility for a higher cost of borrowing, a finding that is 
interesting but not terribly satisfying. However, if I find that there is no effect on spreads or that 
powerful CFOs are able to negotiate lower spreads in addition to greater covenant flexibility I 
may conclude that CFO network centrality is a powerful determinant of loan structure. In the 
latter case, network influence grants borrowing firms significant and economically meaningful 
advantages in contracting.  
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I closely follow Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009) in constructing models testing 
the effect of CFO centrality on loan spreads. To control for the effects of outliers the dependent 
variable is the natural log of the all-in-spread drawn. Like Chava et. al. I also include the 
Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2009) as an independent variable to control for 
managerial entrenchment, which closely resembles the democracy and dictatorship variables of 
interest in their study of shareholder rights and the cost of debt. Other independent variables 
include firm and loan controls, and time, industry, loan purpose, and macro controls. Robust 
standard errors are clustered by firm. I report results in Table XII.  
Model 1 of Table XIII recreates Chava et. al. in examining the role of shareholder rights 
on the cost of debt, and I report strong support of their findings. The Entrenchment Index, 
wherein higher numbers represent managers more insulated from the discipline of the market for 
corporate control, is a negative and statistically significant determinant of the cost of private debt 
at better than the 1% level. More entrenched managers are rewarded with lower spreads at an 
economically meaningful level.
25
 Other results show that firms with greater leverage and those 
closer to default (higher modified Altman’s Z score) pay higher spreads, compensating lenders 
for default risk. I find that firms with higher market to book ratios pay lower spreads. Non-price 
loan terms are also significant determinants of the cost of debt. I find that performance pricing 
and revolving loans, both allowing for more creditor control and monitoring, decrease the cost of 
debt. Finally, I find that larger syndicates imply more credit worthy borrowers and therefore 
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 Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009) argue that banks are concerned about an increase in 
financial risk if the borrower is acquired during the term of the loan. Jandik and McCumber 
(2012) also investigates specific takeover defenses and find similar results, broadening the 
discussion of increased risk to include asset substitution, liquidity, and renegotiation costs 
associated with borrower acquisitions. Thus, although vulnerability to the market for corporate 
control is positive for shareholders in that it decreases agency costs between shareholders and 
managers, takeover vulnerability is priced negatively by private creditors.  
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lower spreads. Longer loans also have lower spreads, a puzzling result, but one that holds 
regardless of tenor specification and time controls; it is possible that this merely reflects the high 
likelihood that longer loans will be renegotiated prior to stated maturity (Roberts and Sufi, 2009).  
Models two through five include CFO centrality percentages in the greater network while 
models six through nine include CFO centrality indicator variables equal to one if the CFO is 
more central than the median CFO in sample. Regardless of specification I report that CFO 
centrality is a negative and highly significant determinant of loan spreads. All are significant at 
greater than the 1% level. Highly central CFOs negotiate lower spreads for their firms.  
To capture the economic significance of these findings I calculate both the natural log of 





percentile of centralities in our sample. Table XIII reports results. Panel A compares log spreads 




 percentile while Panel B reports spreads in basis points. I calculate 
spreads two ways. The first four columns report average spreads allowing all covariates to vary 
by observation while the last four columns hold all covariates at the mean when reporting 
spreads; the results are similar whether allowing covariates to vary or when spread differences 
are calculated for the “average” firm. Under either specification Panel B reports that CFOs 
whose centrality is at the 90
th
 percentile negotiate spreads 21-38 basis points lower than CFOs at 
the 10
th
 percentile in sample, a savings equivalent to 17% to 30% of the mean loan spread of 125 
basis points. I conclude that highly central CFOs not only negotiate fewer loan restrictiveness 
terms of covenant restrictions but also negotiate a lower cost of debt for their firms; greater CFO 




5.4 CFO centrality and syndicate size 
If CFO centrality decreases information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders it is 
likely that the lead arranger is able to sell participations to a greater number of lenders when the 
CFO is more central. Not all syndicate members are lead arrangers; many are participants in that 
they purchase a portion of the loan for their own portfolios from the lead arranger and are not 
privy to all loan negotiations. Sufi (2007) finds that borrower reputation mitigates information 
asymmetry problems, allowing lead arrangers to sell more of the loan to syndicate members. I 
hypothesize that CFO centrality decreases information asymmetry due to increased information 
flows and reputation effects. To test this hypothesis I return to our base model (1) where the 
dependent variable is the size of the lending syndicate. Table XIV reports results. 
Model 1 is a baseline regression without centrality variables. I find that syndicate size is 
increasing in the stated length of the loan and in firm leverage. This makes intuitive sense as 
longer loans to more leveraged firms are issued to well-established, relatively transparent firms. 
Revolving loans are issued to riskier borrowers as they require more frequent and thorough due 
diligence processes. I find that revolving loans have fewer syndicate members. And to the extent 
that firms with higher market to book ratios are growth firms that are thought to be more opaque 
and less predictable with regard to future cash flows it makes sense that loans to firms with 
higher market to book ratios have fewer participants.   
Models two through five include CFO centrality percentages in the greater network while 
models six through nine include CFO centrality indicator variables equal to one if the CFO is 
more central than the median CFO in sample. CFO centrality is a positive and statistically 
significant determinant of the number of lenders in a syndicate. All centrality coefficients are 
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significant at better than the 1% level with the exception of in sample betweenness centrality 
which is significant at the 5% level. I conclude that higher CFO centrality allows lead arrangers 
to sell more participations to syndicate members. Higher CFO centrality decreases informational 
risk while CFO reputation effects mitigate agency risk between borrowers and lenders.  
5.5 Robustness  
5.5.1 Ex-post firm performance 
While I argue that centrality decreases information asymmetries between borrowers and 
lenders and/or incentivizes CFOs to perform well due to reputation effects it is possible that 
centrality is also a proxy for celebrity. Banks may award firms with more generous loan terms if 
CFOs have the power to “strong-arm” lenders into granting favorable spreads and covenant 
structure, holding risk constant. It is possible that CFO centrality incentivizes lenders to be more 
generous, perhaps because banks wish to attract high-profile borrowers to become clients. If this 
is the case then lenders’ more generous loan terms represent a wealth transfer from the lender to 
the borrowing firm as loan terms are more favorable to the firms with more central CFOs than 
would otherwise be the case for the same level of borrower risk.  
Though I do not have data on the performance of specific loans ex-post I proxy for loan 
performance by testing whether there is deterioration in profitability and solvency, as proxied by 
Altman’s Z scores in the latter case, one, two, and three years after a loan is initiated. I choose 
these proxies as it is likely that lenders are concerned with profitability and default risk; these are 
consistently significant determinants of loan spreads and covenant structure in this paper and 
extant literature. I gather quarterly data from Compustat to calculate profitability and Z scores 4, 
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8, and 12 quarters after loan initiation. I collect data through July, 2012 to obtain as many ex-
post observations as possible for our loan sample.  
I first examine whether there is a relationship between CFO centrality and changes in 
firm profitability one, two, and three years ex-post relative to profitability at loan initiation. I 
measure profitability as the ratio of net income to firm assets (ROA) and calculate changes as the 
difference between future ROA and firm ROA at loan initiation. Thus, if firm performance 
deteriorates ex-post I will see negative changes in profitability. I retain the same model 
specification as before with regard to firm, loan, industry, macro, and time controls. The 
dependent variable is the change in profitability and the variables of interest are CFO centrality 
variables, in percent, at loan origination. I next examine whether borrower financial strength 
increases or decreases in firms with more central CFOs. The dependent variable is changes in 
Altman’s Z 4, 8, and 12 quarters after loan origination. With regard to both changes in 
profitability and subsequent solvency I find no evidence that firms with more connected CFOs 
and more generous loan contracts underperform relative to their peers.  
5.5.2 Endogenous covariates 
Considering that spreads and financial covenants are negotiated by borrowers and lenders 
in a single contract one may argue that these are simultaneously determined. In order to test 
whether our results are affected by our model specifications I reran all tests as systems of 
simultaneous equations and again allowing and testing for the presence of endogenous 
covariates. In tests of our logit specification wherein the dependent variable is an indicator equal 
to one if a loan has greater than the median financial covenants I safely conclude that spread may 
be viewed an exogenous regressor. In tests where the dependent variable is the natural log of the 
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spread I find that financial covenants are quasi-endogenous, that is, tests of endogeneity 
approach statistical significance (p-value of 18%). I run regressions inclusive of financial 
covenant structure in spread regressions, with no change to our variables of interest (not 
reported). I drop financial covenants in regressions reported above to be consistent with the 
results of Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009).  
5.5.3 Direct connections between borrowers and lenders 
Engleberg, Gao, and Parsons (2012) find that past personal relationships between lenders 
and borrowers, such as when two people graduate from the same educational institution within 
two years of each other or when past professional associations (i.e. both worked for the same 
firm in the past), decreases information asymmetries leading to a lower cost of debt for borrower 
firms. Although centrality measures network influence regardless of personal relationships I 
attempt to control for the effect of personal relationships for robustness. I follow Engleberg et. al. 
to identify past school and professional connections and find no instances where CEOs, CFOs, or 
board members of borrower firms shared educational or professional experiences with syndicate 
members. This is unsurprising since Engleberg et.al. employ a much larger sample of initial and 
all past loans and find only that only a small percentage of the time do these relationships exist.
26
 
While I cannot be certain that no relationships exist per Engleberg et.al. I am confident that the 
paucity of observations suggests that these are not driving our results.  
I then go one step further, identifying instances where executives and board members of 
borrowers and lenders have direct connections between parties to loan contracts. I examine the 
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 The authors’ database includes 5,057 borrowers and approximately 1,924 commercial banks 
with a network of 65,074 individuals. Our database consists only of deals where no previous 
loans exist between 588 borrowers and 268 lenders.  
82 
 
current and past employment histories of all parties to determine whether, for example, an 
executive of a borrower had been previously employed by a lender in the syndicate or vice versa. 
I also examine whether board members have or had a pecuniary relationship with both parties, 
such as when legal counsel for a borrower also served as a consultant or legal counsel to a 
lender. I identify 50 instances where a significant past relationship existed between borrowers 
and lenders where the executive or board member in question had some professional experience 
with the other party to the loan. In these cases the professional experience is in the past; a 
borrower CEO used to be an employee of a syndicate member or vice versa. I also find 27 cases 
wherein such a relationship is current; the executive or board member of one party is also 
employed (either as a consultant, legal counsel, or board member) by the other party. I rerun our 
regressions to control for these relationships and find that, unsurprisingly, direct professional 
experience of both parties to a loan contract lowers information asymmetries. Both past and 
current professional experience of the other party decreases the likelihood that the borrower had 
greater than median financial covenant restrictions and lowers the cost of debt for borrower 
firms. Past relationships are marginally significant at the 10% level in tests of financial covenant 
restrictions while current professional relationships are significant at better than the 1% level. 
Both past and current professional experiences are only marginally significant in lowering loan 
spreads.
27
 Most importantly, however, the economic and statistical significance of centrality 
variables are unchanged when controlling for past and current direct professional experience. I 
also rerun regressions dropping the 50 past and 27 current relational observations and our results 
are unchanged.  
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 For parsimony I do not report results, though they are available upon request.  
83 
 
5.5.4 Alternative model specifications 
In tests of ex-post firm performance I alter our model specification to replicate the ex-
post firm performance model specifications of Engleberg et.al. (2012). I find no changes in 
results to the variables of interest.  
It may be that central CFOs are choosing covenants over which they exercise greater 
control. I test whether CFO centrality is a determinant of the presence of specific loan covenants 
and find no relation between centrality and specific covenants.  
Finally, I use different variables for firm, loan, and other controls found in the literature, 
finding our results robust to alternate model specifications.  
6. Conclusion 
I present evidence that CFO network centrality has a direct and meaningful impact on the 
pricing and structure of private debt. Firms with highly central CFOs enjoy a lower cost of 
borrowing and increased flexibility with regard to both the number of financial covenants and the 
thresholds at which covenants are set ex ante. Our evidence supports the theory that centrality 
decreases information asymmetries amongst contractual parties as well as the broader network. 
The evidence also supports the theory that network flows serve as a “hidden lever” of corporate 
governance in that reputational effects and informal enforcement mechanisms restrain executive 
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Table I: Loan and Firm Summary Statistics 







Panel A : Firm Characterisitics N Mean 10% 50% 90% Std Dev
Assets, $MM 852 4,321.68 437.11 1,620.04 9,873.30 8,766.50
Market Capitalization, $MM 852 4,447.23 393.34 1,788.60 11,000.00 9,208.84
Market to Book 852 1.31 0.39 0.96 2.51 1.12
Sales to EBITDA 852 18.40 -9.25 15.30 54.44 117.94
Leverage Ratio 852 0.25 0.03 0.24 0.45 0.17
Modified Altman's Z 852 1.88 0.66 1.78 3.19 1.09
Entrenchment Index 852 1.24 0 1 3 1.29
Panel B : Loan Characteristics N Mean 10% 50% 90% Std Dev
Spread, bps over LIBOR 852 153.12 35 125 325 123.15
No. Financial Covenants 852 1.94 1 2 3 0.76
Financial Covenants > Median (2) 852 0.20 0 0 1 0.40
Tenor 852 52.89 36 60 61 14.72
Syndicate Size 852 11.34 3 9 21 9.41
Dealsize to Assets 852 0.25 0.06 0.19 0.50 0.24
Pricing Grid 852 0.84 0 1 1 0.36
Revolving Line of Credit > 13 mo. 852 0.78 0 1 1 0.42
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Table II: Centrality Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics of borrower executive and board centrality metrics, as defined in section two 





CFO Centrality N Mean 10% 50% 90% Std Dev
Degree, % 852 68.93 38 72 96 21.74
Betweenness % 852 72.29 44 78 95 21.65
Closeness % 852 74.56 49 78 97 18.27
Eigenvector % 852 72.69 46 75 96 18.48
CEO Centrality N Mean 10% 50% 90% Std Dev
Degree, % 852 75.84 45 82 98 20.99
Betweenness % 852 79.96 50 86 98 19.25
Closeness % 852 78.76 51 84 98 18.04
Eigenvector % 852 76.72 51 79 97 18.10
Mean Board Centrality N Mean 10% 50% 90% Std Dev
Degree, % 774 78.01 57.17 80.63 93.60 13.97
Betweenness % 774 81.82 65.60 84.00 94.67 11.94
Closeness % 774 79.78 58.17 83.68 95.00 14.43
Eigenvector % 774 77.36 55.33 80.59 93.10 14.61
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Table III: CFO Centrality and Loan Structure, Logit, Financial Covenants  
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the loan has more than the median 
number of financial covenants. Independent variables include CFO centrality metrics, and 
controls. Variables are as defined as in the paper and in Appendix A. Errors are robust to firm 
heteroskedasticity, in parentheses. Statistical significance is designated as ***, **, and * at the 












0.4599*** 0.3823** 0.4497*** 0.4093*** 0.4236***
(0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15)
-0.4778 -0.4249 -0.4421 -0.4669 -0.4584
(0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
0.0098 0.0157 0.0094 0.0157 0.0136
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.0416 -0.2368 -0.1687 -0.2426 -0.1858
(0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
0.7338 0.5583 0.7219 0.6019 0.6852
(0.51) (0.53) (0.50) (0.52) (0.52)
0.4122 0.5503 0.5300 0.5515 0.5255
(0.31) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.33)
0.0334 0.0824 0.0747 0.0862 0.0797
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
-0.2733 -0.2689 -0.2694 -0.2709 -0.2637
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
0.3216 0.8079 0.7499 0.8222 0.6832
(0.59) (0.70) (0.69) (0.70) (0.70)
0.1836* 0.1831 0.1821* 0.1892* 0.1860*
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
0.3964*** 0.3974*** 0.3999*** 0.4067*** 0.3997***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Loan Purpose Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 852 852 852 852 852
Deal Size
Centrality, Percent





























0.4095*** 0.4650*** 0.4266*** 0.4405***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
-0.5043 -0.4588 -0.4732 -0.4743
(0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.34)
0.0126 0.0071 0.0148 0.0102
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
-0.1997 -0.1544 -0.2252 -0.1735
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
0.6086 0.7440 0.5854 0.7305
(0.51) (0.50) (0.52) (0.50)
0.5205 0.5204 0.5480 0.5527*
(0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.33)
0.0779 0.0672 0.0827 0.0641
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
-0.2310 -0.2690 -0.2378 -0.2695
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
0.6740 0.7184 0.6218 0.4488
(0.69) (0.69) (0.69) (0.69)
0.1751 0.1849* 0.1687 0.1726
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
0.3939*** 0.3985*** 0.3954*** 0.4003***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Loan Purpose Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 852 852 852 852
Entrenchment Index
Centrality, Power Indicator 0/1









Revolver > 13 months
Deal Size







Table IV: Margins Analysis of CFO Centrality and Financial Covenants 
Comparable probabilities of inclusion of greater than median financial covenants in initial loan 
contracts, 1998-2010. The confidence interval is 99% that predicted probabilities are +/- the standard 
errors, in parentheses. Panel A compares CFOs in the 10
th
 and 90th percentiles of centrality in the 
network while Panel B compares CFOs in the lower and upper halves of centrality in sample. 
Panel C reports Chi
2
 metrics for significant differences in the probability of increased financial 
covenant restrictions for less central CFOs in sample. Statistical significance is designated as 
***, **, and * at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Centrality variables are as defined as 



































Average Marginal Effects Marginal Effects at Means
Margins, CFO Power at 10th and 90th percentile, whole network
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Observations 852 852 852 852 852 852 852 852
Panel C
18.23*** 2.65 17.53*** 11.52*** 18.47*** 2.65 17.21*** 11.51***
Observations 852 852 852 852 852 852 852 852
Chi
2
 of difference in sample margins
Average Marginal Effects Marginal Effects at Means
Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector
Margins, CFO Power greater than median in sample















Table V: Margins Analysis of CFO Centrality, Financial Covenants and CEO Centrality 
Comparable probabilities of inclusion of greater than median financial covenants in initial loan 
contracts, 1998-2010, in firms divided by high and low CEO centrality. Panel A compares CFOs 
in the 10
th
 and 90th percentiles of centrality in the network while Panel B compares CFOs in the 
lower and upper halves of centrality in sample. Panel C reports Chi
2
 metrics for significant 
differences in the probability of increased financial covenant restrictions for less central CFOs in 
sample. Statistical significance is designated as ***, **, and * at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 





0.3652 0.3062 0.4233 0.3957
(0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
0.2952 0.2317 0.3553 0.3290
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
0.1594 0.1900 0.1632 0.1643
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.1197 0.1368 0.1261 0.1267
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 852 852 852 852
Panel B
0.2461 0.2331 0.2500 0.2467
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.1730 0.1974 0.1642 0.1749
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.1853 0.1685 0.1946 0.1910
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.1264 0.1403 0.1238 0.1317
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 852 852 852 852
Panel C
0 5.41** 1.31 7.14*** 5.28**
1 4.63** 1.25 6.00** 4.57**
Observations 852 852 852 852
Chi
2







1 = Powerful 
CEO




1 = Powerful 
CEO











1 = Powerful 
CEO
CFO Centrality 
in the __ 
percentile
CFO Power at 10th and 90th percentile, whole network
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0.3396 0.2686 0.4074 0.3728
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
0.2594 0.1880 0.3263 0.2942
(0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10)
0.1203 0.1464 0.1223 0.1222
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.0852 0.0976 0.0894 0.0890
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 852 852 852 852
Panel B
0.2048 0.1883 0.2087 0.2025
-0.03 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.1318 0.1524 0.1237 0.1312
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
0.1434 0.1250 0.1525 0.1464
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.0898 0.0997 0.0878 0.0926
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 852 852 852 852
Panel C
0 5.47** 1.32 7.20*** 5.33**
1 4.22** 1.21 5.37** 4.19**
Observations 852 852 852 852
Chi
2
 of difference in sample margins
Marginal Effects at Means
1 = Powerful 
CEO







CFO Power greater than median in sample
Marginal Effects at Means
1 = Powerful 
CEO







CFO Power at 10th and 90th percentile, whole network
Marginal Effects at Means
1 = Powerful 
CEO
CFO Centrality 
in the __ 
percentile
Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector
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Table VI: Margins Analysis of CFO Centrality, Financial Covenants and Board Centrality 
Comparable probabilities of inclusion of greater than median financial covenants in initial loan 
contracts, 1998-2010, in firms divided by high and low board centrality. Panel A compares CFOs 
in the 10
th
 and 90th percentiles of centrality in the network while Panel B compares CFOs in the 
lower and upper halves of centrality in sample. Panel C reports Chi
2
 metrics for significant 
differences in the probability of increased financial covenant restrictions for less central CFOs in 
sample. Statistical significance is designated as ***, **, and * at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 





0.3779 0.3262 0.4022 0.3858
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
0.2412 0.1889 0.2752 0.2580
(0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09)
0.1595 0.1886 0.1679 0.1677
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.0877 0.0983 0.0995 0.0976
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 774 774 774 774
Panel B
0.2524 0.2380 0.2457 0.2433
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.1740 0.2001 0.1741 0.1854
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.1410 0.1250 0.1461 0.1396
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
0.0915 0.1019 0.0985 0.1019
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 774 774 774 774
Panel C
0 5.11** 1.24 4.09** 2.41
1 3.78* 1.13 2.90* 1.77
Observations 774 774 774 774
Average Marginal Effects
Closeness EigenvectorDegree Betweenness

























1 = Powerful 
Board
Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector
CFO Centrality 
in the __ 
percentile
CFO Power at 10th and 90th percentile, whole network
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0.3571 0.2956 0.3843 0.3640
(0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09)
0.2048 0.1499 0.2392 0.2199
(0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10)
0.1240 0.1497 0.1303 0.1295
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.0616 0.0689 0.0702 0.0682
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 774 774 774 774
Panel B
0.2157 0.1984 0.2076 0.2035
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.1368 0.1601 0.1361 0.1455
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.1063 0.0907 0.1103 0.1033
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
0.0641 0.0713 0.0694 0.0713
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 774 774 774 774
Panel C
0 5.23** 1.25 4.24** 2.51
1 3.36* 1.08 2.59 1.62
Observations 774 774 774 774
Chi
2
 of difference in sample margins
Marginal Effects at Means
1 = Powerful 
Board







CFO Power greater than median in sample
Marginal Effects at Means
1 = Powerful 
Board







CFO Power at 10th and 90th percentile, whole network
Marginal Effects at Means
1 = Powerful 
Board
CFO Centrality 
in the __ 
percentile
Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector
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Table VII: Margins Analysis of CFO Centrality, Financial Covenants and Firm Size 
Comparable probabilities of inclusion of greater than median financial covenants in initial loan 
contracts, 1998-2010, in firms divided into quartiles by the log of assets. Panel A compares 
CFOs in the 10
th
 and 90th percentiles of centrality in the network while Panel B compares CFOs in 
the lower and upper halves of centrality in sample. Panel C reports Chi
2
 metrics for significant 
differences in the probability of increased financial covenant restrictions for less central CFOs in 
sample. Statistical significance is designated as ***, **, and * at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 









Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector
0.4801 0.4130 0.5454 0.5397
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
0.2919 0.3540 0.2922 0.2957
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.3522 0.2782 0.4139 0.4029
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
0.1942 0.2304 0.1946 0.1936
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.2419 0.1731 0.2938 0.2797
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06)
0.1224 0.1392 0.1227 0.1195
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.1567 0.1008 0.1958 0.1815
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
0.0738 0.0792 0.0740 0.0703
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.4819 0.4040 0.5573 0.5506
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
0.2672 0.3363 0.2670 0.2712
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.3344 0.2520 0.4048 0.3923
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
0.1646 0.2011 0.1644 0.1639
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
0.2135 0.1434 0.2687 0.2537
(0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07)
0.0962 0.1112 0.0961 0.0936
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.1279 0.0768 0.1656 0.1519
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
0.0544 0.0585 0.0543 0.0516
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)






























Table VII cont: Margins Analysis of CFO Centrality, Financial Covenants and Firm Size 
 
Panel B
0.3844 0.3764 0.3921 0.3985
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
0.1675 0.1482 0.1747 0.1695
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.3149 0.3672 0.2997 0.3165
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.1279 0.1431 0.1216 0.1235
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.2625 0.2457 0.2705 0.2697
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
0.1010 0.0838 0.1066 0.1001
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.2070 0.2384 0.1966 0.2044
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.0751 0.0806 0.0717 0.0707
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.3713 0.3619 0.3801 0.3875
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.1385 0.1194 0.1454 0.1406
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.2928 0.3513 0.2759 0.2946
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
0.1013 0.1146 0.0956 0.0975
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.2355 0.2171 0.2441 0.2434
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.0774 0.0622 0.0823 0.0768
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.1776 0.2094 0.1672 0.1752
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.0555 0.0595 0.0528 0.0521
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Panel C
1 2.90* 0.05 4.54** 3.72*
2 2.89* 0.05 4.54** 3.74*
3 2.74* 0.05 4.31** 3.63*
4 2.44 0.05 3.74* 3.28*
1 2.97* 0.05 4.64** 3.80*
2 2.92* 0.05 4.59** 3.77*
3 2.69 0.05 4.20** 3.55*
4 2.26 0.05 3.44* 3.05*
Observations 852 852 852 852
Marginal Effects at Means
Chi
2




































Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector
100 
 
Table VIII: Margins, Firm Size and CEO Centrality 
Comparable probabilities of inclusion of greater than median financial covenants in initial loan 
contracts, 1998-2010, in firms in the lowest and highest quartile of the log of assets and CEO 
centrality. Panel A compares CFOs in the 10
th
 and 90th percentiles of centrality in the network 
while Panel B compares CFOs in the lower and upper halves of centrality in sample. Panel C 
reports Chi
2
 metrics for significant differences in the probability of increased financial covenant 
restrictions for less central CFOs in sample. Statistical significance is designated as ***, **, and 
* at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Centrality variables are as defined as in the paper 
and in Appendices. 
 
Panel A
0.4069 0.3106 0.4816 0.4516
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
0.3309 0.2206 0.4120 0.3782
(0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10)
0.4185 0.3248 0.5010 0.4709
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
0.3416 0.2322 0.4309 0.3966
(0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10)
0.1644 0.2071 0.1648 0.1647
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.1230 0.1399 0.1284 0.1259
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
0.1712 0.2182 0.1761 0.1760
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.1285 0.1483 0.1377 0.1351
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.3970 0.2882 0.4819 0.4473
(0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09)
0.3116 0.1924 0.4019 0.3634
(0.09) (0.06) (0.12) (0.11)
0.4102 0.3039 0.5043 0.4695
(0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
0.3235 0.2044 0.4236 0.3844
(0.09) (0.06) (0.12) (0.11)
0.1377 0.1787 0.1369 0.1368
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.0989 0.1135 0.1028 0.1005
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.1443 0.1900 0.1478 0.1477
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.1039 0.1213 0.1114 0.1089
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
































in the __ 
Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector
101 
 
Table VIII Cont: Margins, Firm Size and CEO Centrality 
 
Panel B
0.2750 0.2447 0.2766 0.2643
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
0.1723 0.2173 0.1661 0.1880
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.2064 0.1647 0.2150 0.1949
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
0.1241 0.1442 0.1240 0.1343
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
0.2836 0.2562 0.2836 0.2719
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.1786 0.2280 0.1711 0.1941
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
0.2136 0.1735 0.2210 0.2012
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
0.1290 0.1521 0.1280 0.1390
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.2811 0.2464 0.2829 0.2690
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
0.1559 0.2093 0.1518 0.1775
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
0.1971 0.1486 0.2047 0.1822
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
0.1038 0.1238 0.1045 0.1155
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
0.2584 0.2253 0.2563 0.2417
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
0.1413 0.1906 0.1352 0.1574
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.1794 0.1344 0.1835 0.1618
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
0.0936 0.1117 0.0925 0.1016
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Panel C
Smallest No 13.82*** 1.94 12.46*** 7.30***
Smallest Yes 9.98*** 1.80 9.28*** 5.87**
Largest No 13.11*** 1.91 12.40*** 7.15***
Largest Yes 9.31*** 1.75 9.05*** 5.69**
Smallest No 13.70*** 1.96 12.37*** 7.36***
Smallest Yes 8.92*** 1.75 8.39*** 5.45**
Largest No 12.86*** 1.92 12.31*** 7.18***
Largest Yes 8.20*** 1.70 8.12*** 5.24**
Observations 852 852 852 852
Marginal Effects at Means
Chi
2
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Table IX: Margins, Firm Size and Board Centrality  
Comparable probabilities of inclusion of greater than median financial covenants in initial loan 
contracts, 1998-2010, in firms in the lowest and highest quartile of the log of assets and board 




 percentiles of centrality in the population 
while Panel B compares CFOs in the lower and upper halves of centrality in sample. Panel C 
reports Chi
2
 metrics of differences in probabilities given differing CFO centrality. Centrality 
variables are as defined as in the paper and in Appendix A. Errors are robust to firm 
heteroskedasticity, in parentheses. Statistical significance is designated as ***, **, and * at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A
0.4651 0.4640 0.4152 0.4059
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
0.2290 0.1999 0.2695 0.2427
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
0.3048 0.2811 0.2446 0.2163
(0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08)
0.1282 0.1014 0.1423 0.1146
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
0.3068 0.2834 0.2530 0.2251
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
0.1293 0.1024 0.1480 0.1199
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.1812 0.1515 0.1319 0.1050
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
0.0673 0.0490 0.0709 0.0521
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
0.4968 0.5005 0.5072 0.5123
(0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11)
0.2413 0.2124 0.2364 0.2074
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
0.3436 0.324 0.3526 0.3342
(0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15)
0.1424 0.1142 0.1388 0.1112
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.3269 0.3052 0.3266 0.3051
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
0.1331 0.1057 0.1250 0.0986
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
0.2036 0.1736 0.2032 0.1734
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
0.0729 0.0535 0.0679 0.0497
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)





































Table IX Cont: Margins, Firm Size and Board Centrality  
 
Panel B
0.3444 0.3256 0.3336 0.332
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
0.2388 0.2924 0.251 0.2779
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
0.2009 0.173 0.1998 0.1875
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
0.1292 0.1513 0.1421 0.1507
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
0.2064 0.1782 0.1921 0.1812
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
0.1332 0.156 0.1361 0.1454
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
0.109 0.0839 0.1043 0.0912
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
0.0664 0.072 0.0709 0.0711
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.325 0.3041 0.313 0.3113
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
0.2098 0.2674 0.223 0.2518
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.1709 0.1439 0.1702 0.1582
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
0.1021 0.1231 0.1144 0.1228
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
0.1764 0.1489 0.1625 0.1521
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
0.1057 0.1275 0.1089 0.1178
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
0.084 0.063 0.0804 0.0694
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
0.0481 0.0532 0.0522 0.0526
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Panel C
Smallest No 5.82** 1.67 4.68** 2.83*
Smallest Yes 4.14** 1.49 3.08* 1.95
Largest No 6.16** 1.72 4.53** 2.63*
Largest Yes 4.43** 1.56 3.17* 1.95
Smallest No 5.52** 1.63 4.56** 2.82*
Smallest Yes 3.64* 1.39 2.75* 1.78
Largest No 6.40** 1.76 4.70** 2.72*
Largest Yes 3.92** 1.49 2.83* 1.79
Observations 774 774 774 774
Marginal Effects at Means
Chi
2
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Table X: CFO Centrality and Covenant Tightness 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the debt to ebitda covenant is 
“tight” in that firm is closer to the level at which the covenant is set. Independent variables 
include CFO centrality metrics and controls. Variables are as defined as in the paper and in 
Appendix A. Errors are robust to firm heteroskedasticity, in parentheses. Statistical significance 















0.2452 0.2037 0.2124 0.1981 0.2048 0.1880
(0.31) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33)
0.2985* 0.3636** 0.3413** 0.3628** 0.3519** 0.3301**
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
-0.8170 -0.9124 -0.7672 -0.9535 -1.2020 -0.8601
(0.90) (0.95) (0.94) (0.96) (0.96) (0.97)
-0.0910 -0.0865 -0.1076 -0.0814 -0.0656 -0.0558
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
-0.3413*** -0.3899*** -0.3982*** -0.3841*** -0.3955*** -0.3927***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
0.0013 0.0005 0.0007 0.0006 0.0009 0.0006
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.1969 0.2011 0.2000 0.2042 0.1942 0.1886
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
0.4784 0.4834 0.5063 0.4488 0.4204 0.4333
(0.33) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
-0.3616 -0.3158 -0.3022 -0.2793 -0.2036 -0.2439
(0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29)
-0.0560 -0.1461 -0.1535 -0.1435 -0.1632 -0.1499
(0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Loan Purpose Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 271 257 257 257 257 257


















Table XI: Margins Analysis of CFO Centrality and Covenant Tightness 
Comparable probabilities of debt to ebitda covenant tightness.  Panel A compares CFOs in the 
lower and upper halves of centrality in sample. Power, Network and Power, Sample variables are 
as defined in the paper and Appendix A. Panel B reports Chi
2
 metrics of differences in 
probabilities given differing CFO centrality. Centrality variables are as defined as in the paper 
and in Appendix A. Errors are robust to firm heteroskedasticity, in parentheses. Statistical 



























Observations 227 227 227 227 227
Panel B
1.41 0.16 2.05 6.32** 4.81**
Observations 257 257 257 257 257
Average Marginal Effects





















CFO Power greater than median
106 
 
























Observations 227 227 227 227 227
Panel B
1.41 0.16 2.06 6.32** 4.70**
Observations 257 257 257 257 257
Chi
2
 of difference in sample margins
Marginal Effects at Means














CFO Power greater than median






Table XII: CFO Centrality and Loan Spreads 
The dependent variable is the natural log of loan all-in-spread. Independent variables include 
CFO centrality metrics, and controls. Variables are as defined as in the paper and in Appendix A. 
Errors are robust to firm heteroskedasticity, in parentheses. Statistical significance is designated 












-0.0116*** -0.0106*** -0.0109*** -0.0109*** -0.0109***
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
-0.0117*** -0.0097*** -0.0114*** -0.0103*** -0.0110***
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0033)
-0.5671*** -0.5569*** -0.5514*** -0.5605*** -0.5529***
(0.0711) (0.0716) (0.0725) (0.0714) (0.0718)
-0.2947*** -0.2983*** -0.3128*** -0.3038*** -0.3114***
(0.0701) (0.0718) (0.0733) (0.0728) (0.0737)
-0.1839*** -0.1779*** -0.1793*** -0.1786*** -0.1802***
(0.0307) (0.0343) (0.0333) (0.0342) (0.0340)
-0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
0.5064*** 0.5204*** 0.5577*** 0.5338*** 0.5208***
(0.1601) (0.1882) (0.1893) (0.1903) (0.1901)
-0.0962*** -0.1026*** -0.0989*** -0.0997*** -0.0980***
(0.0264) (0.0273) (0.0274) (0.0273) (0.0275)
-0.1390*** -0.1426*** -0.1410*** -0.1417*** -0.1425***
(0.0187) (0.0189) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0191)
Loan Purpose Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 899 852 852 852 852
































-0.0111*** -0.0109*** -0.0110*** -0.0110***
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
-0.0104*** -0.0121*** -0.0106*** -0.0117***
(0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034)
-0.5527*** -0.5529*** -0.5632*** -0.5549***
(0.0721) (0.0727) (0.0722) (0.0722)
-0.3093*** -0.3180*** -0.3058*** -0.3100***
(0.0725) (0.0737) (0.0728) (0.0736)
-0.1797*** -0.1816*** -0.1803*** -0.1842***
(0.0345) (0.0332) (0.0343) (0.0343)
0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
0.4912** 0.5515*** 0.4982*** 0.4925**
(0.1910) (0.1899) (0.1911) (0.1920)
-0.1030*** -0.0987*** -0.1021*** -0.0985***
(0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0275)
-0.1425*** -0.1430*** -0.1434*** -0.1419***
(0.0190) (0.0192) (0.0189) (0.0190)
Loan Purpose Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 852 852 852 852





Centrality, Power Indicator 0/1
6 7 8 9
Tenor
Syndicate Size
Revolver > 13 months
Pricing Grid
Market to Book







Table XIII: Margins Analysis of CFO Centrality and Loan Spreads 
Predicted log spreads from regressions of CFO centrality and controls on log spreads. Panel A 




 percentiles of CFO centrality in the sample. 
Panel B reports levels and differences of spreads in basis points over LIBOR.  Statistical 

























Observations 852 852 852 852 852 852 852 852
Panel B













Observations 852 852 852 852 852 852 852 852




















Table XIV: CFO Centrality and Syndicate Size 
The dependent variable is the number of participants, syndicate size. Independent variables 
include CFO centrality metrics, and controls. Variables are as defined as in the paper and in 
Appendix A. Errors are robust to firm heteroskedasticity, in parentheses. Statistical significance 













0.1026*** 0.0986*** 0.1035*** 0.1034*** 0.1041***
(0.0242) (0.0241) (0.0243) (0.0240) (0.0242)
-2.8915** -2.7241** -2.8490** -2.6659** -2.8179**
(1.2379) (1.2237) (1.2541) (1.2241) (1.2437)
3.5648*** 2.9279** 3.1975*** 2.9904** 3.1561***
(1.1532) (1.1862) (1.2027) (1.1965) (1.2087)
-0.8928*** -0.9336*** -0.9339*** -0.9359*** -0.9171***
(0.2041) (0.1890) (0.2045) (0.1899) (0.1902)
-0.0010 -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0015
(0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0027)
5.3136** 4.8823** 4.6367** 4.7913** 5.1166**
(2.4240) (2.2930) (2.3340) (2.3367) (2.3687)
0.1091 0.3712 0.3502 0.3489 0.3262
(0.2943) (0.2824) (0.2915) (0.2863) (0.2872)
0.0520 0.0419 0.0240 0.0333 0.0478
(0.2739) (0.2760) (0.2822) (0.2759) (0.2773)
Loan Purpose Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 901 852 852 852 852





























0.1077*** 0.1074*** 0.1052*** 0.1068***
(0.0240) (0.0248) (0.0240) (0.0243)
-2.8163** -2.8471** -2.6240** -2.8205**
(1.2357) (1.2657) (1.2230) (1.2546)
3.1353*** 3.3543*** 3.0065** 3.1821***
(1.1925) (1.2188) (1.2081) (1.2035)
-0.9151*** -0.8891*** -0.9170*** -0.8608***
(0.1863) (0.2020) (0.1880) (0.1917)
-0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0013
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0027)
5.3130** 4.7444** 5.4510** 5.6033**
(2.3304) (2.3542) (2.3117) (2.3565)
0.3704 0.2982 0.4052 0.3310
(0.2811) (0.2926) (0.2897) (0.2872)
0.0372 0.0380 0.0647 0.0334
(0.2796) (0.2861) (0.2769) (0.2822)
Loan Purpose Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 852 852 852 852




Centrality, Power Indicator 0/1
6 7 8 9
Tenor
















For each year in our sample I calculate four measures of network centrality, degree, eigenvector, 
betweenness, and closeness for each individual (node) in the network. Centrality variables 
capture network characteristics between nodes (executives or board members). Links are 
relationships between nodes. Higher numbers denote greater network influence or power.  
 
Please see appendix B for a more thorough discussion as to centrality variable construction and 
meaning.  
 
Centrality, % is the percentile in which the centrality variable falls given the distribution of said 
variable within the entire network. That is, if an executive’s degree centrality gave him a rank 
within the top 1% of all network participants his Degree, % would equal 100.  
 
Power variables are four sets of indicator variables equal to one if the executive or board has a 
centrality measure greater than or equal to the median score within the sample. For example, 
Degree Centrality, Power is set equal to one if the degree centrality of the executive (board) is 
greater than or equal to the median degree centrality for sample executives (boards).  
 
Centrality, % is therefore a measuring taking into account the entire network in that year, while 
Power is a variable that only takes into consideration other executives within the sample of 






Market to Book is the market to book ratio computed as quarterly share closing price multiplied 
by shares outstanding, divided by firm assets. 
 
Sales to EBITDA is a measure of profitability to cash flows equal to earnings before interest, 
taxes, and depreciation expenses divided by sales. 
 





 is a measure of default probability as per Graham, Lemmon, and 
Schallheim (1998) equal to Altman’s Z-score absent leverage. 
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 See Jackson (2010) and Newman (2010) for thorough discussions of centrality measures. 
29
 In regressions all firm control variables are computed quarterly, annualized, and lagged one 
quarter. Thus, variables are quarterly rolling annual variables for the quarter immediately prior to 
the quarter in which the loan is issued. Variables are winsorized at the top or bottom 1%, or both, 
as necessary to control for the effects of outliers. Observations beyond the 1% cutoffs are 




Entrenchment Index is a managerial entrenchment index calculated per Bebchuck and Cohen 
(2009). The index ranges from zero to six, giving one point for each of the following firm 
characteristics: classified (staggered) board, executive golden parachute provisions, poison pill 
provisions, and restrictions to shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws, charters, and approve 
merger agreements.  
 
ln Assets is the natural log of firm assets.  
 
ln Cash Flow Volatility is the natural log of the standard deviation of firm EBITDA of the last 
eight quarters. 
 
iROA is a firm return on assets adjusted by industry median return on assets for all firms in the 
same four digit SIC code. This is another measure of profitability and used in robustness tests.  
 
Loan Control Variables 
 
ln Spread is the natural log of all-in spread in basis points over LIBOR at loan issuance.  
 
ln Tenor is the natural log of stated length (maturity) of the loan at origination, in months.  
 
Syndicate Size is the number of lenders taking part in the initial offering. Following Demiroglu 
and James (2010) I use the natural log of syndicate size when investigating covenant tightness.  
 
Revolver > 13 months is an indicator variable equal to one if the loan is a revolving loan greater 
than 13 months in tenor. 
 
Deal Size is the ratio of loan size to firm assets. 
 
Pricing Grid is an indicator variable equal to one if the loan allows variable pricing, that is, if the 
lender has the right to adjust the spread if perceived borrower risk increases. 
 
Investment Grade is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is rated BBB- or higher by 
S&P.  
 
Structural Intensity is an index of loan covenant structure calculated per Bradley and Roberts 
(2004). The index ranges from zero to six, giving one point for each of the following loan 
contract restrictions: dividend restrictions, more than two financial covenants, asset, debt, and 
equity sweeps, and collateral requirements. This variable is used in robustness checks.  
 
Financial Covenants is either the number of financial covenants in the loan contract at 
origination or an indicator variables equal to one if the loan has more than the median number of 
financial covenants in the contract. These variables are used in robustness checks. 
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 Modified Altman’s Z score does not include leverage as I directly control for firm leverage. 
The formula is 3.3*(cash flow to assets ratio) + 1*(sales to assets ratio) + 1.4*(retained earnings 




General Covenants is either the number of sweeps (asset, debt, and equity) in the loan contract at 
initiation or an indicator variable equal to one if the loan requires sweeps. These variables are 
used in robustness checks.  
 
 
Other Control Variables – not reported in tables 
 
Tighten is the quarterly percentage of commercial banks reporting tightening lending standards 
for large commercial and industrial loans, as reported by the St. Louis Federal Reserve (FRED). 
 
Loan Purpose Controls include dummy variables for the stated purpose for loan proceeds.  These 
include working capital, corporate purposes, acquisition activity, and debt repayment. 
  








Appendix B: Centrality as a measure of network influence 
 In order to calculate centrality measures used herein I collect data from BoardEx from 
1997-2010. BoardEx data approximates the social networks of executives and directors of over 
8,000 public and private U.S. firms and non-profit organizations by providing data on current 
and past business relationships between individuals as collected from proxy statements and 
annual reports. The data include approximately 12 million paired connections formed through 
current and past
31
 positions at listed firms and another 9 million pairs formed through non-profit 
organizations, unlisted firms, and educational institutions. I utilize an IBM iDataPlex 
supercomputer to calculate our measures of centrality, or network influence, given the 21 million 
pairs of connections. The four resultant measures are degree, eigenvector, closeness, and 
betweenness centrality (Newman, 2010). I thus have 14 yearly networks with four centrality 
metrics calculated for each node.  
 Degree centrality is simply the number of direct connections between a node and all other 





where xij = 1 if nodes i and j share a connection and zero otherwise. Degree centrality is the size 
of an individual’s network devoid of other considerations, though it is still a useful measure. 
Individuals who have connections to many others may have more or better access to information, 
more prestige, or more influence than people with fewer connections.  Just as I use the number of 
citations to inform our opinion as to the impact of a particular paper in an academic setting an 
individual with a higher degree centrality may be thought to be an important and influential 
executive.  
 An obvious extension of degree is eigenvector centrality wherein an individual’s network 
centrality is increasing in the importance or influence of her connections. That is, holding degree 
centrality constant, an individual is more influential if her connections are also influential. I 
begin by calculating the sum of the degree centralities of i’s connections 
i ij j
j
x A x  
where Aij is an element of the adjacency matrix. The process is iterative in that I calculate the 
centrality of i’s connections, and their connections, and their connections, and so on. Finding Ki 
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 As I lack data on the quality of the connections. In other words I do not know if the 
relationship between two nodes is near and dear, as with close confidants, or distant and 









Eigenvector K A x   
where K1 is the largest eigenvalue of adjacency matrix A. In the context of our study therefore an 
executive may be influential, as measured by eigenvector centrality, if she has many direct 
connections that are not influential, few direct connections to executives that are highly 
connected themselves, or both.  
 Closeness centrality represents the mean distance between node i and all other nodes, 
where distance is that of geodesic distance g between nodes i and j. Geodesic distance is simply 
the number of links one must travel to get from i to j. For example, node a may want to pass a bit 
of news to node e but the message must pass through b to c to d and finally to e. A node that does 
not have to pass through so many others is said to be “closer” than one that does; i and j 
(assuming a distance of 1) are closer than a and e. Thus, if the mean distance Li between i and all 
other nodes is small, or close, i may have quicker and better access to information or may have 
more direct influence on surrounding nodes. Since other centrality measures associate higher 











where dij is the length of the geodesic path from i to j. Unfortunately, the above assumes that all 
nodes are connected; if two nodes are not connected the distance is infinite, rendering the 
variable useless as all closeness collapses to zero. Further, if I were to calculate only mean 
distances within a node’s relevant sub network some nodes would be deemed highly central even 
when their sub network is small and very distant from larger, presumably more important, 
networks. In this case I would expect such a node to be less influential, not more. To correct for 




take into account the size of the sub network n relative to the size of the entire network, N.  
 Betweenness centrality measures how often a node lies between other nodes in the 
network. In other words, in a network a – b – c, b lies between a and c. Within the context of our 
study betweenness is closely connected to the concept of brokerage; b can choose either to 
facilitate information flow, by passing it from a to c, or block information from being shared. 
Nodes with greater betweenness centrality therefore have more control over the availability, 




equal 1 if node i lies on some geodesic path from a to c and 0 if it does not
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 then betweenness 




b p  
However, I make minor adjustments to reflect that there is more than one possible path between 
nodes a and c and further to adjust such that paths initiating from node i are not counted toward 
node i’s centrality:  
/












acp is defined as above and acg is the number of possible paths between a and c.  
 Finally, because some measures of centrality have much greater dispersion than others, 
and to assist in interpretation, I assign percentiles of each variable in relation to its underlying 
distribution. Thus, instead of speaking in levels I speak in percentages; an executive may have a 
closeness centrality that is 2.7654 (level) that places him in the 87
th
 percentile of closeness 
centrality in the network.  
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 More accurately, it is possible for there to be no path if a and c are in disconnected sub 
networks. Zero is assigned in that case as well.  
118 
 
IV. The Structure of Private Debt Syndications 
Abstract : I examine the terms and syndicate structure of loans issued to U.S. firms from 1998 
to 2012. The syndication process is explicitly modeled as a two stage process in order to study 
the effects of asymmetric information on syndicate structure in the market for credit origination. 
The first stage is the underwriting process wherein lead arrangers perform due diligence on the 
borrower and the parties agree to loan terms. The second stage is the syndication process wherein 
lead arrangers invite non-arrangers to participate in the primary offering. I find that asymmetric 
information and agency concerns affect not only the terms of the loan but also the structure of 
the syndicate. Greater information asymmetry increases loan spreads and the concentration of the 
syndicate; non-lead arrangers are less willing to participate in the offering when information 
asymmetries are greater. I find that when the offering spread differs from that of a typical firm-
deal syndicates are more concentrated. This is the case whether the spread is higher or lower than 
expected, a finding that warrants further investigation. These effects are mitigated, but not 
eliminated, by previous lending relationships between borrowers and lenders and previous lead-
participant syndications. Further, the effects of information asymmetry and agency conflicts are 






I model the loan syndication process within the context of contract theory with 
information asymmetry in a repeated game. Given models of agency and moral hazard as per 
Holmstrom (1979) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1979) I study the impact of multiple borrower and 
lender characteristics that represent increasing or decreasing information asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders and between lead arrangers and participant lenders. When firms are more 
opaque they require due diligence ex ante and more effortful monitoring ex post by an informed 
lender (Diamond, 1991). As the informed lender does not retain the entirety of loan shares in 
syndication there is a moral hazard problem because monitoring is unobservable by participant 
creditors. When information asymmetries are more severe potential participants may choose to 
forego participation or require lead arrangers (informed lenders) to hold a greater proportion of 
loan shares to ensure effortful monitoring. Private debt is the largest source of external financing 
for firms, larger than public debt and equity market issuance combined (Gorton and Winton, 
2003, Gomes and Phillips, 2007). Further, a greater number of firms enter the study compared to 
studies of public debt markets as firms unable to access public capital markets may have access 
to bank financing. Private agreements governing loans are concentrated securities for lenders, 
even for syndicate members, and thus well represent the environments of theoretical contact 
theory and security design.  
A syndicated loan is a loan whereby more than one creditor commits to provide capital to 
the borrower; the loan is thus shared amongst two or more lenders. The market for loans issued 
by corporate borrowers has undergone dramatic change since the mid-1980s when loans were 
issued almost exclusively by banks that routinely held the entirety of loan shares in their own 
portfolios to maturity. Loan syndications were rare, informal, and opaque. There was no analysis 
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of loans compared to public credit instruments and arguably no secondary market for loans. The 
creation of standardized documentation in 1995 lowered barriers to participation in loan 
syndications. Subsequently the growth of the primary and secondary markets for syndicated 
loans has increased the amount of credit available to corporate borrowers and has allowed better 
risk sharing amongst creditors.  
Syndicated loan issuance to U.S. borrowers was over $1.52 trillion in 2012. Though not 
at pre-financial crisis levels, loan issuance is increasing.
33
 Institutional interest in primary loan 
offerings, especially in the leveraged segment, is now greater than it was prior to the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. Indeed, primarily due to demand from new collateralized loan obligations and 
loan mutual funds, institutional new-issue activity was a record $150 billion in the first quarter of 
2013, up 66% from $90.3 billion in the fourth quarter of 2012.
34
  
Syndicated loan origination is a two stage process.
35
 In the first, a borrower (issuer) and a 
lead arranger (underwriter) come to terms regarding a loan facility. These terms include the tenor 
(maturity), the amount to be funded, the presence and levels of financial covenants, and a range 
for the spread of the loan the borrower must pay above LIBOR for the use of the funds. In the 
second stage, the issuer and the arranger(s) prepare offering material, the term sheet and 
memorandum, which are distributed to potential investors in the loan facility. Potential investors 
include banks, CLOs, hedge funds, firms specializing in leveraged buy-outs, mutual funds 
(primary funds), insurance companies, pension funds, finance companies, and other institutional 
investors. Investors choose to become participants in the offering, agreeing to fund their 
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 Bloomberg Finance, L.P. syndicated loans league tables, 2012.  
34
 The previous high for institutional primary activity was $144.6 billion in the second quarter of 
2007. Sources: S&P Capital IQ LCD, www.leveragedloan.com.  
35
 For a thorough discussion of the market for syndicated loans as presented by and for market 
participants, see Taylor and Sansone (2007). 
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commitments under the agreement, and the loan facility is originated. Arrangers and participants 
fund the loan and the borrower is able to use the capital in compliance with the terms of the 
credit agreement.  
Although the loan market is the largest source of firm capital there are relatively few 
studies concerning private credit agreements, at least when one considers the vast literature 
dedicated to the study of public capital markets. The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
primary market for syndicated loans such that the functioning of the market is modeled 
explicitly. There are several studies exploring the determinants of loan spreads or syndicate 
structures in this relatively young literature. This is the first to model loan syndication as a two-
staged exploration of contract theory.  
The central result of modeling the syndication process in two stages is that when the 
offering spread differs from that of a typical firm-deal the syndicate is more concentrated. This is 
the case regardless of whether the offering spread is higher, presumably because the borrower is 
weaker than other firms seeking similar deals, or lower, which may signal that the borrower is 
stronger than the typical firm-deal. If the deviation from a typical spread is a manifestation of 
information asymmetry between borrowers and participants and/or between lead arrangers and 
participants then it is logical that spread deviations would increase syndicate structure as per 
other sources of information asymmetries. However, it is plausible that lead arrangers and 
borrower management are fully disclosing all available (including material non-public) 
information to all potential lenders as both borrowers and underwriters have incentives to 
mitigate information asymmetries when borrowing is a repeated game. Further research is 
necessary to isolate the bi-directional effects of information asymmetry and reputation on 
syndicate structure.  
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This study also contributes to the literature by considering spread deviations in 
regressions of syndicate structure in relation to other proxies for increasing or decreasing firm 
opacity. In both the framework of contract theory (Holmstrom, 1979; Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1997; Diamond, 1991) and empirical literature (Simons, 1993; Preece and Mullineaux, 1996; 
Dennis and Mollineaux, 2000 ; Esty and Megginson, 2003; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Sufi, 
2007, Ivashina, 2009; Champagne and Coggins, 2012), syndicate concentration is increasing as 
problems of information asymmetry become more severe; participants will demand a higher 
spread and/or require the lead arrangers to hold a larger share of the loan. Extant literature either 
ignores the spread in studies of syndicate structure or controls for the spread at origination in 
empirical exercises. Ultimately the spread in the loan agreement is what is required to clear the 
market in a way that is acceptable to all parties. Since I only observe loan data ex post it is 
possible that participants are demanding upward spread adjustments to compensate for increased 
risk due to heterogeneous information asymmetries and the risks of adverse selection and moral 
hazard.
 36
 In other words, without attempting to control for the spread “surprise” compared to a 
typical deal, the coefficients and results of studies of information asymmetry and syndicate 
structure may be biased. I find that the direction and significance of the effects of spread 
deviations in subsequent regressions are persistent. Further, controlling for spread deviations in 
subsequent regressions, I find that increasing information asymmetries increases syndicate 
concentration and decreases non-lead participation in support of theory and previous empirical 
studies.  
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 In other words, I observe loan terms and spread after origination, that is, after adjustments 
have been made. If the spread at origination (post adjustments) is adequate compensation to 
participants for perceived borrower opacity I may see decreasing effects of other borrower 
opacity variables on syndicate structure.  
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This rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the empirical framework. 
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 investigates the first stage of loan syndication wherein 
borrowing firms come to terms with a lead arranger or arrangers. Section 5 discusses the second 
stage of syndication wherein potential syndicate participants are invited to become non-lead 
creditors and ultimately syndicate structure is determined. Section 6 concludes.    
2. Empirical framework 
 
Syndicated loans are made up of one or more tranches. When tranches are aggregated 
they represent the “deal” level. Though often similar with regard to the terms contained in the 
credit agreement tranches are created to appeal to different lenders. For example, one tranche of 
a deal may be a revolving loan to be used as a corporate backstop for commercial paper while 
another could be a term loan used to finance an acquisition. The first is likely to be held by 
banks, is often unfunded (an unused facility by the borrower), will have a lower spread,
37
 and 
funds may be paid and redrawn by the borrower. The latter is likely to be funded by institutional 
investors, be subject to a larger spread, have a longer tenor, and cannot be redrawn once repaid 
by the borrower.  
The first stage of loan syndication begins when a borrower engages a lender to raise 
capital for the firm under the terms of a private credit agreement. The lead arranger underwrites 
the loan and the lender and issuer agree to a range of spread for the issue given the terms of the 
loan. I model the first stage to be predictive of the all-in spread of the loan facility as determined 
by borrower credit worthiness and specific loan terms. Over the past two decades loan pricing 
has come to resemble that of public bond pricing wherein underwriters and borrowers agree to a 
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 Revenue from untapped revolvers comes from commitment fees (unused facility fees) more 
than from spread over LIBOR for funds drawn.  
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target and maximum cost of borrowing. The spread at loan origination, however, is determined 
by what is required to clear the market, that is, raise the desired funds from participant lenders 
given the loan terms. As I do not observe the range of spread, only the observed spread at 
origination, I utilize the coefficients from the base regression to predict the expected spread for 
any given firm-deal. I utilize the difference between the predicted spread, which is representative 
of the spread of a typical deal, and the spread at origination to proxy for the offering (target) 
spread presented to potential investors in the second stage.  
The second stage of loan syndication is the formation of the participation syndicate, 
which begins when potential investors are invited to become participants in the facility. Potential 
investors are invited to informational presentations with the lead arrangers and borrower 
management. Participants may participate on the private or public side such that they are privy to 
material non-public information or not; this decision usually rests on the desire of the potential 
creditor to trade in other (public) securities of the borrower. Potential creditors are given a 
memorandum consisting of an executive summary, the selling points of the transaction, terms 
and conditions, and an overview of the borrower, management, and industry trends. Once 
participants agree to become creditors the loan is finalized and funded. Thus, at origination, a 
syndicated loan has lender characteristics that define the syndicate structure.  
I am interested in the determinants of syndicate structure in the primary market. 
Regressions in the second stage look to the determinants of several variables describing 
syndicate structure including syndicate size, the number of lead arrangers, the number of 
participant lenders, the ratio of lead arrangers to all lenders, the percentage of the loan retained 
by the lead arrangers, and the concentration of the syndicate as measured by the Herfindahl index 
of loan shares retained by lead arrangers.  
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I assume that lead arrangers have more information than participant lenders, even if 
participants declare themselves to be “private side” lenders. Lead arrangers are responsible for 
initial underwriting, monitoring of borrowers, and facilitating cash flows between borrowers and 
creditors over time. While there are information asymmetries between the borrower and the 
underwriter(s) in the first stage, my primary focus is on information asymmetries between 
participants and borrowers and between participants and lead arrangers in the second stage of 
syndication. Importantly, lead arrangers are selling portions of the loan to participant lenders and 
therefore moral hazard is a concern to participants. My model of the second stage of syndication 
investigates the relationships between syndicate structure, the difference between the offering 
spread and a “typical” spread, borrower opacity, lead reputation, participant-borrower 
relationships, and market conditions in the context of a repeated game.  
The offering spread – the loan pricing presented to potential participants in the offering 
materials - is an important, and previously unexplored, determinant of syndicate structure. The 
offering spread is both a signal and a potential indication of information asymmetry between lead 
arrangers and participants. If the offering spread is lower than that for comparable firms and loan 
terms it may signal that the borrower is stronger than the typical borrower. If higher, it is a signal 
that the borrower is potentially weaker than similar borrowers. If the deviation from a typical 
spread is a credible signal then participants should be more willing to participate in lower spread 
deals and less willing to participate in higher spread deals on a risk-adjusted basis. However, 
potential participants are sophisticated investors who are tasked with making a credit worthiness 
evaluation given the information presented to them during the sales process. As per contracting 
theory syndicate structure concentration should be increasing as information asymmetry between 
leads and participants becomes more severe. If spread deviations are indicative of increasing 
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information asymmetry then offering spreads that differ from expected spreads should 
concentrate syndicate structure.   
3. Data 
 
The primary data source is the Loan Pricing Corporation DealScan database of 
syndicated loans. DealScan includes loans to both public and private firms. DealScan has some 
information about the borrower, identifies the lead and participant lenders, and provides detailed 
information regarding the size, tenor, fee structure, purpose, and other terms of the loans. 
Financial data on public firms are collected from CompuStat. Appendix A contains detailed 
variable descriptions and formulae.  
Table and Figure 1 illustrate loan originations of U.S. firms from 1998 through 2012. I 
choose this period for two reasons. Standardized documents for primary offerings were 
developed in 1995 and in wide use by 1998; by beginning my study in 1998 I assume that market 
is liquid and fully developed over the course of my study. Secondly, I am able to study 
syndications through both recessionary and growth periods. Over the period of study 23,290 
deals comprised of 35,512 tranches were issued to 10,436 unique borrowers, 5,165 of which are 
private firms and 5,271 are public firms. At the peak of activity in 2005, 3,878 loans were 
originated. During the financial crisis lending contracted considerably, as expected, to a low of 
867 deals in 2009. Overall lending has recovered since 2009 to 1,909 and 1,609 deals in 2011 
and 2012, though interestingly the bulk of the recovery has been loans issued to public firms. 
Loans to private firms are still severely depressed as of the end of 2012. 
As extant literature documents significant differences in lending to private vs. public 
firms I first report summary statistics and results of t-tests for differences in means for private 
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and public firm deals in table 2. The median private firm loan is a five year, $132 million 
revolving loan with a 250 basis point spread over LIBOR. The median public firm loan is 
slightly less than five year $250 million revolving loan with a 175 basis point spread over 
LIBOR. All loan characteristics are statistically significantly different for private vs. public firm 
deals in that private firm deals are smaller, more costly to the firm, and more restrictive than 
public firm deals. 
There are 128 unique underwriters and 9,753 unique participant lenders in the dataset. 
The median deal has four lenders for private firms and six lenders for public firms, though both 
have only one lead underwriter; public firms have a greater number of participant lenders. Leads 
comprise 50% of the typical syndicate for private firms and 33% for public firms. Underwriting 
is dominated by the most reputable lenders. At the means, 86% of all deals are underwritten by 
banks with measurable market share per the syndicated loan league tables. DealScan has shares 
retained data for approximately 24.6% of syndicated loans from 1998 to 2012 and thus I am able 
to create variables of syndicate concentration inclusive of shares retained by the lead arrangers. 
For both private and public firms the percentage of loan shares retained by the lead arrangers is 
approximately 60%.  
Table 3 reports summary statistics and t-tests for differences in means for borrower 
characteristics for private and public firms. Private firms are significantly smaller than public 
firms in terms of sales revenues; the median private firm has $271 million in sales versus $764 
million for public firms. Not surprisingly, private firm loans are more likely to be sponsored by a 
third party, 30% at the mean. 65% of private firms do not have a debt rating at the time of loan 
origination, though 46% of public firms are also unrated. Unrated public firms are also less likely 
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to have Compustat financials available for researchers and thus I expect that this study is more 
inclusive than studies of syndicate structure that rely upon Compustat and similar data sources.       
4. Underwriting and initial loan terms 
 
4.1 Pricing model specifications 
To model the pricing of the loan I utilize cross sectional regressions  
bc lc conSpread BC LC CON           (0.5) 
where Spread is the all-in cost of funds drawn in basis points over LIBOR, BC is a vector of 
borrower characteristics, LC is a vector of loan characteristics, and CON is a vector of control 
variables for loan purpose, industry, and year of loan origination.
38
 Data is limited for private 
firms, though DealScan does provide sales data on private borrowers in addition to loan details.  
I modify the base model (0.5) to include additional data as available. In all model specifications I 
calculate bootstrapped standard errors.  
 Approximately 48% of the tranches are subject to financial covenants. Covenants give 
creditors control rights ex ante even outside of a default state (Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Chava 
and Roberts, 2008; Roberts and Sufi, 2009; Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2012). A borrower’s 
willingness to accept financial covenant restrictions invites improved monitoring by arrangers. 
Firms whose loans are subject to covenant restrictions are typically riskier borrowers. However, 
firms that choose to set covenant threshold levels closer to a violation state at loan origination 
                                                     
38
 For time controls I use indicator variables for loan years. In robustness checks I controlled 
directly for loan market conditions by controlling for the percentage of banks reporting 
tightening credit conditions for large and middle market commercial loans as per Federal 
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) available at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org. Results are unaffected.  
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signal their willingness and ability to meet or exceed these thresholds, thus the acceptance of 
“tighter” covenant levels have been shown to lower loan spreads (Demiroglu and James, 2010).  
 Since the level at which covenant thresholds are set has been shown to be a determinant 
of loan spreads I expand my base model (0.5) to include a calculation of covenant threshold 
“tightness”. The most common financial covenant in my sample is the maximum allowable ratio 
of borrower debt to cash flow, present in 33% of all tranches. The debt to cash flow covenant, 
also known as the debt to EBITDA covenant, is common because of the relative ease with which 
monitors are able to determine compliance according to generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) (Demiroglu and James, 2010).
39
 I first examine the notes concerning financial 
covenants found in the DealScan data to determine whether the language concerning the debt to 
cash flow covenant is compliant with GAAP language, i.e. “total long and short term debt 
outstanding to EBITDA per GAAP”. I discard observations where the language obviates a 
simple interpretation, i.e. “average three year long term debt to pro forma cash flow”. For 
compliant observations I compute the median threshold for all firm-deals in the same three digit 
SIC code. The median threshold is preferred to a mean threshold level as thresholds are set at 
discrete 0.25 intervals, i.e. 4.25, 4.50, 4.75. I then create an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm chooses a threshold level that is closer to a violation state compared to other firm-deals in 
the same industry. Thus, a covenant is “tight” if a firm chooses a maximum debt to cash flow 
covenant threshold level that is lower than the median threshold in the industry.  My expanded 
model is a cross sectional regression  
                                                     
39
 Demiroglu and James (year) calculate the tightness of the minimum current ratio covenant. I 
focus on the debt to cash flow covenant as it is the most common covenant in my sample at 33% 
of all tranches versus the current ratio covenant present in only 3.01% of tranche observations.  
130 
 
t bc lc conSpread T BC LC CON             (0.6) 
wherein T is the indicator variable for covenant tightness. As covenant information is available 
for both public and private firms I am able to include this additional information for a large 
subsample of observations.  
 My third model specification includes variables that have been shown in extant literature 
to be determinants of spread for firms with CompuStat financial data available. For public firms I 
utilize the cross sectional regression   
cs bc lc conSpread CS BC LC CON             (0.7) 
wherein CS is a vector of borrower financial ratios including firm size, leverage, tangibility, 
income to assets, cash flow to assets, and a measure of firm solvency.  
4.2 Empirical results, determinants of spread 
 Table 4 reports coefficients and significance of the determinants of loan spreads as per 
the three model specifications. Panel A reports deal level results while panel B includes all 
tranche observations. There are advantages to both methods. I assume that the largest tranche is 
representative of the prevailing terms of the loan and thus the terms of the largest tranche 
represents the overall deal. The advantage to this method is that firm variables are not over 
weighted for firms with multiple tranche deals. On the other hand, tranche level observations are 
desirable to the extent that tranches are significantly different from one another in the same deal 
even though all tranches are subject to the terms of a single credit agreement.  
 Whether at the deal or tranche level, almost all variables are significant at better than the 
one percent level. Further, the signs and significance of the coefficients are consistent in all 
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model specifications. Lower spreads are correlated with larger loans with longer maturities to 
larger firms, consistent with increased demand for syndicated loans from institutional investors. 
Loans in the leveraged segment and those that require financial covenant restrictions are riskier 
loans and therefore have higher spreads. Loans with pricing grids, wherein the spread can 
increase if firm financials deteriorate over the life of the loan, have smaller spreads at 
origination. I find that firms electing tighter covenants at origination enjoy lower spreads, 
providing supporting evidence to Demiroglu and James (2010). As expected, firms with greater 
solvency, cash flow, income and lower leverage all enjoy a lower cost of borrowing.   
 4.3 Predicted spread and resulting metrics 
 In order to closely approximate how the syndication process works in practice I need to 
construct a proxy for the range of spread as presented to potential syndicate participants. As I 
only observe the spread at origination, not the target spread offered to primary investors, I 
calculate a proxy for the target spread by multiplying the coefficients obtained from models (1.1) 
– (1.3) by firm variables. Note that since the adjusted R
2
 metrics are increasing in model 
specificity the predicted spread is that which results from the most granular model given firm 
data availability. Table 5 reports summary statistics of spreads at origination and predicted 
spreads. Spreads at origination and all predicted spreads are higher for private firms than public 
firms. At the means, private firms’ cost of borrowing is 50-60 basis points higher than 
comparable public firms, a difference that is economically and statistically significant. This 
makes intuitive sense. Arrangers set a target spread that is likely to clear the market in the 
primary offering such that the loan is fully subscribed. Private firms are necessarily more opaque 
in that there are not required to publically disclose financial statements nor do they have SEC 
registered securities trading in secondary markets. Because there are greater information 
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asymmetries between both leads and issuers and between issuers and participants, primary 
investors will require greater compensation for increased risk. Importantly, the predicted spread 
from models (1.1) - (1.3) is very close to the mean observed spread for both private and public 
firms. 
 I calculate the difference between the spread at origination and the predicted spread from 
models (1.1) - (1.3), the Spread Differential, for inclusion in subsequent studies.  
5. Syndicate structure 
 
5.1 Syndicate structure model specifications 
I model the second stage of syndication as a process by which the borrowing firm and 
lead arrangers jointly present issue memoranda to potential non-arranging creditors. The 
dependent variables are measures of syndicate structure including the total number of lenders 
(syndicate size), the number of lead arrangers, the number of participant lenders, the ratio of 
leads to syndicate size, and when shares retained data is available, the percentage of the loan 
retained by lead arrangers and syndicate concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index of 
shares retained by leads. The base model is a cross sectional regression 
sd ls tl gcSS SD LS TL GC           (1.1) 
where SS is the syndicate structure variable, SD is the difference between the offering spread, as 
presented to potential participants, and a typical firm-deal spread, LS is a vector of indicator 
variables concerning loan size, TL is an indicator variable equal to one if the loan is a term loan, 
and GC is an indicator variable equal to one if the loan terms include at least one general 
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covenant. I present results using deal level data, though results are unaffected when all tranches 
are included in syndicate structure regressions (not reported).
40
  
 I expand my investigation beyond (2.1) by including other circumstances I hypothesize 
affect syndicate structure, including macro uncertainty and variables capturing borrower opacity, 
arranger reputation, previous banking relationships, and borrower third party relationships. 
Subsequent models are represented thusly 
o sd ls tl gcSS O SD LS TL GC            (1.2) 
where O is the variable of interest, as in proxies for borrower opacity, and all other variables are 
as in (2.1).
41
 For ease of interpretation I introduce each additional variable in a separate 
regression to minimize the potential biases resultant of correlation; it is possible for a borrower 
to be both private and unrated, for example, or private, unrated, and have a previous lending 
relationship with a syndicate participant.  
5.2 Base structure, spread differential 
Panel A of Table 6 reports results from the base model (2.1) of determinants of syndicate 
structure. I divide the sample of loans into terciles based upon the size of the deal in millions 
USD. The largest loans have the largest syndicate size are more likely to have more participant 
lenders. Syndicates for the largest loans are the least concentrated; lead arrangers represent a 
smaller contingent of the syndicate and hold a smaller percentage of loan shares. The opposite is 
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 For simplicity of interpretation I do not include any variables in the second stage that are 
present in the first stage regressions for spread determinants. In robustness tests I rerun second 
stage regressions inclusive of industry, loan purpose, and time controls; coefficients and 
significance are unaffected.   
41
 Though subsequent regressions include Spread differential as a control variable I also rerun all 
syndicate structure controlling for (Spread differential)
2
 for robustness. Coefficients and 
significance for the variables of interest are unaffected.  
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true for the smallest loans in terms of deal size. There are several plausible explanations. Smaller 
loans imply smaller syndicates and greater syndicate concentration purely from a scaling effect 
as offerings require minimum participation levels (in USD millions) for primary loan shares. 
Lead arrangers have less incentive to monitor smaller loans and therefore participants may 
require leads to retain a greater portion of loan shares to incentivize proper monitoring ex post. 
Potential participant lenders are also likely to consider secondary market liquidity when choosing 
to invest in the primary market. Smaller loans are likely to be less liquid and therefore less 
attractive to potential participants. In order to clear the market, therefore, lead arrangers must 
hold a greater proportion of shares of smaller loans. I also study the effects of term loans and the 
presence of general covenants in the base regression.
42
 Term loans imply less frequent 
monitoring by leads, at least when compared to revolving lines. Unsurprisingly, term loan 
syndications are more concentrated with smaller syndicates, fewer participants, and a greater 
proportion of shares held by lead arrangers. Loans that require general covenants are, all things 
equal, riskier than loans without general covenant restrictions in that general restrictions protect 
lenders against undesirable firm behavior; the presumed need to legislate against misbehavior 
signals that management is unknown and/or more likely to engage in such behavior.
43
 Lending 
                                                     
42
 In the first stage (underwriting) I include variables that have been shown in prior literature to 
be determinants of spread, including whether a loan is a revolving credit (implying more 
frequent and thorough due diligence processes by leads when deciding whether or not to renew 
the line) and the presence and characteristics of financial covenants. The onus of monitoring both 
revolving lines and financial covenants falls on the lead arrangers; I therefore model these as part 
of the underwriting process. I include a term loan indicator in the second stage because 
institutional investors, especially collateralized loan obligations, prefer term loans to revolving 
loans for structural reasons. I include general covenant protection in the second stage because, 
while financial covenants require frequent monitoring by leads, general covenants require less 
effort to monitor as they protect against gross violations, i.e. using capital raised via the credit 
agreement to pay dividends to shareholders.  
43
 My rationale is simple. If the other party to an agreement is known and trusted there is less 
reason to legislate against specific undesirable behavior; there is an implicit contract mitigating 
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syndicates are more concentrated in terms of loan shares held by lead arrangers when loan terms 
include general covenant restrictions. However, these same syndicates are larger with a greater 
number of participants. This may be because public firms are more likely to have general 
restrictions that address creditor-shareholder agency conflicts. All else equal, syndicates will be 
larger with more non-lead participants when firms are public and therefore less opaque, even if 
the loan terms require general covenant restrictions.   
Syndicate structure is shown to be increasing in Spread Differential; loans with higher 
than expected spreads have fewer lenders, fewer participants, and lead arrangers are required to 
hold a greater portion of loan shares. However, it remains unclear whether this effect is driven by 
a negative signal from lead arrangers, i.e. that the borrower is weaker than similar firms seeking 
similar terms, or by the fact that a deviation from spread expectations indicates increased 
information asymmetry between leads and potential participants.  
In order to disentangle the pricing effect of a negative signal and increased information 
asymmetry I construct two indicator variables, Spread 50 bps lower and Spread 50 bps higher 
such that the variable is assigned a value of one if the spread is 50 or more basis points lower or 
higher, respectively, than that predicted from models (1.1) – (1.3). I chose these cutoff points for 
two reasons, namely that spreads are usually offered in discrete intervals, i.e. 250 as opposed to 
247 basis points, and because the distribution of spread differentials closely approximates -50 
bps at the 25
th
 percentile and +50 bps at the 75
th
 percentile. Panel B of Table 6 reports results. 
The increased information asymmetry hypothesis dominates the pricing effect of signaling, 
though it can be argued that both effects are present. Spread differentials that are significantly 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the risk of misbehavior. If the other party to a potential agreement is unknown or is known and 
not deserving of trust (but still deserving of a contract) the parties will make an explicit contract.  
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higher or lower have smaller syndicate sizes, fewer participants, and the lead arrangers must 
retain a higher proportion of loan shares. This finding supports the argument that spreads that 
deviate from that expected in the typical firm-deal is an indication of information asymmetry 
between lead arrangers potential participants; when information asymmetry is more severe 
participants will demand the lead arrangers to hold a greater portion of the loan to properly 
incentivize adequate monitoring ex post. However, loans with spreads that are higher than 
expected have marginally more concentrated syndicates indicating that the signaling effect for 
weaker borrowers may also at work. Since both borrowers and lead arrangers have incentives to 
fully disclose all relevant information to potential participants in a repeated game I will further 
investigate the effects of reputational capital in subsequent research.  
To illustrate the nonlinearity of the relationship between spread differentials and 
syndicate structure I regress syndicate concentration against both Spread Differential and 
(Spread Differential)
2 
to plot the fitted values as shown in Figure 2. The nonlinearity is clearly 
visible; spreads that are both higher and lower than similar deals increase syndicate 
concentration. The effect is more limited for lower spreads, obviously, as there is a floor as to 
how much lower spreads can be. A deal with a proposed spread 50 bps lower is receiving a 20% 
discount to comparable deals for private firms and a 29% discount for public firms.  
5.3 The effect of macro uncertainty 
As the market for syndicated loans is relatively young I investigate the effects of macro 
uncertainty, namely recessions, on loan issuance and syndicate structure. During the period of 
study there were two recessions in the United States, a “normal” (non-financial) recession in 
2001 and 2002 and a severe banking crisis of 2007 to 2009. While there is considerable debate as 
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to whether recoveries following financial crises are slower and longer
44
 it makes intuitive sense 
that financial intermediation would be affected by a severe banking crisis. I recall from Figure 1 
that while there is some evidence of a mild retraction in loan issuance in the 2001-2002 recession 
there is a sharp contraction in loan issuance beginning in 2007, with loans issued to private 
borrowers yet to recover as of the end of 2012. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 made 
clear that the recession was not limited to the housing market and that the U.S. was in the midst 
of a severe banking and financial crisis as short term bank creditors withdrew funds and 
borrowers with current lines of credit drew down funds (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). I thus 
create an indicator variable Financial Crisis equal to one if the loan is issued any time from 2008 
forward to investigate whether, contingent upon a loan being issued, syndicate structures were 
affected by the severe exogenous shock. As non-originating creditors in syndicated loans are part 
of the shadow banking system (Gorton, 2009) it is reasonable to expect syndicate structure to be 
more concentrated during a financial and liquidity crisis.  
Table 7 reports results of regressions investigating the relationship between the financial 
crisis and syndicate structure. As expected, contingent upon a loan being issued, syndicates were 
smaller with fewer participant lenders from 2008 forward. Lead arrangers represented a greater 
proportion of syndicate lenders and retained a greater proportion of lead shares. There are several 
plausible explanations. Non-banking lenders do not have access to depositor funds nor are they 
as likely to have had access to TARP funds for liquidity purposes. Participants may also have 
been concerned about secondary market liquidity; if the ability to sell participations in the 
secondary market at a reasonable price is constrained potential participants are less likely to fund 
                                                     
44
 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), an article by Dwyer and Lothian at the Atlanta Fed, 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/pubscf/nftv_1110.cfm ,and John Conchrane’s The Grumpy 
Economist blog at http://johnhcochrane.blogspot.jp/2012/05/slow-recoveries-after-financial-
crises.html for differing opinions on the rate of recovery following financial crises. 
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new issues. Participant balance sheets may have been negatively affected by the crisis even if 
they are not subject to Basel regulations requiring troubled assets to be discounted. Finally, given 
the Lehman Brothers example, it is possible that participants were concerned that some 
underwriters would cease to be going concerns, at least in their current forms. Greater macro 
uncertainty restricted both the ability and willingness of participants to fund new issues.   
In robustness tests I also include an indicator variable for the recession of 2001-2002 in 
the regressions above. There is no significant effect for this “normal” recession on syndicate 
structure (not reported) and I thus conclude that financial and liquidity crisis of 2008 forward 
introduced strains on the shadow banking system that are not present in non-financial crises to 
date.   
5.4 Borrower opacity 
The primary market for syndicated loans has seen a large influx of non-bank institutional 
investors in the last decade. I thus extend Sufi’s (2007) study of the effects of information 
asymmetry on syndicate structure to include an additional decade of syndicated loan data. I 
utilize several proxies for increasing borrower opacity including whether the borrower is a 
private firm, is unrated, and when Compustat data is available, whether syndicated loans to 
borrowers with higher accruals to assets and research and development to assets ratios have more 
concentrated syndicates as predicted by contract theory and documented empirically by Sufi 
(2007). Table 8 reports results for the whole sample investigating whether private or unrated firm 
loans have more concentrated syndicates. In contrast to Sufi (2007) I find that syndicated loans 
to private firms are not more concentrated. Indeed, the proportion of lead arrangers in the 
syndicate is lower for private firms and statistically significant. I conclude that as institutional 
demand for syndicated loans increased in the decade following Sufi’s study non-lead creditors 
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were more willing to purchase private firm loan shares. This may also be an effect of an 
institutional search for yield; private firms have a higher cost of debt (see Table 5), market rates 
have been at historic lows since 2001, and the risk-return tradeoff for syndicated loans may have 
made private firm loans relatively more attractive to institutional investors.  
I do not find this to be the case for unrated borrowers, however. In support of Sufi’s 
conclusions I find that unrated borrower loans have significantly more concentrated syndicates. 
Syndicates are smaller with fewer lead and participant lenders and lead arrangers retain a greater 
proportion of loan shares as measured by the Herfindahl index. The absence of a third-party 
credit rating remains a source of information asymmetry between borrowers and participants and 
between lead arrangers and participant lenders.  
In the subsample of firms with Compustat data available I calculate ratios of accruals to 
assets and R&D to assets as both are proxies for increased firm complexity and/or information 
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. Table 9 reports results for the subsample of 
Compustat firms relating increased borrower opacity to syndicate structure. Borrowers with 
higher levels of accruals and R&D expense issue loans with smaller syndicates as there are 
significantly fewer leads and participants in both cases. Problems of information asymmetry 
appear more severe in firms with higher R&D expense. Lead arrangers represent a greater 
proportion of the syndicate and hold a greater percentage of loan shares at origination when 
R&D expense is higher.  
5.5 Lead reputation and previous banking relationships 
Lead arranger reputation and previous banking relationships have been shown to mitigate 
information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders (Sufi, 2007; Barath et al., 2011; 
140 
 
Champage and Coggins, 2012). I extend previous studies with additional data and controlling for 
spread differentials, concentrating on syndicate structure as opposed to loan spreads. I create an 
indicator variable equal to one if the lead arranger(s) is a reputable bank in that it is has a 
measurable share of the syndicated loan market as per industry league tables. As DealScan 
identifies all lenders of the primary syndicates I am able to create indicator variables equal to one 
if the borrower has had a previous lending relationship with any lead arranger or participant prior 
to the current offering. I also create an indicator variable equal to one if, regardless of the 
borrower in question, the majority of lenders in the current syndicate have also been lenders in a 
previous loan. I expect lead arranger reputation and previous syndicate structures mitigate 
information asymmetries between lead arrangers and participant lenders. Similarly, I expect that 
when borrowers originate loans with creditors with whom they have had the opportunity to build 
reputational capital those lenders would be more willing to participate.  
Table 10 reports results of regressions relating lead reputation, previous lending 
relationships, and previous syndicate structures to new deal syndicate structure. When the lead 
arranger(s) are more reputable I find that not only are participants more likely to join the 
syndicate but the syndicates include more lead arrangers. Not all lead arrangers are responsible 
for the task of underwriting and it is possible that supporting lead arrangers are more willing to 
join the syndicate when the lead has significant syndicated loan market share, perhaps in an 
effort to improve their reputations by association. Syndicates are larger, have greater non-lead 
participations, and the lead arrangers are required to hold fewer loan shares. Similarly, when 
syndicate members have previously issued loans together I find that syndicates are larger and the 
ratio of the syndicate comprised of lead arrangers is lower as information asymmetry is 
decreasing between leads and participants in a repeated game. Panels B and C of Table 10 
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illustrate the effect on syndicate structure on previous banking relationships between borrowers 
and leads and borrowers and participant lenders, respectively. In both cases a previous loan 
between borrowers and creditors decreases information asymmetries and therefore syndicate 
structure, though it should be noted that in agreement with Sufi (2007) it appears that previous 
relationships between participants and borrowers matter more. Participants require the lead 
arrangers to hold relatively fewer loan shares when there exists a previous relationship between 
participants and borrowers, though the effects for both lead and participant relationships are 
statistically and economically significant.   
5.6 Third party relationships 
Finally, I investigate whether the explicit or implicit backing of a loan to a borrower by a 
third party affects syndicate structure. DealScan includes information on third party 
relationships. These include whether a borrower is a subsidiary of another firm or whether the 
loan has a guarantor or sponsor. Examples of potential guarantors or sponsors include a parent 
firm, a strategic partner, or private equity firm.
45
 I create indicator variables to capture these third 
party borrower relationships and run regressions of syndicate structure to capture any effects. If a 
borrower is a subsidiary it is reasonable to expect that syndicates will be less concentrated if the 
borrower is implicitly or explicitly backed by the parent firm, making a default less likely. The 
effects of guarantors and sponsorship on syndicate structure are more difficult to hypothesize, 
however. It may be that the borrower would not have been able to access the syndicated loan 
market without the guarantor or sponsor; the presence of the third party relationship may have 
been enough to overcome barriers to entry but still indicate that the borrower is weaker than non-
                                                     
45
 There is potential overlap with regard to subsidiaries and guarantors/sponsors as a parent firm 
may explicitly not be liable for repayment in the event of a subsidiary loan default while still 
sponsoring the borrowing entity. For example, the subsidiary may be responsible for loan terms, 
but subsidiary cash flows are resultant of contracts with the parent as in a vertical conglomerate.  
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sponsored firms. If loan terms are not deemed enough to compensate for any increased risk 
participants may be less willing to join the syndicate. On the other hand, a reputable and/or deep-
pocketed guarantor or sponsor may mitigate the risk of default or undesirable borrower behavior 
and thus make joining the issue more attractive to potential creditors. Unfortunately, while 
DealScan reports the presence of a third party relationship to the borrower it does not report data 
on the third party itself. I am therefore limited to investigating the effect of the existence of third 
party relationships.  
Table 11 reports results of regressions of third party borrower relationships and syndicate 
structure. All else equal, the explicit or implicit backing of a parent firm increases the number of 
both lead arrangers and participant lenders, though syndicate concentration is unaffected. The 
presence of a guarantor or sponsor, however, appears to decrease the willingness of non-lead 
creditors to participate in the offering. In both cases lead arrangers must hold a greater proportion 
of loan shares to clear the primary market. The effect is greater for sponsored deals, as not only 
are more shares held by leads but the ratio of leads to syndicate members is also significantly 
higher. This makes intuitive sense as the presence of a guarantor implies that the third party is 
liable for the failure of the borrower to comply with the terms of the facility whereas mere 
sponsorship does not. I conclude that on balance explicit guarantees increase syndicate sizes, if 
not effecting syndicate concentration, while the less certain backing of guarantors and sponsors 
signal borrower weakness and result in more concentrated syndicates.   
6. Conclusion 
 
I study the primary market for syndicated loans within the context of contract theory with 
information asymmetries in a repeated game. I explicitly model the syndication process in two 
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stages. The first begins when a borrower engages a lead arranger and ends when the parties agree 
to the terms of a loan facility inclusive of amount, tenor, covenant and additional structures, and 
a target and maximum spread. The second stage begins when the borrower and lead arrangers 
invite potential non-lead creditors to informational presentations about the borrower and the 
issue and concludes when the syndication closes and the loan is funded, resulting in the 
syndication structure at loan origination. I focus on the second stage of loan origination and the 
role of information asymmetries between the borrower and participant lenders and between lead 
arrangers and participants. In the first stage I regress loan spreads on borrower and loan 
characteristics to then predict the spread for a typical firm-loan deal. I then include any deviation 
in the offering spread from a typical firm-deal in the second stage. I find that deviations in spread 
away from what is typical for similar firm-deals is potentially an indication of information 
asymmetry between lead arrangers, who are responsible for underwriting and setting loan 
spreads, and participants. Whether the spread differential is significantly (50 basis points) higher 
or lower than typical potential participants are less willing to join the syndicate and syndicates 
are therefore more concentrated, a finding consistent with but not fully attributable to that of the 
role of information asymmetry in contract theory. Controlling for spread differentials in 
subsequent regressions I find that factors mitigating information asymmetries between borrowers 
and participants and between lead arrangers and participants decreases syndicate concentration. 
Conversely, syndicate structure is more concentrated when information asymmetry is increasing 
and when the macro environment increases overall uncertainty in the market as during the 
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Firms 5,165 5,271 10,436
Loans 9,287 14,003 23,290
Tranches 15,873 19,639 35,512
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Table 2: Deal level summary statistics 
Summary statistics of loans issued to U.S. firms by lending syndicates, 1998-2012. Tranches are 
aggregated to the deal level. T-stats are for tests of differences in means between private and 






Obs Mean SD 10th 50th 90th 
Syndicate Structure
Lenders 9,287 5.65 6.52 1 4 11
Leads 9,287 1.30 0.65 1 1 2
Participants 9,287 4.35 6.41 0 2 10
Ratio of leads to all lenders 9,287 56.32 36.23 12.5 50 100
League 9,287 0.87 0.33 0 1 1
% Retained, Leads 1,316 60.83 25 28.8 58.34 100
Syndicate concentration (Herfindahl) 1,316 2,280 2,520 312 1,314 5,290
Loan Characteristics
Revolver 9,287 0.56 0.5 0 1 1
Performance pricing 9,287 0.22 0.41 0 0 1
Financial covenant 9,287 0.28 0.45 0 0 1
Covenants, Financial 9,287 0.59 1.05 0 0 2
General covenant 9,287 0.30 0.46 0 0 1
Covenants, General 9,287 0.75 1.37 0 0 4
Previous, Lead 9,287 0.28 0.45 0 0 1
Previous, Participant 9,287 0.05 0.22 0 0 0
Highly leveraged 9,287 0.39 0.49 0 0 1
Tenor, Days 9,287 1,580 625 720 1,800 2,520
Spread on drawn funds 9,287 257.81 144.15 87.5 250 425
Loan Purpose
Corporate Purposes 9,287 0.40 0.49 0 0 1
Debt Repayment 9,287 0.10 0.30 0 0 1
Leveraged Buyout 9,287 0.10 0.31 0 0 1
Takeover/Acquisition 9,287 0.13 0.34 0 0 1
Working Capital 9,287 0.13 0.34 0 0 1








Obs Mean SD 10th 50th 90th t-stat, diff
Syndicate Structure
Lenders 14,003 7.91 8.23 1 6 17 -22.29
Leads 14,003 1.54 0.99 1 1 2 -21.01
Participants 14,003 6.37 8.04 0 4 15 -20.32
Ratio of leads to all lenders 14,003 48.83 37.11 9.09 33.33 100 15.22
League 14,003 0.85 0.35 0 1 1 4.08
% Retained, Leads 4,405 59.83 22.7 30.67 58.49 100 1.37
Syndicate concentration (Herfindahl) 4,405 1,842 2,325 293 980 4,601 5.88
Loan Characteristics
Revolver 14,003 0.73 0.45 0 1 1 -26.76
Performance pricing 14,003 0.52 0.50 0 1 1 -48.19
Financial covenant 14,003 0.64 0.48 0 1 1 -56.88
Covenants, Financial 14,003 1.30 1.17 0 1 3 -47.31
General covenant 14,003 0.57 0.49 0 1 1 -42.59
Covenants, General 14,003 1.15 1.37 0 1 4 -21.51
Previous, Lead 14,003 0.33 0.47 0 0 1 -7.91
Previous, Participant 14,003 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 4.42
Highly leveraged 14,003 0.18 0.39 0 0 1 35.65
Tenor, Days 14,003 1,492 573 720 1,710 2,160 11.06
Spread on drawn funds 14,003 204.96 140.17 52.5 175 375 27.85
Loan Purpose
Corporate Purposes 14,003 0.41 0.49 0 0 1 -1.34
Debt Repayment 14,003 0.11 0.31 0 0 1 -1.62
Leveraged Buyout 14,003 0.02 0.14 0 0 0 28.86
Takeover/Acquisition 14,003 0.13 0.34 0 0 1 0.19
Working Capital 14,003 0.24 0.43 0 0 1 -21.71




Table 3: Firm level summary statistics 
Summary statistics of borrower firms, 1998-2012. Variables are defined as in Appendix A. T-




Obs Mean SD 10th 50th 90th t-stat, diff
Firm Characteristics
Total sales ($M) 9,287 1,312 7,415 41 271 2,437 -15.48
Guarantor 9,287 0.07 0.25 0 0 0 -11.60
Sponsor 9,287 0.30 0.46 0 0 1 46.53
Subsidiary 9,287 0.15 0.35 0 0 1 -3.94
No rating 9,287 0.65 0.48 0 1 1 28.91
Rating (1 = CCC/Caa, 9 = A/A) 9,287 2.51 2.28 1 1 6 -24.64
Firm Characteristics
Total sales ($M) 12,516 3,618 12,856 93 764 7,722
Guarantor 14,003 0.11 0.32 0 0 1
Sponsor 14,003 0.08 0.27 0 0 0
Subsidiary 14,003 0.16 0.37 0 0 1
No rating 14,003 0.46 0.50 0 0 1
Rating (1 = CCC/Caa, 9 = A/A) 14,003 3.31 2.47 1 4 6
Compustat data
Total assets (book value, $M) 10,932 7,530 45,399 142 1,195 13,429
Tangibility 10,128 0.32 0.26 0.04 0.25 0.74
Leverage 10,896 0.31 0.25 0.02 0.29 0.6
Modified Altman's Z 8,861 1.66 12.27 0.45 1.85 3.48
Net income 10,898 0.03 0.43 -0.05 0.04 0.11
Sales 10,898 1.01 0.87 0.16 0.84 2.01





Table 4: Determinants of syndicated loan spreads 
Regression results of firm and loan term characteristics on syndicated loan spreads in basis 
points over LIBOR, 1998-2012. Panel A aggregates loan tranches to the deal level whereas Panel 
B retains all tranche observations. Variables are defined as in Appendix A. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is designated as ***, **, and * 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  






























Loan purpose controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes
Time controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,290 6,802 8,379
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Income to assets ratio
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Loan purpose controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes
Time controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,370 11,054 11,729

















ln Modified Altman's Z
Income to assets ratio
Cash flow to assets ratio
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Table 5: Summary statistics of predicted loan spreads 
Summary statistics deal-level loan spreads, 1998-2012. Spreads are predicted given the 
coefficients from three model specifications dependent upon data availability. Predicted – data 
appropriate is the predicted spread for all firms using the best fit model given firm data 
availability. Spread Differential is the difference between the observed spread at loan origination 
and the predicted spread given firm-loan characteristics. T-stats are for tests of differences in 
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Figure 2: Non-linearity of spread deviations and syndicate structure 
A plot of predicted values of syndicate concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index of 
loan shares retained by lead arrangers from a linear regression of syndicate concentration on 
Spread Differential and (Spread Differential)
2
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Table 6: Loan characteristics and syndicate structure 
Results of regressions relating loan characteristics to syndicate structure. Panel A reports results 
of all loan deals. Panel B includes indicator variables for whether the spread is 50 basis points 
lower or higher than is typical. Variables are defined as in Appendix A. Bootstrapped standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is designated as ***, **, and * at the 







-0.0044*** 0.0002*** -0.0046*** 0.0343*** 0.0013 1.6287***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.46)
6.1469*** 0.6185*** 5.5284*** -8.3697*** -4.9489*** -677.8187***
(0.13) (0.02) (0.13) (0.55) (0.77) (52.19)
-3.6021*** -0.2690*** -3.3332*** 32.5205*** 7.8298*** 2,242.3537***
(0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.60) (0.96) (83.21)
-1.0394*** 0.0351*** -1.0745*** 11.6360*** 6.2884*** 1,188.6182***
(0.14) (0.01) (0.10) (0.51) (1.03) (109.08)
1.4643*** -0.1152*** 1.5796*** -5.6658*** 2.3237*** 343.5998***
(0.10) (0.01) (0.09) (0.45) (0.66) (54.97)
Observations 23,290 23,290 23,290 23,290 5,721 5,721
R-squared 0.277 0.176 0.245 0.255 0.061 0.288
Panel B
-0.5653*** -0.0694*** -0.4959*** 2.7766*** 2.2782*** 218.1758***
(0.11) (0.01) (0.11) (0.54) (0.78) (75.91)
-1.4182*** 0.0049 -1.4231*** 9.7622*** 1.9113** 470.3411***
(0.10) (0.01) (0.11) (0.64) (0.78) (91.60)
Characteristics
6.0744*** 0.6230*** 5.4514*** -8.0963*** -4.9329*** -676.9201***
(0.13) (0.02) (0.14) (0.45) (0.76) (54.08)
-3.5438*** -0.2681*** -3.2757*** 32.1286*** 7.5637*** 2,232.1615***
(0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.53) (0.78) (87.94)
-1.0007*** 0.0395*** -1.0401*** 11.4200*** 5.8877*** 1,135.9159***
(0.13) (0.01) (0.12) (0.51) (0.89) (103.95)
1.4312*** -0.1267*** 1.5579*** -5.6751*** 2.2454*** 343.3120***
(0.10) (0.01) (0.09) (0.40) (0.69) (53.91)
Observations 23,290 23,290 23,290 23,290 5,721 5,721
R-squared 0.277 0.176 0.245 0.255 0.061 0.288
Term loan









Loan size: largest 
tercile








Spread 50 bps lower
Spread 50 bps higher
Spread Differential
Loan size: largest 
tercile
Loan size: smallest 
tercile
Term loan

















Table 7: Financial crisis and syndicate structure 
Results of regressions relating financial crisis and recovery years 2008-2012 to syndicate 
structure. Variables are defined as in Appendix A. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in 









-0.9740*** 0.7309*** -1.7049*** 15.0820*** 3.3150*** 288.6979***
(0.10) (0.02) (0.10) (0.48) (0.77) (73.27)
Characteristics
-0.0043*** 0.0001 -0.0044*** 0.0320*** 0.0004 1.5528***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.46)
6.2294*** 0.5565*** 5.6729*** -9.6473*** -5.3276*** -710.7969***
(0.14) (0.02) (0.14) (0.54) (0.78) (55.44)
-3.6742*** -0.2149*** -3.4593*** 33.6364*** 7.9767*** 2,255.1415***
(0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.59) (0.96) (83.44)
-1.0726*** 0.0601*** -1.1326*** 12.1500*** 6.0908*** 1,171.4130***
(0.14) (0.01) (0.10) (0.50) (1.01) (109.68)
1.3804*** -0.0522*** 1.4326*** -4.3656*** 2.8097*** 385.9283***
(0.10) (0.01) (0.08) (0.46) (0.66) (58.83)
Observations 23,290 23,290 23,290 23,290 5,721 5,721
















Loan size: largest 
tercile
Loan size: smallest 
tercile
Term loan




Table 8: Borrower opacity and syndicate structure 
Results of regressions relating measures of borrower opacity to syndicate structure. Variables are 
defined as in Appendix A. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical 





-0.1372 -0.1482*** 0.0110 -2.2197*** -1.0919 -8.9253
(0.10) (0.01) (0.09) (0.43) (0.79) (77.71)
Previous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,290 23,290 23,290 23,290 5,721 5,721
R-squared 0.273 0.180 0.241 0.255 0.060 0.285
Panel B
-1.4916*** -0.1971*** -1.2944*** 1.2806** 0.4171 146.1441**
(0.09) (0.01) (0.06) (0.52) (0.88) (65.87)
Previous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,290 23,290 23,290 23,290 5,721 5,721































Table 9: Borrower opacity and syndicate structure, Compustat metrics 
Panel A reports summary statistics of borrower opacity as proxied by borrower use of accruals 
and the ratio of research and development expense to total assets. Panels B and C report 
regression results relating accruals and R&D to syndicate structure. Variables are defined as in 
Appendix A. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is 








-3.5046** -0.4401*** -3.0644** 10.9534* 0.6741 -287.3548
(1.74) (0.14) (1.39) (5.98) (6.03) (567.43)
Previous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,552 10,552 10,552 10,552 3,526 3,526
R-squared 0.263 0.179 0.228 0.280 0.063 0.306
Panel C
-7.5060*** -0.0060 -7.5000*** 57.9843*** 23.2558* 2,347.3711**
(1.38) (0.16) (1.13) (7.29) (13.48) (957.79)
Previous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,552 10,552 10,552 10,552 3,526 3,526

































Obs Mean SD 10th 50th
0.04
10,932 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.12
158 
 
Table 10: Reputation, banking relationships and syndicate structure 
Results of regressions relating arranger reputation and previous banking relationships to 
syndicate structure. Variables are defined as in Appendix A. Bootstrapped standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is designated as ***, **, and * at the 1%, 5%, 






1.0899*** 0.0875*** 1.0023*** -5.7141*** -0.1553 -375.9229***
(0.10) (0.01) (0.10) (0.58) (0.94) (98.49)
Previous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,290 23,290 23,290 23,290 5,721 5,721
R-squared 0.276 0.176 0.243 0.257 0.059 0.288
Panel B
0.6732*** -0.1114*** 0.7847*** -7.3501*** -4.3773*** -324.5607***
(0.11) (0.01) (0.11) (0.48) (0.59) (61.70)
Previous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,290 23,290 23,290 23,290 5,721 5,721
R-squared 0.275 0.178 0.244 0.263 0.067 0.289
Panel C
0.5895*** -0.1266*** 0.7161*** -14.3151*** -5.8450** -532.8212**
(0.18) (0.02) (0.19) (0.72) (2.27) (209.29)
Previous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,290 23,290 23,290 23,290 5,721 5,721
R-squared 0.274 0.175 0.242 0.261 0.060 0.286
Panel D
0.5967*** -0.1260*** 0.7228*** -13.8530*** 0.5932 4.1085
(0.10) (0.01) (0.10) (0.47) (1.38) (142.03)
Previous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,290 23,290 23,290 23,290 5,721 5,721
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Table 11: Third party relationships 
Results of regressions relating borrower third party relationships to syndicate structure. 
Independent variables include whether the borrower is a subsidiary of another firm or whether 
the loan has a guarantor or sponsor. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. 









0.6564*** 0.1559*** 0.5005*** 0.0148 0.1968 -5.3413
(0.18) (0.02) (0.16) (0.61) (0.71) (65.85)
Previous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,290 23,290 23,290 23,290 5,721 5,721
R-squared 0.274 0.179 0.242 0.254 0.059 0.285
Panel B
0.2202 0.1220*** 0.0982 0.3941 2.6422*** 150.8410
(0.19) (0.02) (0.17) (0.70) (0.97) (95.24)
Previous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,290 23,290 23,290 23,290 5,721 5,721
R-squared 0.273 0.176 0.241 0.254 0.061 0.286
Panel C
-0.0939 0.0970*** -0.1910 3.3518*** 4.0094*** 183.6787
(0.16) (0.01) (0.14) (0.72) (1.45) (134.29)
Previous controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,290 23,290 23,290 23,290 5,721 5,721














































Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Loan characteristics 
Revolver is an indicator variable equal to one if the loan is a revolving loan with a tenor greater 
than one year.  
Term loan is an indicator variable equal to one if the loan is a term loan. 
Performance pricing is an indicator variable equal to one if the spread charged varies with the 
performance of the borrower. 
Financial covenant is an indicator variable equal to one if the loan terms include at least one 
financial covenant. 
General covenant is an indicator variable equal to one if the loan terms include at least one 
general covenant restriction. 
Tight covenants is an indicator variable equal to one if the borrower has chosen a debt to cash 
flow financial covenant level that is closer to a violation state at loan origination than the median 
firm-loan debt to cash flow covenant level in the same two digit SIC code.  
Highly leveraged is an indicator variable equal to one if the loan is considered a highly leveraged 
loan by the lenders; the loan is in the highly leveraged segment.  
Ln Tenor, days is natural log of the tenor of the loan in days from origination. 
Spread is the all-in spread on drawn funds in basis points over LIBOR. 
Predicted, all firm-deals is the predicted ln Spread from base spread regression model (1). 
Predicted, tight is the predicted ln Spread from spread regression model (2) for loans with 
covenant information. 
Predicted, public is the predicted ln Spread from spread regression model (3) for firms with 
Compustat financial data available. 
Predicted, data appropriate is the aggregated predicted spread from models (1)-(3) such that 
predicted spread is the spread predicted from the model with the most data availability. 
Spread differential, data appropriate is ln Spread minus Predicted, data appropriate and thus is 
the surprise, positive or negative, of the spread at origination.  
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Spread 50 bps higher (lower) is an indicator variable equal to one if the spread at origination is 
50 basis points higher (lower) than the predicted spread for similar firm deals, prediction at the 
means.  
Ln Deal size is the natural log of the size of the deal, inclusive of all tranches, in USD millions.  
Loan size, largest tercile is an indicator variable equal to one if ln Deal size is in the largest 33% 
of all deals.  
Loan size, smallest tercile is an indicator variable equal to one if ln Deal size is in the smallest 
33% of all deals.  
Syndicate structure 
Number of lenders is the size of the syndicate as represented by all lead arrangers and participant 
lenders.  
Number of leads is the total number of lead arrangers for a loan. 
Number of participants is the total number of non-lead arrangers who participate in the loan as 
lenders. 
Leads to lenders ratio is the ratio of lead arrangers to all lenders to a loan deal. 
% of the loan retained by the leads is the percentage of the total loan offering that is held on the 
books of the lead arrangers at the time of origination. 
Syndicate concentration is the Herfindahl index of the proportion of the loan retained by the lead 
arrangers at loan origination, max 10,000.  
Borrower characteristics 
Private borrower is an indicator variable equal to one if the borrowing firm is a private entity. 
Unrated borrower is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm does not have an S&P or 
Moody’s credit rating at the time of loan origination. 
Ln Sales is the natural log of firm sales in USD millions. 
Ln Assets is the natural log of total firm assets in USD millions. 
Leverage is the ratio of total firm debt to total assets. 
Tangibility is the ratio of firm net property plant and equipment to total assets. 
162 
 




Income to assets ratio is the ratio of net income to total assets. 
Cash flow to assets ratio is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets.  
Accruals is the ratio of firm accruals to total assets. 
R&D is the ratio of net in-progress research and development expense to total firm assets.  
Reputation and relationship characteristics 
Previous lead is an indicator variable equal to one if any lead arranger served as a lead arranger 
for a previous loan to the borrower from 1995 forward. 
Previous participant is an indicator variable equal to one if any non-lead arranger was a 
participant lender for a previous loan to the borrower from 1995 forward. 
Previous syndication structure is an indicator variable equal to one if lead arrangers and 
participants issued a loan to any borrower from 1995 forward.  
League table is an indicator variable equal to one if the lead arranger(s) are banks that are 
represented on the  league tables for syndicated loans during the period of study. 
Subsidiary is an indicator variable equal to one if the borrower is a subsidiary of another entity. 
Guarantor is an indicator variable equal to one if loan performance is guaranteed by a third 
party, for example, a parent firm. 
Sponsored is an indicator variable equal to one if the borrower is sponsored by a third party, for 
example, a private equity firm. 
Other control variables 
Loan purpose controls are indicator variables for stated loan purpose. These include refinancing, 
corporate purposes, working capital, acquisition line, leveraged buy-out, and other.  
Industry controls are indicator variables for two digit SIC codes.  
Time controls are indicator variables for the year of loan origination.  
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 Modified Altman’s Z score does not include leverage as I directly control for firm leverage. 
The formula is 3.3*(cash flow to assets ratio) + 1*(sales to assets ratio) + 1.4*(retained earnings 




Recession is an indicator variable for years 2001-2002. 
Crisis is an indicator variable for years 2007-2009. 





In the first essay I show that borrower governance matters to creditors in syndicated loan 
originations. Firm governance that mitigates agency risk between managers and stakeholders 
decreases the cost of borrowing, especially when borrowers display greater credit risk. However, 
creditors view acquisitions of borrowers as value destroying and therefore charge higher spreads 
to firms at greater risk of acquisition. Acquisition is especially costly to lenders when borrowers 
are financially stronger. Lenders therefore value staunch takeover defenses in borrowers that 
pose little credit risk.  
The second essay illustrates how network dynamics may enable implicit contracting and 
partially substitute for reputational capital when lenders and borrowers have no direct experience 
or connections with each other. Specifically I show that chief financial officers possessing 
greater network centrality negotiate more generous loan terms with creditors, namely more 
flexible contracts at a lower cost of borrowing. As firms negotiating better terms do not 
underperform peer firms ex post I argue that lenders benefit from CFO network position as 
centrality improves screening ex ante and monitoring ex post.   
The third essay describes the syndication process in two stages, those of underwriting and 
syndication. I document that when offering spreads deviate from a typical firm-loan deal the 
syndicate is more concentrated in a manner consistent with information asymmetry between 
underwriters and participant lenders. Syndicate concentration is increasing in borrower opacity 
and decreasing in reputational capital.  
